Policy Wire

Battle Damage Assessment of Pakistan’s September 21 Strikes in Afghanistan There has been significant misinformation about Pakistan’s September 21 airstrikes in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan. The current battle damage assessment (BDA) confirms 19 terrorists killed and 11 wounded across three locations in Paktika and Kunar Provinces. The strikes hit a suicide-bomber training camp, a madrassa converted into a combat training site, and a joint facility used by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State. The dead include 13 members of TTP and affiliated branches, as well as six members of the Islamic State network. The most senior terrorist currently identified among the dead is Hanzala Wazir, a senior member of TTP’s Military Commission for South Waziristan. The Military Commission is the organization’s operational command structure, responsible for directing terrorist operations, assigning commanders and fighters, coordinating training, and helping determine where and how attacks will be carried out. Here is what was struck, who was killed, and what the Taliban is trying to conceal. The September 21 Strikes At approximately 2:55 to 3:00 a.m. local time on September 21, Pakistani fighter aircraft struck three locations in Paktika and Kunar Provinces. The first target was a suicide-bomber training camp in the Torkandi area of Barmal District, Paktika Province. The second was Farouqia Madrassa in the Rukha area of Paktika. The site was previously used as a religious school but had been converted into a combat training camp for foreign terrorists. The third target was in Patan village in Nurgal District, Kunar Province. This location was being used jointly by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and TTP personnel. Terrorists at the site were being trained to wear suicide vests, handle explosives, and conduct suicide attacks. There was initially some uncertainty over whether the sites belonged primarily to TTP or ISKP. The training infrastructure in these areas is principally associated with TTP and Lashkar-e-Islam. ISKP personnel, however, were also receiving suicide-attack training at the camps. The presence of both organizations at the same location reflects how terrorist collaboration has evolved in Afghanistan. This is now the norm, not the exception. Groups increasingly rely on dual-hatted personnel and share trainers, facilitators, suicide bombers, and the infrastructure used to prepare them for attacks. On The Networks Operating in the Area Lashkar-e-Islam merged with TTP in late 2021 following the death of its leader, Mangal Bagh. On April 11, 2025, Lashkar-e-Islam became the second-largest component of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, an alliance bringing together three major Pakistani jihadist networks: (1) The Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (2) Lashkar-e-Islam (3) Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan The relationship between the Orakzai networks of TTP and the Islamic State predates the September 21 strikes. Personal, tribal, and operational relationships have continued despite changes in organizational affiliation. These connections allow fighters, trainers, facilitators, and suicide-bomber infrastructure to move between networks or operate alongside one another. Many of the Islamic State fighters and suicide bombers associated with the Orakzai branch come from Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP). The branch’s senior leadership and operational direction, however, remain tied to ISKP. Describing the sites as exclusively TTP or exclusively ISKP misses what was happening there. The camps supported overlapping networks preparing fighters and suicide bombers for future attacks. Terrorists Killed The BDA confirms that 13 members of TTP and its affiliated networks were killed: 1. Hanzala Wazir, TTP Military Commission for South Waziristan 2. Kaka Waziristani 3. Siddiq Umar Muhajir 4. Farooq Madakhel 5. Muawiya 6. Huzaifa Mehsud 7. Abu Zarar 8. Maroot Abu Bakr 9. Ghazi Umar Waziristani 10. Qari Yaser 11. Hafiz Shoaib 12. Muawiya Bajauri 13. Mufti Fayyaz Six members of the Islamic State network were also killed: 1. Azzam al-Khorasani 2. Abu Nasr Orakzai 3. Abu Ahmad Bajauri 4. Salahuddin Logari 5. Hanzala al-Kunduzai 6. Mufti Nadeem al-Badakhshani Note: The names listed above are aliases used by terrorist organizations to conceal the legal identities, nationalities, movements, and family connections of their members. In addition to the 19 terrorists killed, 11 foreign terrorists were wounded in the strikes. The dead and wounded were transported to the former Forward Operating Base Bostick, originally known as FOB Naray, in Naray District, Kunar Province. The site now houses a facility known as the National Security Hospital, which is affiliated with the eastern zone of the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) and operated by the Haqqani network. The former base also houses a Taliban Ministry of Defense battalion and an al-Qaeda madrassa. The Civilian Casualties A civilian home near the targeted location in Kunar was also struck. Sadly, Noor Ahmad, his wife, and their young daughter were killed. Noor Ahmad’s son and three other family members were wounded. Their deaths should not be minimized, but they should not be separated from the reason terrorists were operating in and around a civilian home. The Taliban allows foreign terrorists to use civilian homes as safehouses, transit points, meeting hubs, and temporary staging locations. Some households may cooperate willingly. Others are pressured or forced by Taliban officials and armed commanders and have no meaningful ability to refuse. This is not simply a matter of terrorists hiding among civilians without the Taliban’s knowledge. Before a strike, civilians provide physical cover, allowing terrorists to move, meet, rest, and prepare for operations without using easily identified compounds. After a strike, civilian casualties provide political cover. The Taliban conceals the terrorists who were present, portrays the location as entirely civilian, and places the dead family at the center of the story. Taliban officials then take the civilian casualties to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), international media, and GDI propaganda channels. The deaths in this case were used to accuse Pakistan of indiscriminately attacking Afghan civilians, while the terrorists operating there, the purpose of the targeted sites, and the Taliban’s role in placing them among civilians gets ignored. The civilians are used twice: first as physical cover and then as political cover. That does not make Noor Ahmad or his family responsible for what happened. It means the Taliban deliberately put them in danger. The Taliban knows civilian casualties will generate international pressure against Pakistan and make other countries more reluctant to conduct similar operations in the future. Once the image of a dead family becomes the headline, the Taliban’s version becomes the international media narrative. That is not an unintended consequence. It is the result of a covert influence operation conducted by a terrorist group. We have to do better when reporting BDAs involving terrorist targets. Civilian casualties must be acknowledged, but they cannot be allowed to erase the terrorists, the targets, or the deception that placed civilians in danger.