Pinned Tweet
The Situation in Yemen
November 19
The Ansar Allah movement continues its offensive on all fronts, drawing closer to the main prize of the entire military campaign: Aden.
➡️ In Marib province, pro-Saudi forces attempted a counterattack in the Ragwan area, but, judging by the footage, without success. The Saudi-led coalition’s forces are spread across multiple directions, and the resources available are insufficient to dislodge the Houthis from their positions
➡️ In Taiz, the Houthis appear to be faring better, according to reports. From the northwest, they managed to break through part of the defensive line, and the offensive on the encircled city continues.
At the same time, the movement is conducting an information campaign against the garrison, actively disseminating reports of deserters who have voluntarily surrendered
➡️ The most interesting developments are in Lahij province. According to the latest reports, the Houthis have cut off the road to Al-Juhar (Am Juhar) and are attempting to encircle the remaining areas of the Kharaz mountain (which we have marked as controlled on the map).
If these positions fall, the northern screen protecting Aden will effectively disappear: the commanding heights would provide observation and fire adjustment along the coastal highway, and the logical next step would be to pressure the approaches to the city using logistics along the coast
➡️ Saudi aviation carried out more than 20 strikes over the past day, with reports of civilian casualties. In response, Ansar Allah claimed attacks on targets in Jazan and Khamis Mushayt, while the day’s main information event was the damage to the building of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund
❗️The Houthis are methodically tightening the pincers around key strongholds of the pro-Saudi forces, while Aden responds with chaotic counterattacks and airstrikes that do not change the front line. At this pace, the question of defending Aden could quite plausibly move from theoretical to practical
The defenders’ problems are systemic. The coalition is holding an extended perimeter without unified command, lacks sufficient reserves for every direction, and air support only compensates for isolated breakthroughs. In addition, the Houthis operate along internal operational lines and redeploy forces between fronts faster than their opponent
Situation in Yemen
November 20
The consequences of the Houthi offensive near Bab al-Mandeb continue to emerge: Ansar Allah’s resources have published footage of damaged and captured equipment belonging to the “Southern Giants” brigades and other forces of the Aden government (around 40 vehicles, mostly armored MRAPs)
All of this is the outcome for several hundred fighters who held positions in the mountains for forty days while cut off from the main forces. While Aden was deciding whom to evacuate and how to save the encircled troops, these people were abandoned. The result was a montage of burned-out vehicles in a propaganda video
The “Southern Giants” were considered one of the most combat-capable units on the western coast supported by Saudi Arabia. They were once funded by the UAE before coming under Riyadh’s wing. However, even the most motivated units cannot withstand a highly organized force operating on a much larger scale
The picture once again confirms the collapse of command among the pro-Saudi forces: communications have broken down, commanders have abandoned positions without authorization, and the authorities’ promises to “break the siege” have remained just words. In forty days, assistance could have been organized several times. Instead, it has produced perfect material for information warfare
The stabilization of the front in this part of the country has freed up Houthi forces to exert pressure in other areas - for example, on the encircled city of Taiz. With each such success, the likelihood of a further collapse in the defenses of the Presidential Leadership Council’s supporters and a rapid advance on Aden grows ever higher
3
409
The Saudi coalition struck the port of Al-Hudaydah (smoke rose over the coastline) while Riyadh reported the destruction of six workshops producing components for missile and drone launch platforms
Riyadh also claimed to have destroyed one of Ansar Allah’s main supply depots in the capital, Sanaa. In other words, the Saudis carried out exactly the plan they had announced, and their reports described only military targets
