state retweeted
0/ Today, the Ethereum Foundation completed a bilateral swap of ~21,269 aWETH to wstETH, coordinated with @LidoFinance and @mellowprotocol as part of their ongoing deleveraging work.
Replying to @smyyguy @crypto_condom
think mstr uses diluted for mnav right?
Replying to @smyyguy @crypto_condom
bmnr said 221
xitter.cf/BitMNR/status/19599935…
Replying to @BitMNR
2/5
BitMine's Crypto NAV (net asset value) is $39.84 per $BMNR share:
- ETH $8.24 billion (1.7mm $ETH tokens)
- BTC $22 million (192 $BTC coins)
- treasury cash (unencumbered) $562 million
= NAV $8.82 billion
- fully diluted shares outstanding 221,515,180
= NAV per share $39.84 per $BMNR share
Chairman: Thomas "Tom" Lee @fundstrat
Ticker: $BMNR
Replying to @hasufl
but you're increasing the earnings per LDO which are in ETH
Replying to @hasufl
headline a bit misleading PR just says they approved a program for when it would be better, doesn't seem like they'll do it asap
Replying to @HadickM
wow okay i thought it had an expiry, where did you see that, their s1?
Replying to @HadickM
circle giving coinbase 50% of all the reserve income won't last forever though
Replying to @hasufl
100% agree, there is zero reason for a 20B+ AUM CEX to be blind signing transactions coming from a website for their cold wallets instead of having a institutional grade fully offline custody setup
state retweeted
Replying to @EvgenyGaevoy
This is a tricky thing to answer (and not because I'm investor in Safe - my stake is tiny and I couldn't care less about it relative to my reputation)
For Safes and other smart wallets to be useful, the ability to make secure signatures must exist as a complement.
Safe provides one such possibility through the centralized front end, but it should never be relied on exclusively.
I would blame Safe most for not working more with the largest and most at-risk Safe users to educate them on secure signing practices to ensure secure signing is abundant.
Secondarily, I would blame Safe for getting compromised, and I hope we eventually learn how that happened exactly.
But the reality is that
1) independent message verification for Bybit is easy and prevents almost every hack
2) perpetually preventing a frontend from becoming compromised is comparatively much harder
3) drawing attention to 2) instead of 1) prevents people from learning the right lesson, which is to adopt secure signing practices and stop trusting frontends
state retweeted
Replying to @safe
Since it is not clear in @safe’s update:
The front end served by SAFE from safe.global was fully compromised and could have affected any users from that front end, however only Bybit was attacked.










