ODsec retweeted
Starting on November 4th, Entra ID users will be able to create agent identity blueprints unless this capability is disabled. I strongly recommend you disable this capability so you don't have users creating agent identity blueprints.
There's a setting to turn this off in Entra ID under User Settings: "Users can register agent blueprints".
Switch it to "No" to prevent users from being able to do this.
Agent identity blueprints are templates that define identity configuration and credentials for AI agents. This is similar in capability to app registrations but for agent identities.
Allowing all users to create blueprints has similar risk to allowing all users to register applications (default is enabled as well). When a user creates an agent identity blueprint, they become the owner of it until removed. This provides full control access to the blueprint.
Agent ID Developer and Agent ID Administrator will still have the ability to create them.
More details here (including searching for existing blueprints):
lazyadmin.nl/office-365/micr…
ODsec retweeted
Microsoft Threat Intelligence is tracking an active supply chain attack in which a threat actor compromised the trusted OAuth App of the backup application ConnectWise Cloud Backup (AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae), formerly SkyKick Backup, to obtain access tokens across customer tenants.
ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a multitenant vendor application; customers grant consent for the application to operate in their tenants. We assess that the threat actor likely abused permissions previously granted by customers to the application, including highly elevated permissions like Directory.ReadWrite.All.
On October 15, 2026, we observed broad successful service principal authentication originating from the IP address 144.172.64[.]128. Follow-on activity included Microsoft Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add additional credentials on the related service principal in target tenants to maintain direct access as a backdoor.
Microsoft Defender detects post-exploitation activity with the following alerts:
- Any alert related to "Suspicious sign-in"
- Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP address
- Verified Threat Actor IP
Defenders should review service principal sign-ins from unrecognized IP addresses, app credential changes, and OAuth grant activity associated with this specific OAuth AppId. In addition, we recommend looking for Threat Intelligence alerts on matching of IP against the Graph API activity and service principal activities.
We will continue to monitor this incident and will share updates as they become available. We encourage customers to check ConnectWise advisory for more information and additional guidance: msft.it/6013aQBvV.
Indicators of compromise (IOCs):
- App name: ConnectWise Cloud Backup
- AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae
- Publisher name: SkyKick
- Source IP: 144.172.64[.]128
- User agents: Python-urllib/3.12, python-requests/2.31, python-requests/2.34.2
ODsec retweeted
I’m in total disbelief my Commanders had such poor clock management in today’s overtime game against the Giants. All we had to do was kick the field goal and we would have won the game!🤦🏾♂️
ODsec retweeted
For the long weekend, I am offering a 50% discount on my lifetime access to red teaming; it is a two-day training, and you will get access to the slides, recordings, and all future updates.
truecyber.world/portal/url.m…
Synopsis for the training:
truecyber.world/training/red…
#redteam
Seems like a good opportunity to get more info on the revamped CVP
Replying to @GuruDetective
Have more questions? We are hosting a webinar to answer Q&A here! claude.com/resources/webinar…
Excellent!
We’re expanding our Cyber Verification Program to give security professionals broader access to our most capable models.
Through this program, verified security professionals can access Claude Mythos 5.1, Opus 5.5, and Sonnet 5.5 with safeguards designed for defensive work.
We’re also opening up new tiers to allow for authorized offensive work, like penetration testing and red-teaming.
anthropic.com/news/cyber-ver…
This is really important for small orgs that aren’t collecting these logs already. Great to see!
ODsec retweeted
This is also why you need centralized logging. The Entra audit logs, service principal signin logs, etc are only available in the console for a 30 day look back. If you are collecting logs in a central repository, you should be able to trace everything that occurred in Entra and M365. Where it gets fuzzy is if the threat actor had access to on-prem. This logs sources are much easier to tamper with.
This is a really good question.
What do you do after Entra ID is compromised?
The good news is this scenario happened to none other than Microsoft themselves and to their corporate tenant.
Even better is they've been providing quarterly updates through their SFI program on what they've been doing across all of their services.
In my last two years at Microsoft, I was part of the team that took all the internal learnings and made them available to all our cuatomers.
We published the guidance at aka.ms/entra/security
There's a lot in there and you don't need to wait till you get compromised to roll them out.
Note: This is after you address the basics of recovering the tenant.



