Media outlets supporting Ansar Allah have confirmed that strikes occurred, but the footage published online remains questionable. There is also relatively little of it for such locations: civilians in the Middle East are very fond of filming bombings in their hometowns
The Saudi campaign is entering a new phase. The only problem is that ports and thermal power plants in Houthi-controlled Yemen are being restored faster than the Saudis’ reputation as a “safe destination”. Investors and airlines will not wait for the final results of the bombing campaign
1
7
2,204
According to @araReuters and on-the-ground reporting by @nytimes, a Houthi missile damaged the Public Investment Fund (PIF) Tower in Riyadh’s financial district. Windows were shattered on several floors, and the facade was damaged
This is the second strike on a symbolic landmark in the Saudi capital in less than two weeks. Meanwhile, numerous unreliable videos supposedly filmed at the scene are circulating online. Fake and exaggerated footage benefits Houthi supporters, as it creates the image of an undefended capital, while Saudi authorities must simultaneously deal with the aftermath and debunk fabrications, expending both media and moral resources
Against the backdrop of the offensive in southern Yemen, the Houthis continue to demonstrate their ability to reach Riyadh. Although the strike had no military significance, its target was highly important: the PIF is the calling card of the Saudi economy and the Vision 2030 program. The impact affects the country’s image and reminds investors that the Kingdom’s “safe haven” is within missile range
In the short term, further attempts to strike symbolic targets can be expected, along with intensified Saudi airstrikes against Houthi-held territory in response. In the medium term, this routine will systematically undermine the Kingdom’s investment appeal and push the authorities in Riyadh to seek an exit from the Yemeni campaign on acceptable terms
Donald Trump had to seek support in Asia. On the sidelines of the summit in China, the US president told Xi Jinping that both the United States and China have an interest in the free flow of energy resources through the Strait of Hormuz and in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
China is the main buyer of Persian Gulf oil, so burning tankers hit the Chinese economy no less hard than the American one. The only problem is that it is not in Beijing’s interest to pressure Iran alongside the White House: discounted Iranian oil is one of the pillars of China’s energy balance, and the Iranian authorities remain longstanding strategic partners
Honestly, and the very idea of assigning China someone else’s problem looks like a good way out for Trump. The blockade of the strait has failed to produce results, sanctions have been exhausted, and a military campaign is expensive and unpopular. Shifting the pressure onto a third party is a chance to break out of the deadlock without losing face: it was not us who backed down, but our partners who resolved the issue
❗️So the Chinese will most likely express agreement to “feel concern,” but are unlikely to exert real pressure on Iran. The White House will once again have to solve the Hormuz problem on its own - and the range of available solutions remains exactly the same
1
402
NYTimes propaganda
American journalists have once again unearthed a secret Iranian scheme. @nytimes (@NYTimesPR) published an investigation under the headline “Why Has Iran Built So Many Dams?” and then answered its own question: Tehran, it says, needs reservoirs to provide cover for missile bases across the country
In short, Hamburg-based ecologist Nima Shokri overlaid a map of Iran’s 533 dams on a map of strikes against missile facilities and saw an “arc-like” pattern of overlap from north to south. From this, journalists concluded that underground “missile cities” need autonomous supplies of water and electricity - and that dams are the backup infrastructure
❗But Iran is primarily an arid country, and last year the Islamic Republic experienced a serious water crisis. Building dams in such geography does not require a conspiracy-theory explanation
Moreover, as Israeli analysts themselves rightly point out, there are essentially no examples of missile bases located immediately next to dams. And even if there were, mountainous areas are convenient both for spillways and for underground facilities
❓Why, then, publish such a piece in an American outlet?
