Syrian Network

I was honoured today to meet Austria’s Minister of Finance, Dr. Markus Marterbauer, on the sidelines of the Third Symposium on Supranational Responses to Corruption, organised by the World Bank Group and its partners in Vienna on 9–10 November 2026, under the theme “Turning Illicit Gains into Development Outcomes.” The symposium is being held at OPEC headquarters in Vienna. I am participating in a panel discussion on Asset Restoration in Fragile and Post-Conflict Contexts, where I am addressing approaches to tracing, freezing, confiscating, and recovering the funds and assets of the Assad regime and its associated corruption networks. More importantly, I am examining how recovered assets can be used to finance reparations for victims and survivors, as an essential component of transitional justice in Syria. In Syria, corruption was not separate from gross human rights violations. Rather, it was deeply intertwined with the system of detention, torture, enforced disappearance, property confiscation, and forced displacement. Recovering these assets should therefore go beyond simply returning funds to the state treasury. It should also contribute to providing justice and reparations for victims through transparent mechanisms that ensure their meaningful participation in decisions about how the recovered assets are allocated and used. The objective is to transform part of the wealth accumulated through repression and corruption into a tangible means of delivering justice and redress to its victims. I have also written an article examining this issue in greater depth, which will be published soon. I will share my remarks from the symposium at a later date. They are based on a jointly authored paper to which we contributed and which we hope the World Bank will publish soon, allowing us to share its findings more widely.

It was wonderful to finally meet @AlabedBana after more than ten years of staying in touch online, going back to the days of the siege of eastern Aleppo. Bana is now in the eleventh grade and is no longer the little girl she was during the years of the Assad regime’s brutal siege. Bana volunteers with the Syrian Network for Human Rights @snhr and since the fall of Assad, she has more actively engaged in speaking about the challenges facing children, schools, and education in Syria. It was a wonderful coincidence that we happened to be in the Netherlands at the same time and were able to meet in person for the first time. I only wish that our first meeting could have taken place in eastern Aleppo, which I visited this summer after meeting with the Governor of Aleppo. We agreed that our next meeting will be there, in eastern Aleppo. My sincere thanks to our dear friend, Syria’s Ambassador in The Hague, @MhdKatoub for welcoming Bana to the Syrian mission. I would also like to pay tribute to Bana’s mother, a remarkable woman who has stood by her side throughout the years and continues to travel with her and support her, together with Bana’s father, with great courage and determination. I was truly delighted by this meeting. I wish you, Bana, and all the children of Syria continued success and a bright future.

I was delighted to be interviewed by Syrian-American journalist @HalaGorani with whom I discussed a number of pressing issues concerning Syria’s transitional justice process and the broader challenges facing the country during this critical transitional period. We discussed the recent judicial rulings against a number of senior officials of the former Assad regime, their significance for victims and Syrian society, and the debate surrounding the death penalty, including the need for a clear and narrowly defined policy toward its use during the transitional period. I also stressed that accountability must be accompanied by the full guarantees of a fair trial, particularly in cases involving grave violations and international crimes. The credibility of transitional justice will depend not only on whether perpetrators are prosecuted, but also on the quality, independence, and transparency of the proceedings. In this context, we discussed the importance of publishing court judgments and their legal reasoning so that victims, lawyers, human rights organizations, researchers, and the wider public can assess the evidence and the judicial process. The conversation also addressed settlements involving individuals connected to violations, war profiteering, or the former regime’s economic networks. I emphasized the importance of distinguishing between different levels and forms of responsibility. Any settlement mechanism must be transparent and subject to public and institutional scrutiny, and it must not become a means of shielding individuals implicated in crimes against humanity or other grave crimes from criminal accountability. Beyond individual prosecutions, we discussed the wider political and institutional dimension of the transition. Sustainable stability in Syria cannot be achieved through security measures or formal representation alone. It requires the construction of genuinely representative institutions, meaningful participation by Syria’s diverse communities at both the local and national levels, stronger institutional safeguards, and a political process capable of addressing accumulated grievances rather than reproducing exclusion in new forms. Transitional justice is therefore not simply a question of trials. It is part of the broader challenge of rebuilding trust between Syrians and state institutions, ensuring accountability, recognizing victims, preventing revenge and collective blame, and establishing institutions capable of protecting the rights of all Syrians. Hopefully, we will meet soon in Syria, Hala. Thank you very much for this thoughtful interview and discussion. Link to the full interview in the first comment.

