F.....n reta.......ds are selling for no reason $SPY $QQQ $DIA $IWM $AMZN $MSFT $NVDA $AMD $INTC $MU $SNDK $NBIS $CRWV $IREN $ASTS $IONQ
BREAKING: US technology stock valuations have hit their lowest level since March 2020 amid the market correction.
The S&P 500 Info Tech Index P/E ratio is now at its lowest since March 20th, 2020, at 16.4x.
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Today is bad market day, but i did pretty good with @graniteshares's $AIL & $ANS. I traded both earlier.
@AnthropicAI $ANT $AIL $ANS @graniteSharesET
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We believe the shortseller's attack on AMD does not hold up to close scrutiny. I agree with AMD when it says "the claims misrepresent AMD's business practices and relationships. AMD complies with applicable U.S. export control laws and regulations and maintains rigorous processes to ensure compliance across our global operations..." We would buy it if we could for the trust
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Du.....b f.....n reta.....ds are selling robinhood:0x86923f96303d656e4aa86d9d42d1e57ad2023fdc after the @hntrbrkmedia scam bullshit.
@hntrbrkmedia I know who you are .... you guys are reta........ded
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I hope @AMD $AMD sues @hntrbrkmedia for these false accusations. This is nonsense. lol
@hntrbrkmedia you fu.....n ret.......ded
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$ASTS dirt cheap. if you don't think you are reta.....ded. Get yourself checked in.
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$NVDA: This is an absurd take. When a board pushes out a CEO for having an affair with a subordinate, there is near zero chance the board will suddenly have a change of heart and say they’ve reconsidered, the executive can come back just because the stock has dropped. The board would look like clowns and lose all credibility with investors. There is too much practical and legal risk to the firm, even if the relationship was consensual.
Here is a summary of risks per Grok.
- Sexual harassment and retaliation claims (Title VII and state equivalents): This is the core exposure. A subordinate can later claim the relationship was not truly welcome because of the power differential (the CEO controls compensation, promotions, assignments, and continued employment). Even if it starts consensually, adverse actions after a breakup (denied promotion, poor review, termination, reassignment) support retaliation claims. Other employees can also claim a hostile work environment based on perceived favoritism. In some states (notably California under FEHA), employers face strict liability for supervisor harassment.
- Favoritism and discrimination claims: Co-workers who believe the subordinate receives preferential treatment can sue. Courts have recognized claims where a supervisor’s relationships create a toxic environment of perceived quid pro quo for advancement.
- Policy violations and fiduciary/breach-of-duty issues: Most large companies prohibit or tightly restrict relationships between managers and direct (or indirect) reports, or require disclosure. Non-disclosure or concealment can support claims that the CEO breached duties of loyalty or care to the company. For public companies, boards that fail to address the known risk may face derivative claims from shareholders.
- Reputational, operational, and financial fallout: These situations routinely produce media coverage, internal morale problems, difficulty managing the subordinate’s performance, and board distraction. Settlements are common even in weak cases because of embarrassment. High-profile precedents include the ousters of CEOs at McDonald’s (Steve Easterbrook, later sued for clawback of ~$105 million severance after concealment of other relationships), Intel, Nestlé, Norfolk Southern, and others. Recent reporting has tied similar issues to Nvidia leadership transitions.
Practical Implications
The firm’s exposure is often larger than pure legal damages (which under Title VII are capped by company size for compensatory and punitive awards). Defense costs, settlements driven by optics, loss of leadership continuity, stock-price reaction, and cultural damage frequently dominate. Individual managers are rarely personally liable under Title VII, but the company is, and the CEO almost always loses his job.
Bottom line: A truly mutual, disclosed, and carefully managed relationship can sometimes avoid catastrophe, but the combination of power imbalance and direct reporting line makes it high-risk for the firm. Most sophisticated boards treat it as a governance and risk issue that should not occur, and many CEOs have lost their positions over it even when the relationship was described as consensual. Outcomes depend heavily on jurisdiction, the company’s policies, whether it was disclosed, and subsequent conduct.
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I believe the @nvidia board is not acting in the best interest of shareholders nor in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties.
What we know is that the board fired Jensen or forced his resignation for violating company policy and/or in response to the accusation of an affair with a spy.
They did so without careful consideration of the impact on the company, its customers, its shareholders or other stakeholders.
They rushed to judgment without the benefit of careful due diligence or even with a basic understanding of the facts.
How do we know this?
We know this by how quickly Jensen was fired and how little was known at the time of his firing.
It takes time to convene a board meeting. There was time, maybe, for one Zoom.
And this is a decision that should have been made by a board sitting in person and carefully deliberating the facts once they are known.
And they should have slept on the decision and met again the day after to discuss the facts, the risks and the other implications of their decision.
The timing and lack of information did not allow for careful board deliberation.
While boards can fire a CEO for an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate, it should not be an automatic decision. That is why we have boards comprised of humans and not agents.
A board should consider whether or not such a relationship was consensual or whether it was an abuse of power dynamics. And a board has to consider what the impact of the firing is on all stakeholders.
If I were in this board, I would not have rushed to judgment based on articles in the media. I would have made sure the board had all of the facts so it could make a careful and informed decision.
Boards of Delaware companies have a duty of care which means they must make informed, prudent and good faith decisions. This clearly did not happen here.
What law firm is advising this board?
Or is the board even taken good legal advice?
It doesn’t look like it.
And now the board is compounding its failures by insisting that there is no possibility for Jensen’s return as CEO.
Why is it in the best interest of the company to foreclose the possibility of Jensen’s return and to do so before all of the facts are known? This is yet another breach of their duty of care.
Furthermore, the board has launched an investigation whose scope is unknown. Investigations can be extremely damaging to a company and should be carefully targeted to address whatever facts need to be known rather than be overly broad in scope.
In short, this looks like a series of major governance failures by directors that panicked due to headlines in the media. They likely felt compelled to do something because they were afraid of looking bad in the media, not because it was the right thing for them company.
They couldn’t stand the heat.
The board’s conduct here is shocking for a company of this scale and importance to our country and the world at large, particularly at this moment in history.
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