If dams are “part of the missile infrastructure,” then hydropower facilities become “legitimate targets” Sleight of hand - and no fraud at all. Since strikes on civilian infrastructure require justification, the investigation comes in very handy
All of this prepares readers to accept the idea that bombing dams is also part of “countering Iran’s missile program”
nytimes.com/2026/11/16/world…
3
387
And now the southwestern outskirts of Yemen have definitely been “taken”: Ansarallah’s official spokesman, Yahya Saree, confirmed the completion of control over the recently encircled territories on the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
During the operation, the Houthis occupied vast territories in the provinces of Taiz and Lahij. Moreover, judging by the map they presented, the scope of this operation also included areas directly under Taiz, i.e., the plan was long-term
The claimed figures about the destruction of 60 enemy brigades and hundreds of pieces of equipment can certainly be divided in half (if not more), but they play a nominal role. Far more important are the territorial gains, about which the Houthis exaggerate less often in official statements
And these gains are such that the remnants of the leadership sitting in Aden should start thinking. A direct assault on the city is still unlikely (it is surrounded by a plain inconvenient for attackers), but Ansarallah can continue its path along the ridges, successively occupying the heights to the north and west of the city
Then the southern capital may find itself in the center of yet another pocket. Aden will retain its supply routes by sea, but against the overall backdrop, they will clearly not be enough. And if the Houthis’ adversary does not turn the tide of the war, there is a risk that Yemen will in the future have to be divided into Western and Eastern
What Jabal Kharaz Gives
1⃣First and foremost, it provides observation. From the summit, there is a direct line of sight onto the Mokha–Aden coastal highway and the approaches to the coast, which makes it possible to deploy spotters and direct mortars, anti-tank guided missile systems, and FPV drones at columns. A couple of crews are enough to cut the road, while restoring traffic under fire costs the anti-Houthi coalition disproportionately more
2⃣Second is concealment. The mountainous terrain shelters mobile launchers and crews from direct observation and reduces the radio horizon for aviation approaching from the sea. Launches from reverse slopes force the adversary into constant UAV patrolling, which stretches its reconnaissance resources
3⃣A separate value lies in the camp itself as a command node. Ready-made infrastructure, warehouses, and air-defense positions give the Houthis a forward supply base, shortening the supply line to the western front. At the same time, holding the height requires regular resupply for the Houthis themselves, and fixed positions over time become targets for aviation
The bottom line is this: Kharaz does not close the strait by itself - it is about 80 kilometers from the water. But as an observation, cover, and logistics node, it significantly reduces the cost to the Houthis of controlling the coast and complicates any ground operation by their adversary in Lahij
Yemen War
November 14–15
The Ansarallah movement has carried out a major offensive in Lahj province, pushing the Saudi-backed forces back toward the shore of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Apparently, the Houthis managed to take control of the strategic heights south of Ash Shatt and cut off the logistics routes. The supply of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) units in this area from Aden has been disrupted
According to media reports, a few days earlier, the pro-Saudi forces of the Aden government had partially withdrawn from Lahj, fearing the closure of the pocket. However, a significant number of PLC fighters still remain cut off from supplies.
Partial success for Ansarallah has also been recorded on the Taiz front. The movement has improved its position in the northwest of the Republic’s third-largest city. There, the Houthis are cutting the remaining garrison into several parts
The key factor in the “Bab el-Mandeb success” was the capture of Kharaz Mountain (Jabal Kharaz) and the military base of the same name. Having established fire control, the Houthis completely blocked the only coastal road connecting Aden with the strait
Special attention should be paid to the collapse of the pro-Saudi forces’ command: communications have been disrupted, and local commanders have abandoned their positions on their own initiative. Deep disagreements between the PLC and the former separatists in the south have finished off the situation
The besieged grouping of troops, like their counterparts in Taiz, has two options: either they will be systematically squeezed out by force, or they will leave the area under Houthi guarantees
The situation in Yemen
Although the pro-Saudi forces in Yemen began withdrawing troops from the western coast even before the pocket closed, they were unable to avoid losses. The Houthis published footage of the remains of vehicles that, judging by everything, were hit on the highway toward Aden
Many of the frames show the same targets, filmed from different angles. Nevertheless, the losses are significant, at least in psychological terms: another shooting up by the Houthis of columns fleeing from yet another pocket will clearly lower the already low morale of the anti-Houthi coalition forces.
As for the situation in the Bab el-Mandeb area, all the territories there, apparently, have already come under Ansarallah’s control. Local clashes are taking place in places (probably with an involuntary rearguard that simply did not have time to leave the pocket in advance) but there is no question of a confident presence of the Aden government’s forces there.