سعدت بالمقابلة التي أجرتها معي الصحفية السورية-الأمريكية هالة غوراني، @HalaGorani والتي ناقشنا فيها عدداً من القضايا المرتبطة بمسار العدالة الانتقالية في سوريا، وفي مقدمتها الأحكام الأخيرة بحق عدد من مسؤولي النظام السابق، ومسألة عقوبة الإعدام، وضمانات المحاكمة العادلة، والتسويات مع المتورطين في الانتهاكات والجرائم، إضافة إلى أهمية نشر الأحكام القضائية. كما تناولنا التحديات الأوسع التي تواجه المرحلة الانتقالية، ولا سيما ضرورة بناء مؤسسات أكثر تمثيلاً، وتعزيز المشاركة بما يؤسس لاستقرار مستدام. وعلى أمل أن نلتقي قريباً في سوريا يا هالة، شكراً جزيلاً على هذه المقابلة والنقاش. رابط المقابلة في التعليق الأول.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights @snhr submitted to the court the documentation it possesses in connection with the case of Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, the former Grand Mufti of the Assad regime, as well as in other cases. We are always ready to assist in cases brought against perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun has been sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay financial compensation. We will continue our work on the ongoing cases. Praise be to God that the documentation we have worked on for fourteen years is now being used inside Syria, after having already been utilized in cases outside Syria. Our thanks go to the team that worked tirelessly, day and night, to meet these requests, and to all media and local activists, witnesses, and victims’ families for their trust and assistance.

Initial comment on the verdict against the criminal Waseem al-Assad The verdict issued against Waseem al-Assad represents an important step in breaking the immunity long enjoyed by networks of influence linked to the former regime, and in affirming victims' right to have their testimonies heard and to hold those involved in crimes against Syrians accountable. @SN4HR The value of the verdict is measured by the extent to which individual criminal responsibility is established and fair trial guarantees are respected. The Syrian context — and the legacy of widespread crimes of killing, torture, and enforced disappearance — demands that accountability be serious and proportionate to the gravity of the acts, while recognizing that many victims see maximum penalties as a facet of equity. Nevertheless, the death penalty must remain bound by the strictest safeguards: it must rest exclusively on intentional killing established with evidence removing any doubt; it must be issued as a reasoned ruling by a competent and independent court; the right to defense must be guaranteed; and effective judicial review before a higher court must be available before the ruling attains final and binding status. We now call on the court to publish the reasoned ruling, and to state the evidence and the individual nexus of responsibility linking the defendant to each act for which his responsibility has been established. @snhr We are honored, at the Syrian Network for Human Rights, to have contributed to the evidence against the criminal Waseem al-Assad. Thank you to everyone who helped us over the past years build a database of violations since 2011, and we move forward toward the trial of another major criminal.

The verdict against Bashar al-Assad, Maher al-Assad, and Atef Najib The verdict marks a major break with Syria’s long-standing culture of impunity by bringing former senior regime figures before a domestic court and recognizing victims’ right to participate in justice. It is significant because it treats the repression in Daraa as part of a broader system of violations and challenges the former assumption that the presidency and security institutions were beyond accountability. However, it remains an opening precedent rather than a complete model of international-crimes justice, particularly because Syria still lacks a comprehensive legal framework and a specialized, demonstrably independent transitional-justice court. @snhr The judgment’s legal strength will depend on whether it clearly establishes each defendant’s individual criminal responsibility. Senior officials cannot be convicted merely because crimes occurred under their authority; the court must show whether they ordered, instigated, assisted, jointly planned, or failed to prevent or punish crimes committed by subordinates under their effective control. The case must also demonstrate a coherent evidentiary link between particular offences in Daraa, the wider pattern of repression, the state institutions involved, and each defendant’s conduct, knowledge, and authority. The main concerns are the use of ordinary domestic criminal law to address international crimes, the procedural legitimacy of trials in absentia, the need for judicial independence and transparent reasoning, and especially the imposition of death sentences. The authorities should publish a detailed judgment, guarantee full retrials for absent defendants, ensure meaningful defence rights and witness protection, and adopt legislation incorporating international crimes and leadership liability in line with international standards.

