Red Team Journal retweeted
I think there is way too much concern expressed about verification of AI output in everyday work due to a risk of factual errors.
It used to be true, but data on more recent models suggest they beat human experts, including PhD specialists, in finding facts and checking claims.
Red Team Journal retweeted
So much “wait until the agent swarms are stealthy” talk. They’re effective today because they do a massive amount of noisy testing and iterate on the results. Making them stealthier means sacrificing coverage.
That tradeoff has always existed. This is the same pentest vs. red team conversation we’ve been having for years. You get coverage or stealth you don't get both.
Red Team Journal retweeted
Almost half of all breaches now involve a third party vendor/partner
Some of the biggest openings in security have nothing to do with patching
How breaches began, per a 2026 report:
- 31% exploited a vulnerability
- 35% used phishing, stolen logins or impersonation scams
And nearly half now involve a vendor or partner, up 3x since 2024
Full piece from a16z's Asaf Ezra and Steph Zhang on six cybersecurity companies worth building: a16z.news/p/defense-in-depth…
Red Team Journal retweeted
This is the most correct take I have heard on the future of cyber.
It blows me away how this is so lost on security teams today. We have a long way to go until this concept is grokked.
None of your quarterly planning, DAST scans, and SOC can stop a swarm. None of it.
Calif CEO @XorNinja says cybersecurity has no playbook for stopping 1,000 AI agents attacking a network simultaneously, even if defenders can detect them:
"Attackers always adapt faster and earlier than defenders. Even the AI companies themselves don't have great security."
"Imagine you enter a cage fight, but you are blindfolded and the other guy stay in the dark, and every once in a while they would come out and punch you and then disappear."
"How could you win that fight?"
"I was at Google and that's basically the mantra at Google. In security you have three things: prevention, detection, and response. And Google accept that prevention gonna fail at scale."
"You can detect them, but does it help you if you find that there's maybe a thousand agents hacking you right now inside your network? How can you contain them without a full shutdown of your system?"
"This actually requires defense to come up with a new paradigm. I haven't seen anybody come up with a good idea here. We're not there yet."
@calif_io
Red Team Journal retweeted
First ever post from Sam McCandlish. Anthropic co-founder and Chief Architect, leads pretraining and RL. He says Anthropic is preparing to share a report on their internal acceleration. Bet on this being the announcement they have hit the 2x Responsible Scaling Policy threshold.
I'm Sam, one of Anthropic's co-founders, and I lead much of our safety work. I'm going to have more to share on that work over the coming months.
I thought I'd start by sharing a few thoughts on the latest report from @METR_Evals.
The speed of progress in model capabilities is one of the most important questions in AI safety, and METR’s work here provides the public with an independent, external view into how this is happening inside Anthropic. I’ll talk more about some of the details below, but first some context for those new to this work.
How quickly AI progress is accelerating has many important safety implications, since it determines how quickly the risks from advanced models increase. But, because most research happens within the frontier labs, it’s difficult for external observers and policy makers to get a strong sense of what that rate is. We kicked off the process with METR that led to this report earlier in the year, in anticipation of progress continuing to accelerate.
For this report, we gave METR access to a range of sensitive internal data, including benchmark scores for unreleased models, estimates of how models are progressing, and interviews with our researchers. They had complete independence to form their own conclusions.
Many of their conclusions match my own. AI is speeding up our research, but it’s hard to say exactly how much. While they conclude AI can't yet make the most important contributions to model training on its own, they think the pace of development could, by default, accelerate further.
This work began well before and is separate from the embedded third-party evaluators that are part of our commitment to pacing the frontier, but it’s a good illustration of why we think evaluators are a good idea. The more access reviewers have, the clearer a picture they can form of the situation and the better-positioned they are to highlight situations like this one.
We redacted a lot, and I accept that this makes it harder for others to check METR’s work. But we determined that sharing exactly what is driving the speedup isn’t the right thing to do, both because it’s commercially sensitive and because it risks handing out a roadmap for others to go faster. That would make the risks METR is worried about worse. That’s a tradeoff. I think we made the right call, though we’re continuing to assess the pros and cons here.
In the coming weeks, we plan to share a report with our own analysis of the speed of AI progress within Anthropic, including where we stand against our Responsible Scaling Policy, plus new steps we’re taking to strengthen our safety and security practices as AI keeps improving quickly.