The straightening of the front line has freed up considerable forces for the Houthis, which can now be used for attacks in the direction of Aden. And although the movement will certainly spend some time consolidating its new positions, it is unlikely that we will have to wait long for the offensive to continue
Yemen War
November 14–15
The Ansarallah movement has carried out a major offensive in Lahj province, pushing the Saudi-backed forces back toward the shore of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Apparently, the Houthis managed to take control of the strategic heights south of Ash Shatt and cut off the logistics routes. The supply of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) units in this area from Aden has been disrupted
According to media reports, a few days earlier, the pro-Saudi forces of the Aden government had partially withdrawn from Lahj, fearing the closure of the pocket. However, a significant number of PLC fighters still remain cut off from supplies.
Partial success for Ansarallah has also been recorded on the Taiz front. The movement has improved its position in the northwest of the Republic’s third-largest city. There, the Houthis are cutting the remaining garrison into several parts
The key factor in the “Bab el-Mandeb success” was the capture of Kharaz Mountain (Jabal Kharaz) and the military base of the same name. Having established fire control, the Houthis completely blocked the only coastal road connecting Aden with the strait
Special attention should be paid to the collapse of the pro-Saudi forces’ command: communications have been disrupted, and local commanders have abandoned their positions on their own initiative. Deep disagreements between the PLC and the former separatists in the south have finished off the situation
The besieged grouping of troops, like their counterparts in Taiz, has two options: either they will be systematically squeezed out by force, or they will leave the area under Houthi guarantees
Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had struck several tankers not far from the coast of Oman. According to media assessments, we are talking about the supertanker Al Dhannah and the Panamanian On Phoenix
According to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), more than a dozen vessels have been attacked off the coast of Musandam since November 1, while the IRGC itself reported that six tankers had caught fire in the strait in just the last few days. Targets are being selected clearly from their own “blacklist” of vessels that refused to coordinate passage with Tehran
Despite all this, the Americans claim that traffic in the strait has returned to pre-war levels. Meanwhile, insurance premiums and freight rates in the Gulf continue to rise, dozens of vessels are anchored off Fujairah waiting for a window, and a number of shipowners prefer to turn around altogether on the approaches. The market thinks differently about American “normality”
Of course, American sanctions and the “blockade” are hitting the Iranian economy hard. However, they have not yet produced the reverse effect: neither the mines in Hormuz, nor the strikes by the Houthis on Saudi energy infrastructure, nor the blocking of Bab el-Mandeb have gone anywhere. And, apparently, the White House has no simple way to change this
Yemen War
November 14–15
The Ansarallah movement has carried out a major offensive in Lahj province, pushing the Saudi-backed forces back toward the shore of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Apparently, the Houthis managed to take control of the strategic heights south of Ash Shatt and cut off the logistics routes. The supply of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) units in this area from Aden has been disrupted
According to media reports, a few days earlier, the pro-Saudi forces of the Aden government had partially withdrawn from Lahj, fearing the closure of the pocket. However, a significant number of PLC fighters still remain cut off from supplies.