What Did I Say to President Macron? I said, in my speech to the French President Emmanuel Macron, which extended for three minutes, that Syria is passing today through one of the most important and sensitive stages of its history since the independence, and that enabling it to stand on its feet again requires a genuine and sustainable international support. The challenges that the country is facing aren't only a result of the years of the armed conflict, but also a result of decades of weakening the institutions of the state and emptying them of competence, independence, and the rule of law; these are policies that preceded the Syrian revolution and worsened in a catastrophic manner after it. I called on France, which has supported numerous Syrian institutions, among them the Syrian Network for Human Rights, from which, and from Germany, I had the honor of receiving the Franco-German Prize for Human Rights and the Rule of Law in 2023, to continue supporting the rebuilding of the institutions of the Syrian state, particularly the Ministries of Justice and Interior, in accordance with the standards of the rule of law, professionalism, transparency, and accountability. The building of institutions that are capable of protecting citizens, providing services, and enforcing the law constitutes one of the most important guarantees to prevent the recurrence of violations. However, this process needs considerable financial resources, which may reach hundreds of millions of dollars, and years of training, qualification, and capacity building. The states emerging from devastating conflicts, such as Syria, don't possess on their own the financial and human capacities that are necessary for this task. The photo is from the breakfast that gathered some of the Syrian civil society organizations. I was sitting opposite him, and I ate most of the breakfast because he was busy the whole time listening and writing, so he didn't eat anything. I told him at the end of the meeting that I had eaten almost everything; he said to me, smiling: "Don't worry, I'll manage!" What caught my attention is that the President shook hands with all of the workers in the restaurant of the hotel, upon his entrance and upon his exit, and he also took a group photo with them. This is the first time where I have met a high-level official who does such an ethical act. Yesterday, I conducted an interview on Syria TV and on the Syrian Al-Ikhbariya about the meeting, and I spoke in both of them only about the speech that I delivered, and about the responses of the President. I also spoke about the terrorist bombing that struck Damascus; we thank God for the safety of the Public Security forces, and we ask Him to heal the wounded among them, and to protect our beloved country and its honorable people. We will issue a statement soon about the bombing. The links are in the comments.

Suspending the Cybercrime Law: A Constitutional Test for the Transitional Phase in Syria Fadel Abdulghany The arrest of the content creator Hassan Akkad in Damascus on 17 June 2026, as reported, against the backdrop of charges relating to electronic defamation, insult, and slander, has reopened a question that the transitional legal system has not yet answered through any clear legislative or judicial review: should the Syrian government in the post-Assad phase continue to apply Law No. 20 of 2022 on Cybercrime, a penal law adopted under the legal order of the Assad era, at a time where Syria today falls under a new transitional constitutional framework? The significance of the case does not lie in its individual details, which remain within the competence of the judicial authority, but rather in that it exposes a structural problem in the transitional legal framework, namely the continued use of inherited penal tools before testing them in light of the new constitutional obligations. The argument calling for suspending the enforcement of the Cybercrime Law rests on four bases. The first relates to the principle of criminal legality. The second relates to the test governing the permissible restrictions on freedom of expression under international human rights law. The third relates to the chilling effect that loosely drafted penal provisions produce in the public sphere. As for the fourth, which is the weightiest in the present constitutional moment, it relates to the tension between Article 48 of the Constitutional Declaration issued on 13 March 2025, which requires the repeal of exceptional laws incompatible with human rights, and Article 51, which keeps existing legislation in force unless it is amended or repealed. The first basis is criminal legality, expressed in the Latin maxim: “no crime without a defined law”; that is, no person may face punishment under an offense so vague that its scope cannot reasonably be foreseen. This is not merely a procedural guarantee, but rather a substantive constraint on the form that penal legislation may take. So when a provision criminalizing conduct on the electronic network uses terms of undefined scope, leaves its elements unspecified, and consigns its application to the discretionary interpretive authority of the investigating or judicial bodies, then the provision risks performing the function of a broad delegation of penal authority more than that of a clear legal rule. And according to my reading, a number of the articles of the 2022 law that relate to expression involve precisely this kind of indeterminacy, and this vagueness is concentrated in the provisions governing expression rather than in those governing attacks on systems or data. The article is in the first comment.