Red Team Journal retweeted
I am a broken record about this, but: frontier agents are not going to be a purely digital phenomenon for much longer. They will be able to use anything in the physical world that can be actuated programmatically—first competently, then at human-expert level, then superhuman. By and large, we probably won’t need specialist models; the frontier models will just do it. If your model of the future hinges on physical AI happening “for real” many years into the future, I think you will be in for a surprise.
i went to bed and asked claude to paint an autumn tree overnight.
at around 4am, it realised that it didn't have some shades -- so it stopped and titrated its own paint: diluting red, sienna and madder step by step on a second palette, then measuring each pocket from a photo.
woke up to this beautiful watercolor painting. 303 brush marks, took about 4.5 hours 🍂 (still working on the speed)
Red Team Journal retweeted
A lot of cybersecurity problems are really organizational dysfunction problems hidden behind a layer of tech. No amount of AI tokens can fix that.
Feel free to send this post to your boss.
Red Team Journal retweeted
Fun fact:
You don't need a threat hunting program if adversaries can achieve their goals in a few hours. Maybe hire some storytellers, @anton_chuvakin? I bet it would be fun 😅
medium.com/anton-on-security…
Red Team Journal retweeted
Cybersecurity people, what models are we using for cyber tasks these days?
GPT, Claude, Gemini, DeepSeek or local models?
Curious which ones using and are actually worth it m for technical security work?
Red Team Journal retweeted
I've been working on a way to generate better attack path diagrams. Turns out I had no idea what a good one looked like... I just kinda could feel it.
For example I just gave it a prompt to make a diagram off the nodes/proxy RCE.
Absolutely useless diagrams:
Red Team Journal retweeted
I did a whole lot of IR last month. Much of it was helping companies affected by compromises at their neocloud providers.
I wrote up the lessons and practical steps teams can take to reduce their exposure and make incident response less painful.
scrty.io/black-october
The GA Engine brings investigation, challenge, and possibility exploration together, and we’re learning how to make the most of its potential without turning over too much of the thinking to AI.
gravel-anagram.com/the-ga-en…
Red Team Journal retweeted
Hackers backdoor Linux servers using trojanized CWP web server
bleepingcomputer.com/news/se…
bleepingcomputer.com/news/se…
Red Team Journal retweeted
‼️ OpenAI's AI agents generated 948 working #Linux exploits that can escalate local user access to root.
In a 30-hour run, its pipeline reproduced 1,724 vulnerabilities and developed 291 information-leak PoCs.
Total API cost ➜ $1.2 million.
Read ↓ thehackernews.com/2026/11/op…
Red Team Journal retweeted
The bug is like a joke.
On Alpine Linux, type 257 to 1024 characters of anything and you get root. 💀
‼️ BREAKING: OpenSSH has rushed out a fix for a critical flaw that lets attackers log into some Linux servers without the right password.
The team learned of the bug a day earlier. OpenSSH's Damien Miller says long embargoes now mostly help attackers, because AI agents rediscover bugs, sometimes within hours.
It hits Linux systems on the musl C library with PAM off, such as Alpine Linux. Miller told admins to disable password logins or SSH itself "IMMEDIATELY".
Version 10.6p2 works around it. Systems on glibc or PAM are not affected, and Miller says the root cause sits outside OpenSSH.
Red Team Journal retweeted
I think we've crossed an important threshold
ARTEX, Cairn and similar frameworks can now automate substantial parts of real intrusions. And as models become cheaper and more capable, the number of attacks is no longer constrained in the same way by human skills, time and attention
I wrote about what changed, why this is different from traditional automation, and what I expect to happen next
medium.com/@cyb3rops/the-tip…
Red Team Journal retweeted
Honestly, if you read just one thing today, please read the annual report from @NCSC
In a sea on hype, this is an honest, sensible view of the world! A great job from the team!
#UK #Cyber #NCSC #DefendAsOne #Security #AI
ncsc.gov.uk/collection/annua…
Red Team Journal retweeted
Here’s the thing about agentic attacks - the current incarnation won’t score on you with some l33t zero day…but they will check every possible “door handle” to see which one you forgot to lock
How many red team assessments has your organization gotten where they searched some internal knowledge repository/file share…etc and found reams of creds/secrets/tokens…and your organizational response was a collective shrug 🤷♂️ and nothing got fixed/improved to prevent it from happening again?
Agentic attack often target the security tech debt of every organization that has always been there - but just hasn’t been abused by an external attacker yet

