Partial success for Ansarallah has also been recorded on the Taiz front. The movement has improved its position in the northwest of the Republic’s third-largest city. There, the Houthis are cutting the remaining garrison into several parts
The key factor in the “Bab el-Mandeb success” was the capture of Kharaz Mountain (Jabal Kharaz) and the military base of the same name. Having established fire control, the Houthis completely blocked the only coastal road connecting Aden with the strait
Special attention should be paid to the collapse of the pro-Saudi forces’ command: communications have been disrupted, and local commanders have abandoned their positions on their own initiative. Deep disagreements between the PLC and the former separatists in the south have finished off the situation
The besieged grouping of troops, like their counterparts in Taiz, has two options: either they will be systematically squeezed out by force, or they will leave the area under Houthi guarantees
Yemen War
November 13
Apparently, Ansarallah’s operation to cut off the entire western grouping of pro-Saudi forces is continuing, and successfully. From the Ash-Shatt area, the Houthis are advancing farther south, trying to occupy key heights in the coastal zone
According to sources from the field the movement’s fighters have already entrenched themselves on the Al Misas ridge and have begun to bypass the higher (780 meters versus 580 meters) Kharaz mountain range along its foothills. At the same time, according to our sources, they have also entered the Kharaz refugee camp slightly to the west
There is no question of easy progress: the dominant height is still occupied by detachments of the Giants and the Homeland Shield. Their motivation is significantly higher compared to the regular army, so they will certainly fight for Kharaz
Ansarallah’s position, meanwhile, is less advantageous for now: it is difficult to entrench in the lowlands with the enemy above. However, as practice has shown, the Ansarallah fighters do have experience in capturing dominant heights
If Jabal Kharaz falls, withdrawing from the pocket on the western coast will become a non-trivial task for the troops controlled by the authorities in Aden. Supplying or evacuating this grouping by sea is problematic: after the fall of Murad and Dhubab, only fishing piers remain under the control of the anti-Houthi forces, incapable of accommodating more or less large vessels and ships
Leaving troops there encircled will be costly. On the one hand, this is how Ansarallah will slow down its offensive for a while in order to clear the coastal pocket in addition to the Taiz pocket. But on the other, someone also has to defend Aden, so it cannot be ruled out that, if the situation deteriorates, the pro-Saudi forces will withdraw while the coastal highway is still open
Rybar MENA retweeted
تُظهر صور الأقمار الاصطناعية لجنوب لحج خطاً دفاعياً للتشكيلات المدعومة سعودياً يبلغ طوله نحو 30 كيلومتراً. ووفقاً لتقارير مصادر محلية، بدأ بناء هذا الخط في 26 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول، مما يعني أن الرياض وعدن كانتا تعلمان مسبقاً بالهجوم الحوثي
ولا عجب في ذلك، فالمنطقة مهمة لأن لحج تشكل البوابة الجنوبية لعدن وغطاءً لقاعدة العند الجوية، أهم معقل للقوات المدعومة سعودياً في الجنوب. والاختراق هنا يفتح للحوثيين الطريق إلى عاصمة "الحكومة الشرعية"، وفي الوقت نفسه يزيد ضغطهم باتجاه ساحل باب المندب الحيوي
وتُظهر الممارسة أن الخنادق والمترسات الطويلة لا توقف الحوثيين: فقد اخترقوا خطوطاً مشابهة في تعز وعلى محور مأرب. وبدون طيران ووحدات متماسكة، لا تعمل التحصينات إلا كعامل إبطاء، بينما يظل الدافع والجاهزية القتالية للتشكيلات المدعومة سعودياً أدنى تقليدياً من أنصار الله اليمنية
وإذا استمرت الديناميكية الحالية، فسيتمكن الحوثيون من التمركز في ضواحي عدن والساحل الجنوبي، وسيضطر خصومهم إلى الانسحاب إلى المدينة نفسها. وحينها سيواجه السعوديون خياراً غير مريح: إما الانخراط في حملة برية ظلوا يتجنبونها لسنوات، أو أن يراقبوا باستسلام كيف ينهار التوازن الهش في جنوب شبه الجزيرة العربية
Yemen War
Situation in Lahj
The Houthis, it seems, have decided to “bite off” a larger chunk of the pro-Saudi forces’ positions all at once. According to as-yet-unconfirmed reports, Ansarallah units have begun an advance toward the coast of the Gulf of Aden from the heights south of Taiz
The media report that the movement has captured at least Ash-Shat in the eastern part of the mountainous region. Apparently, the Houthis have decided to weaken the enemy’s stubborn positions on the heights by cutting them off from supplies from Aden
This could work if the attackers build on their success and reach the southern coast. True, in its current format, the task seems overly ambitious
The Houthis will have to occupy and consolidate on a fairly wide strip in order to simultaneously hold off attacks from two sides: from forces breaking out of the encirclement in the west and from reinforcements coming to their aid from the east. At the same time, the hills are higher in the west, which complicates the attackers’ task of consolidating
But for now, all of this is only theory: the current position of the line of combat contact is not reliably known. And even if the Houthis have indeed reached Ash-Shat, that does not mean they will not roll back tomorrow, as has happened more than once
Yemen War