The report asks: to what extent do the proceedings of the Fourth Criminal Court meet the legal standards necessary to establish a credible national accountability for international crimes? It examines, within this framework, the legal structure of the proceedings and the hierarchy among their sources; the characterization of the charges and the implications of relying on national legislation rather than on the definitions of international crimes; the individual criminal responsibility of Atef Najib and the modes of responsibility available under Syrian law; the temporal threshold that determines the extent of the applicability of the war crimes framework to the early events in Daraa; and the due process implications of the in-absentia trial of Al-Assad and the other absent accused. The analysis is based on a doctrinal legal study of Syrian law, in both its legislative and constitutional dimensions, and on its assessment against the standards of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, with limited reference to comparative transitional justice practices. The scope of the report is limited to the proceedings documented up to the end of the second session on 10 May 2026, and it does not independently address the potential use of the judicial record internationally before foreign courts or within international judicial cooperation frameworks. The report concludes that the proceedings, as they currently stand, exhibit clear gaps across five main dimensions of the legal structure: the legislative framework, the characterization of the crimes, the doctrinal basis of individual responsibility, the temporal application of the war crimes framework, and the procedural guarantees governing the in-absentia trial. These gaps can be addressed within the proceedings themselves. However, if they remain unaddressed, they will undermine the capacity of these proceedings to claim to represent a coherent legal accountability for conduct that rises to the level of crimes against humanity. Fadel Abdulghany, the Executive Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, says: "Accountability is not measured by the number of judgments issued, but by the extent to which the judicial record can withstand legal scrutiny. The first true test of justice in post-Assad Syria lies in convicting the perpetrators, and also in building judicial proceedings that respect the very rule of law that has been violated for decades, that produce a record which preserves the rights of victims and safeguards their dignity, and that remains a credible legal reference for generations to come." The report is in the first comment.

Reintegrating and Reforming Armed Groups in Transitional Phase in Syria: Pathways to Sustainable Stability This report explains that the reintegration and reform of armed groups in Syria constitute one of the most sensitive and complex challenges of the transitional phase, because the issue concerns not merely the transfer of former fighters into state institutions, but also the rebuilding of the relationship between arms, legitimacy, law, and society. The report demonstrates that the multiplicity of factions, the diversity of their loyalties, the differences in their military and ideological structures, and the involvement of some factions in human rights violations are all factors that make any integration process that fails to adhere to established standards liable to generate renewed instability rather than achieve stability. The report argues that the success of this process requires the simultaneous advancement of three principal tracks. The first track involves linking reintegration to transitional justice through holding those responsible for serious crimes accountable, avoiding both comprehensive and selective amnesties, and guaranteeing the rights of victims and affected communities. The second track concerns reforming the military and security sector through the establishment of unified, professional national forces subject to clear leadership and civilian oversight and committed to the rule of law and human rights. The third track involves providing realistic economic and social conditions for former fighters, including employment opportunities, vocational training, psychological support, and social reintegration. The report concludes that failure in this process will leave Syria exposed to the dangers of parallel armed structures, local retaliation, external intervention, and renewed conflict. Its success, however, requires a transparent and inclusive national process, supported internationally and grounded in accountability rather than fragile settlements, thereby paving the way toward sustainable stability and genuine institutional and social recovery @snhr View the full report: snhr.org/?p=78186

