Without lies Christianity dies... It seems that Inspiring Polytheism, did not read the study he shared properly. Jonathan Fox explicitly states in his study: "The results show that there is INSUFFICENT evidence to support the stereotype of the Islamic militant." (Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict, Jonathan Fox, p. 1.) Fox also explains that similar stereotypes of religious violence can be applied to other religious groups. He specifically mentions Christian fundamentalists who violently oppose abortion, Jewish settlers, and the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. (Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict, Jonathan Fox, p. 2.) Although Fox finds that religion plays a more prominent role in conflicts involving Islamic ethnoreligious groups, he does not conclude that Muslims are inherently more militant or inclined towards violence. His findings distinguish the importance of religion in particular conflicts from the stereotype that Muslims are naturally more violent. (Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict, Jonathan Fox, p. 1.) As for Monica Duffy Toft's study, Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, her research does not establish that Islam inherently causes violence. Her principal statistical finding concerns politically excluded Arab Muslim populations and a particular category of religious civil war. She explicitly states: "There is no evidence of Arab Muslim exceptionalism for other kinds of civil wars." (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1624.) Toft herself distinguishes this finding from a general association between Islam and religious warfare. Although she concludes that religion can motivate rebellion, her research does not show that Islamic teachings inherently encourage violence, as IP attempts to suggest. In fact, she explains that the findings concern Arab Muslim populations in particular, rather than Muslims generally. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, pp. 1624, 1626.) She also discusses how political leaders and armed organisations compete to present themselves as the most credible defenders of religion, thereby gaining political support and resources. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1626.) She provides two relevant examples. Iraq, 2003: Following Saddam Hussein's removal, the armed opposition initially consisted largely of former members of the Ba'ath Party. Toft explains that militant religious organisations subsequently became increasingly influential within the insurgency. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1626.) Libya, 2011 to 2014: Following Muammar Gaddafi's removal, political instability and competition created conditions in which several militant Islamist organisations emerged, including the Islamic State. (Getting Religion Right in Civil Wars, Monica Duffy Toft, p. 1626.) Turning to Seung Whan Choi and Davis Brown's empirical study, the authors explicitly acknowledge: "Despite Islam itself not being necessarily violence-prone", before discussing how militant organisations may exploit religion to justify political objectives. (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 4.) They also conclude: "Our overall analysis suggests that Islam is more than epiphenomenal but less than causal." (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 11.) Furthermore, they explicitly acknowledge: "We cannot claim that Islam is a direct cause of the deadliest political violence." (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 11.) In other words, although the researchers find an association between Islam and particular patterns of suicide terrorism, they cannot demonstrate that Islam itself directly causes these attacks. Which is what IP tried to make it out to be. Regarding Davis Brown's study, The Influence of Religion on Interstate Armed Conflict: Government Religious Preference and First Use of Force, 1946–2002, the research identifies relationships between government religious preferences and the likelihood of initiating armed conflict. However, Brown acknowledges that the study does not establish why these relationships differ between religions. He explicitly states: "No explanation is offered for the different results herein", before discussing several possible explanations, including religious identity, religious commitment, political circumstances and religious teachings concerning warfare. (The Influence of Religion on Interstate Armed Conflict: Government Religious Preference and First Use of Force, 1946–2002, Davis Brown, p. 817.) Consequently, these studies does not establish that Islamic teachings are responsible for the observed relationship. This raises an important question: Why do countries with a Muslim majority account for a disproportionate share of armed conflict??? Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen address this question in their study Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence? (2016). They discuss several possible explanations for the greater concentration of armed conflict in Muslim countries. Colonialism: European colonial powers imposed artificial borders that contributed to territorial disputes and subsequent conflicts. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 5.) Foreign interventions: Military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya contributed to political instability and armed conflict. The authors suggest that the increase in conflicts after 2001 may partly reflect reactions to interventions by major powers. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, pp. 5, 6.) Political repression: Authoritarian governments, state repression and political instability may contribute to the emergence and continuation of violence. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) Economic conditions: Lower levels of economic development, dependence on oil revenues and large young populations are among the factors associated with greater conflict. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) Sectarian conflicts: Fighting between Sunni and Shia groups contributes to violence in parts of the Muslim world. The authors also compare this phenomenon with historical conflicts between Catholics and Orthodox Christians. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) Declining conflicts elsewhere: Muslim countries account for a greater proportion of global civil wars partly because the overall number of civil wars elsewhere declined considerably after the Cold War. Nils and Ida explain that this does not necessarily indicate a substantial increase in the absolute number of civil wars involving Muslim countries. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, pp. 1, 3.) Most importantly, Gleditsch and Rudolfsen reference Karakaya's 2015 study, which found that the increased conflict proneness of Muslim countries disappeared after accounting for economic development, political repression, oil dependence and large young populations. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, p. 6.) This is particularly significant because it demonstrates that the statistical association between Muslim countries and civil war can disappear when relevant political, economic and demographic variables are taken into account. Conclusion None of these studies proves that Islam itself causes violence. Although several identify statistical associations between religion and particular forms of conflict, these findings should not be confused with evidence that Islamic teachings inherently produce violence. Choi and Brown explicitly acknowledge that they cannot establish Islam as a direct cause of the deadliest political violence. (Islam and Suicide Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis, Seung-Whan Choi and Davis Brown, p. 11.) Furthermore, Gleditsch and Rudolfsen identify numerous political, historical and economic explanations for the concentration of armed conflict in Muslim countries. They also reference Karakaya's findings, which show that the association between Muslim countries and civil war disappears after controlling for several important factors. (Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, pp. 5, 6.) Therefore, presenting these studies as proof that Islam itself is inherently violent MISREPRESENTS what their findings actually establish.