Situation in Lahj
The Houthis, it seems, have decided to “bite off” a larger chunk of the pro-Saudi forces’ positions all at once. According to as-yet-unconfirmed reports, Ansarallah units have begun an advance toward the coast of the Gulf of Aden from the heights south of Taiz
The media report that the movement has captured at least Ash-Shat in the eastern part of the mountainous region. Apparently, the Houthis have decided to weaken the enemy’s stubborn positions on the heights by cutting them off from supplies from Aden
This could work if the attackers build on their success and reach the southern coast. True, in its current format, the task seems overly ambitious
The Houthis will have to occupy and consolidate on a fairly wide strip in order to simultaneously hold off attacks from two sides: from forces breaking out of the encirclement in the west and from reinforcements coming to their aid from the east. At the same time, the hills are higher in the west, which complicates the attackers’ task of consolidating
But for now, all of this is only theory: the current position of the line of combat contact is not reliably known. And even if the Houthis have indeed reached Ash-Shat, that does not mean they will not roll back tomorrow, as has happened more than once
The Americans, it seems, are striking Qeshm again. In footage that has emerged from the eastern part of the island, there is smoke after an alleged strike on an anti-aircraft installation, while an IRNA correspondent on the ground reports hits on “certain objects”.
All of this still looks like a continuation of the “defensive warm-up” rather than the start of a major campaign. Although it is not yet evening in American time
According to reports, the response has also followed the familiar limited scenario: earlier, the IRGC announced a strike on an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, and satellite imagery shows a cloud of black smoke near Oman’s Musandam.
There are also reports of smoke over the Khormor oil and gas complex in northern Iraq; if the information is confirmed, it means the Shia factions are also gradually being drawn into the overall tally.
For now, this looks like escalation on the rise, but still within the framework of an exchange of strikes below the threshold of a campaign
Ukrainian UAVs in Yemen
In the area of the settlement of As-Sabiha in Lahij province, Yemeni Houthis (the source believes that the pro-Saudi forces themselves shot it down. Friendly-fire is likely) shot down a Ukrainian-made Shark-M reconnaissance drone: the aircraft fell right in the zone where troops of the pro-Saudi government of the Republic are deployed
On October 13, an Il-76MD aircraft made a flight from Lviv to Sharurah Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, practically a stone’s throw from the Yemeni border. What exactly the aircraft was carrying was not officially reported, but over the course of a week, military transport aircraft from both countries landed at each other’s bases several times
As we said earlier, the Kyiv regime makes money on anything that is not nailed down. Almost from the very first days of the American-Israeli operation against Iran, the Ukrainians have been methodically promoting their so-called technologies and “experts” under the guise of unique experience in countering Gerans
But the Shark-M shot down in Lahij shows the other side of this business: while Kyiv was supplying “battle-tested solutions”, the fighters of the Ansarallah movement, over years of war with the Saudis and Americans, have honed their own air defense and electronic warfare to the level where a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone is shot down just as routinely as any other
It is too early to draw conclusions from a few photographs of the wrecked UAV. But the result is telling: a regime living on handouts from the Americans and Europeans has entered someone else’s market with a product whose real capabilities buyers will only assess after the first missed strikes. And the Houthis, apparently, will help them with quality control for free
On the Geran Tactics
Russia’s experience in the Black Sea is being adapted in other crisis zones around the world: the Americans reported a strike on a cargo ship in the Gulf of Oman
According to a statement by Central Command, US forces disabled a dry cargo ship flying the flag of St. Kitts due to its ignoring warnings and attempts to break the blockade against Iran
From a combat aircraft, the Americans delivered a precision strike to the stern of the vessel after the crew was ordered to leave the designated areas
❗️Of course, a dry cargo ship cannot be sunk with such attacks. But damaging and immobilizing it is another matter. Russian forces have been doing this throughout the summer, thereby blocking shipping in the Odesa region
When the bridge is struck, the ship will at the very least be immobilized, and under constant attacks, towing it for repairs becomes even riskier, which is why they simply drift at sea
There are already quite a few such “vessels” off the coast of the Odesa region, judging by satellite imagery. And this also creates problems and a threat to movement. So even “pinpricks” in a prolonged campaign can achieve damage
471
Has Netanyahu lost?