The findings of the investigation into the Ain al-Arab/Kobani incident involving an SDF fighter and numerous bodies on January 22: Key findings of @snhr report on this horrific incident: The victims were prisoners who escaped during the chaos and were subsequently killed during the pursuit, not fighters killed in combat. The fact that some of the victims had their hands bound behind their backs is a strong indication that they remained in detention or were recaptured and then killed while incapable of fighting. The report documents the killing of 21 prisoners in a single incident and states that the two video clips (night and day) document the same scene at different times. The positioning and proximity of the bodies suggest that the victims were gathered together before being shot. The report rejects the official SDF narrative regarding the identities of the dead. It notes that the SDF acknowledged the authenticity of the video and arrested the cameraman, but claimed that those appearing were “government fighters” killed in clashes. The investigation concluded that the evidence it gathered (digital verification, visual indicators, witness statements, and context) contradicts the narrative of a clash and confirms that they were prisoners or individuals not involved in hostilities at the time of their deaths. The report established a minimum of 21 deaths, but it also documented the disappearance of other individuals whose fate remains unknown. We believe the actual death toll could reach 40–45. The full report is in the first comment.

The Fundamental Kurdish Rights in Decree 13: A Foundational Step in the Right Direction Fadel Abdulghany Recognizing minority rights within constitutional frameworks is a fundamental pillar for establishing political legitimacy and strengthening social cohesion in pluralistic societies. In Syria, Presidential Decree No. 13, issued by President Ahmed al-Sharaa in January 2016, marked a significant turning point in the country’s constitutional trajectory, as it included explicit recognition of the identity, language, and citizenship rights of Syrian Kurds, and paved the way for dismantling the foundations of oppression that had accumulated over decades of systematic exclusion. Based on the constitutional declaration issued in March 2025, this decree establishes a model of national unity that is not based on imposing ethnic or linguistic homogeneity, but rather on recognizing diversity and integrating it within the concept of equal citizenship. This decree also represents the first official recognition of Kurdish rights in Syrian legal history, signaling a qualitative shift from approaches of national exclusion to a civic nationalism rooted in the principle of citizenship. This article examines the theoretical foundations, legal structure, and constitutional implications of this recognition, arguing that while the inclusion of fundamental Kurdish rights is a necessary and commendable step forward, its transformative potential remains contingent upon constitutional enshrinement, comprehensive implementation, and sustained political commitment. The Constitutional Declaration issued in March 2025 constitutes the legal framework from which Decree No. 13 derives its authority and legitimacy. Article 7(3) of the Constitutional Declaration stipulates the state’s commitment to guaranteeing the cultural diversity of Syrian society and protecting the cultural and linguistic rights of all Syrians, thus establishing a positive constitutional obligation that goes beyond mere tolerance to a duty of effective support. This provision entails an enforceable institutional obligation, requiring state bodies to enable the cultural expression of minorities in practice, not merely to grant it formal permission. The full article is in the first comment.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights @snhr considers that the detention of children and minors in al-Aqtan prison during the period of control by the Syrian Democratic Forces #SDF amounts to an arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty where such detention occurs in a facility not designated for juveniles, in the absence of effective and genuine separation from adults, without prompt, independent, and meaningful judicial oversight, or in violation of the principle that detention must be employed solely as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. The applicable legal standard is not the invocation of “special treatment” or purported “rehabilitation programs,” but rather the extent to which the substantive and procedural safeguards enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the relevant international standards governing juveniles deprived of their liberty are fully and demonstrably satisfied. Compliance with these standards is assessed based on verifiable conditions and enforceable guarantees, not generalized assurances or rhetorical claims. The Syrian Network for Human Rights further affirms that the detention of children and minors in al-Aqtan prison during the period of control by the Syrian Democratic Forces constitutes, in itself, an arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty. The governing legal principle is unequivocal: the arrest, detention, or imprisonment of a child must be lawful, non-arbitrary, and used exclusively as a measure of last resort for the shortest appropriate period. Such detention must ensure treatment consistent with the child’s age and inherent dignity, guarantee regular contact with family members, and provide effective access to legal assistance. As a general rule, children must be separated from adults in places of detention, unless it is affirmatively demonstrated, under narrowly defined and exceptional circumstances, that non-separation serves the child’s best interests. Consequently, the placement of minors in adult detention facilities gives rise to a strong presumption of arbitrariness, illegality, and exposure to torture or ill-treatment. International juvenile protection standards mandate separation as a core safeguard, permitting exceptions only in strictly limited cases related to family unity or participation in a clearly defined, demonstrably beneficial specialized program, subject to rigorous oversight and specific safeguards, and never based on generalized administrative convenience or security considerations.

