THE FILE IS NOT THE FIGHT I read this article carefully about the Joint Warfighter Evaluation, and I actually think the author is arguing in good faith. So I’ll return the salvo in kind. Mostly. His central mistake is assuming the current system has already identified most of the right people, and JWE is simply another instrument to refine the cut. I mostly disagree. The current system absolutely identifies talent. It identifies people who are very good at succeeding inside the current system. They understand the gates, the timing, the tribes, the assignments, the patrons, and the wickets required to survive decades of institutional judgment. That takes ability, sure. It just does not prove you can actually fight. The author actually describes the problem himself when he writes that “timing and tribes” can determine who becomes a general and then concludes there is “nothing inherently wrong” with that. There is. Every tribe eventually starts breeding in its own image. If the men choosing the next generation value the same assumptions that made them successful, the institution becomes a hall of mirrors. Everyone looks impressive because everyone looks familiar. JWE puts a bit of a window in the room. The Louisiana Maneuvers point is where I disagree most. The author argues Marshall faced a fundamentally different problem because today’s colonels have already commanded, been assessed repeatedly, and spent 25 years operating in war. But that misses the lesson. Marshall wasn't simply asking whether an officer had experience. He wanted to know whether yesterday’s successful officer could fight tomorrow’s war. We have that EXACT problem now. Twenty years of GWOT experience can be enormously valuable. It can also be scar tissue. COIN rewarded habits, assumptions, risk calculations, command structures, and instincts shaped by a very particular kind of war. The next fight may punish some of them brutally. Experience is only an advantage until the battlefield changes faster than the officer does. The French Army of 1940 was not short on experienced officers. It was short on officers whose experience had not become a literal prison. The article also separates “Can this officer fight?” from “Can this officer think?” and suggests war colleges might provide the latter. At this level, I don’t think those are separate questions. Senior warfighting is thinking under pressure. The information is incomplete, the enemy moves, logistics fracture, time disappears, political constraints intrude, and every option sucks. Writing an excellent paper can tell me something about your mind. Watching you make consequential decisions when the floor starts moving tells me something else entirely. And this is where I think the article undersells JWE. JWE is not revolutionary because it produces another score. It's revolutionary because it allows the institution to discover that its own résumé may be wrong. A 'golden child' might freeze. Yet the quiet colonel might see the entire problem immediately. The officer with every credential and every sponsor might get beaten by someone nobody had penciled in for stars. If we're unwilling to accept that possibility, then there is no reason to test anyone, ever. For thirty years we have looked at the file and inferred the officer. JWE simply asks reality for a second opinion. The file tells you who the institution thinks can fight. The arena of the JWE tells you who actually can. But @stuartscheller may have some thoughts on this as well. mwi.westpoint.edu/how-do-you…

FWIW this guy also went to Harvard. Shocking right? Working with some incredible leaders like @DerrickforVA and @JulesHurstIII, Luke has drafted more meaningful policy proposals, especially for the Army, than most in the Pentagon. Bureaucrats despise him. So I like him.