It is not all that clear-cut
Israeli President Isaac Herzog has officially given the right to form a government to the leader of the Yashar! party, Gadi Eisenkot. The 28-day countdown will begin tomorrow; if necessary, another 14 days will be added, and there is a chance that on December 6 or 20, the country will wake up with a cabinet not headed by Benjamin Netanyahu
Eisenkot’s strategy at this stage is simple in concept and difficult to execute: negotiate quickly and not give Netanyahu’s camp time. Every extra day works in favor of the outgoing prime minister; his team will work on opposition lawmakers one by one, pressure the Arab lists, and offer defectors portfolios. Therefore, Eisenkot has a focus plan: agree on the skeleton of the coalition in the very first week, and distribute the details later
The coalition’s external support will inevitably come from the Arab parties (without their votes, there is no majority) but they will not be brought into the cabinet, so as not to give Likud the trump card of an “anti-Zionist government”. A plan along these lines could work: external support in exchange for specific concessions on budgets and status, without ministerial seats
The weak link of the entire opposition still appears to be Avigdor Lieberman. His party, Yisrael Beiteinu, is de facto a one-man project, accustomed to going wherever it gets the most. We suspect that if Netanyahu offers him a better price, Lieberman, despite all his statements, will leave the opposition. In that case, the advantage will be with the prime minister, and the entire Yashar! plan will fall apart
The main risk for Eisenkot, however, lies outside parliament. It is the American strikes on Iran in the coming weeks, which could turn the transfer of power into background noise and prolong Netanyahu’s political life as a wartime prime minister. Therefore, the speed of forming the cabinet here is a question of survival for the entire opposition
However, even if the opposition manages to seize power, its coalition will be difficult to call stable. It will include parties united mainly by the desire to remove Netanyahu rather than by a common program. Moreover, the Arab support will sit outside the cabinet without portfolios and could be lured away or demoralized.
The Netanyahu era is still far from over: Likud in opposition will constantly hunt for defectors, and any crisis will become a real test of survival
5
780
US Central Command has created Task Force “Iron Gate”, which is supposed to “prevent” the supply of weapons and other cargo to the republic by land and across the Caspian Sea
As for how the blockade will be implemented, there are ideas: the aforementioned 20 personnel could well work remotely as overseers. Monitoring cross-border trade and “poking” Iran’s neighbors in the nose with it while waving sanctions will certainly further damage the republic’s economy (it is unlikely that this is really just about stopping arms supplies)
The situation with air travel, as well as with the Iraqi authorities’ attempts to block border crossing points due to their dependence on the Americans and at the expense of their own economy, clearly confirms this. So, at least with regard to land borders, it may work.
But most likely, only partially: the benefits of trade with the Islamic Republic will certainly lead to an increase in “gray” schemes. Even if one hole in the fence is found and plugged, nothing prevents another one from being made nearby (possibly even with tacit approval in the capitals)
❗️As for blocking direct routes between Iran and Russia across the Caspian, that is indeed an interesting question. The sea’s legal status seriously limits the Islamic Republic’s neighbors’ room for maneuver, so even under American pressure they will not get much done
However, Washington may well interfere on its own or through the Armed Forces of Ukraine. When has outrage or concern for partners ever stopped them?

