Condemnation of the Bombing of the Aleppo Governorate Building During an Official Press Conference On Saturday, January 10th, a drone, reportedly launched by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), hit the Aleppo Governorate Building during an official press conference attended by the Governor of Aleppo, Azzam al-Gharib, the Minister of Information, Hamza al-Mustafa, and the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, Hind Qabawat, as well as several journalists and representatives of local and international media outlets. The Aleppo Governorate Building constitutes a purely civilian object. Its nature and function do not qualify as a military objective. Additionally, there has been no indication that the Building was being used for any military purpose at the time of the attack. Accordingly, the targeting of the Governorate Building amounts to a direct attack on a civilian object protected under international humanitarian law, in clear violation of the principle of distinction and the categorical prohibition of attacks against civilian objects. The timing of the strike, while journalists and media workers were present inside the building, further heightens the gravity of the violation, as it deliberately exposed protected civilians to serious and foreseeable harm while they were carrying out legitimate professional activities. Therefore, the attack constitutes an unlawful act and may rise to the level of a war crime, giving rise to individual and command criminal responsibility for those who ordered, executed, or otherwise contributed to the attack, in accordance with established principles of international criminal law. The Syrian Network for Human Rights @snhr unequivocally condemns this attack and calls for the immediate protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as for full respect for the rules and principles of international humanitarian law.

My esteemed professor, Ruti Teitel @rutiteitel referred to my name and to our joint work on Syria in her interview with Christiane Amanpour on CNN. Below are the key points she highlighted: Teitel defined transitional justice as the framework through which societies confront past abuses and hold perpetrators accountable during periods of profound political transformation, particularly in transitions from illiberal or authoritarian regimes toward more open political orders. She emphasized that transitional justice extends beyond criminal accountability to encompass broader political change, as well as the institutional and structural reforms required to address the legacies of systematic repression. Applying the concept to Syria’s transition Teitel referred to the research paper she co-authored with Fadel Abdulghany, Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, underscoring the complexity of Syria’s transitional process and cautioning against the risks of prematurely implementing a transitional justice agenda that fails to account for its social and institutional foundations. She instead advocated for a deliberate, inclusive approach that ensures meaningful participation by victims and authentic representation of Syria’s diverse social components, thereby reinforcing legitimacy and avoiding the reproduction of exclusion and division. Teitel further stressed the centrality of comprehensive documentation as a foundational prerequisite for future public policy. She explained that documentation must extend beyond direct human losses to include patterns of compounded harm, such as property confiscation, looting, theft, and exploitation. Such an approach, she noted, is essential for designing evidence-based compensation, reparations, and reconstruction programs. Lessons from other transitions Drawing on comparative experiences, Teitel observed that several initiatives undertaken in the aftermath of major political upheavals, including those following the Arab Spring, failed to yield sustainable outcomes. This, she argued, reinforces her core conclusion: successful transitions require caution, inclusivity, and sensitivity to context, and must avoid hasty measures that erode trust and undermine both the process and its legitimacy. The link to the interview is provided in the first comment.