Obviously, not. The results speak for them selves. @UNIFIL_ and 1701 have failed miserably.
"How can someone who has been declared persona non grata receive an extension of his residency permit?" @samygemayel
Lebanese Foreign Minister Joe Rajji declared Iran's designated ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, persona non grata as early as March 2026. Now, amid reports that the Directorate General of General Security is considering extending his residency permit, the question arises whether a security agency aligned with the Shiite camp will obstruct the implementation of the Foreign Ministry's decision.
The Directorate General of General Security is headed by Hassan Choucair, who is affiliated with the Amal Movement, and in recent years, allegations of Hezbollah's infiltration of the agency have intensified. If Sheibani's residency permit is indeed extended despite the Foreign Ministry's position, it would provide further evidence of the ability of actors aligned with the Iranian axis to influence state institutions and circumvent official government decisions through administrative and security mechanisms.
The Sheibani affair is not merely a diplomatic dispute—it is a real test of whether Lebanon's state institutions are capable of enforcing the country's sovereignty in the face of the influence wielded by Iran and Hezbollah. israel-alma.org/another-test…
Why did the IDF take over the Beaufort?
On June 3, we wrote about the IDF’s takeover of the Beaufort area and noted that this is not just another hill in southern Lebanon…
The important part of the story lies in what Hezbollah built— with direct Iranian assistance—inside the ridge, beneath the Beaufort fortress.
This is one of Hezbollah’s most strategic and significant tunneling assets in southern Lebanon: a vast underground complex that for years served as a command center, weapons storage facility, and fire control hub.
The tunnel infrastructure within the Beaufort Ridge was constructed in a location that enables operational control over Israeli territory near the border.
The tunnel network was designed to accommodate hundreds of Hezbollah operatives simultaneously. Inside, rooms were identified that are prepared for prolonged stay and extended combat.
Infrastructure for water and electricity was found within the tunnels, along with medical facilities and kitchens, in addition to extensive anti-tank and air defense systems.
One of the tunnels is approximately one kilometer long.
As part of efforts to enforce the agreement between Israel and Lebanon, a request was submitted to the Lebanese Army to address the tunnel network beneath Beaufort. However, Hezbollah prevented the Lebanese Army from doing so.
Hezbollah is sacrificing Lebanon to save Hezbollah. Iran is sacrificing Lebanon and Hezbollah to maintain the threat on Israel.
Hezbollah planned to cause a national disaster in Lebanon in order to halt the IDF’s advance north of the Litani River.
In a strike carried out near the Qaraoun Lake Dam, the IDF thwarted a Hezbollah plot to blow up the dam, which is a strategic national infrastructure asset that supplies electricity and water to large parts of Lebanon.
The collapse of the dam could have unleashed a massive flood wave, causing widespread flooding, severe damage to critical infrastructure, destruction of property, and endangering the lives of countless civilians (many of them Shiites who support Hezbollah...).
Why? To make crossing the Litani River impossible, prevent IDF forces from crossing it, and inflict damage on troops and equipment operating in the area on their way to seize the Beaufort Castle sector and the Ali al-Taher Ridge—strategic positions of significant operational importance.
For Hezbollah, the heavy price that could have been paid by Lebanese civilians and the country's national infrastructure was simply not a consideration. Full report here: israel-alma.org/hezbollah-pl…
And I would personally appreciate a response from @damiengayle. I am sure The @guardian has footage showing everything @ZehaviAlma mentioned. Weird, they didn't bring up this perspective as well.
Israel targeted Hezbollah, it's clear as day
Mass funerals in Lebanon reflect the scale of Hezbollah’s losses
In recent weeks since the ceasefire, there has been a growing number of reports from across Lebanon documenting mass funerals of Hezbollah operatives, taking place simultaneously in multiple locations. These events provide a significant indication of the scale of losses the organization has sustained during the current fighting.
Hezbollah systematically refrains from publishing full and official figures regarding its casualties. This pattern of behaviour is intended, among other things, to obscure the number of its military operatives eliminated and to incorporate them into the overall count of civilian casualties in Lebanon during the war, without distinguishing between combatants and civilians.
This pattern leads to a distortion of the overall picture: the inclusion of Hezbollah operatives among civilian casualties contributes to presenting an unusually high number of “civilian deaths” in Lebanon, and at times creates the impression that the primary harm has been inflicted on the civilian population.
However, despite the fact that Hezbollah systematically operates from within civilian environments and embeds its military infrastructure within civilian populations—while also using these areas as human shields—the data indicates that most of those killed are Hezbollah operatives. This is largely the result of targeted strikes carried out by the IDF based on precise intelligence.
We are all still waiting for Lebanon to wake up and do their job...
The Lebanese government has entrusted the care of displaced Shiites to the “BANIN Charity Association” — an organization that presents itself as humanitarian yet is repeatedly linked to Hezbollah.
Instead of building a civilian alternative, the state is deepening dependence on Hezbollah and reinforcing the civilian infrastructure that also underpins its military activity.
This is not how you weaken Hezbollah — this is how you entrench it.
Why is Hanin El-Sayed—the responsible minister and an expert in building formal social protection systems meant to serve as an alternative to Hezbollah’s welfare networks—allowing such a mechanism (“BANIN”) to operate under the approval and legitimacy of the Lebanese government?
israel-alma.org/the-lebanese…
You ask, Alma Center answers: What will bring security to the residents of northern Israel? Is a security zone required, and what should its size be?
The discussion about Israel’s “end game” in Lebanon must change. It is no longer possible to rely on the Lebanese government or the Lebanese Army to disarm Hezbollah.
The solution requires a combination of measures: continuous strategic weakening of Hezbollah, dismantling its military infrastructure south of the Litani by Israel, an international effort against Hezbollah’s economic and civilian networks, and a focus by the Lebanese government on the civilian and financial spheres alongside a cleanup within the Lebanese Army. Finally, the creation of a buffer zone to protect northern Israeli communities.
The goal is clear: long-term security for the residents of northern Israel.
Read the full policy paper: What is Israel’s “end game” in the campaign in Lebanon? israel-alma.org/policy-paper… @ZehaviAlma @TalBeeri72
Ankara prefers an Islamic Republic that is strong enough to keep Israel and the West busy, but not one that is too dominant in the region.
Ankara wants the ayatollah regime to survive, not out of sympathy, but to avoid uncertainty and the possible disintegration of the Islamic Republic.
Erdogan sees the possible collapse of the Islamic Republic as a direct threat: the potential for Kurdish autonomy in Iran, the fear of an influx of refugees into Turkey, and the fear that a new, pro-Israeli regime in Tehran would threaten their national interests.
As a result, Turkey is reportedly preparing contingency plans for military operations inside Iran in the event that the regime falls, with the aim of establishing a buffer zone against refugees and Kurdish entrenchment. Ankara prefers an Islamic Republic that is strong enough to keep Israel and the West busy, but not one that is too dominant in the region. israel-alma.org/the-second-i…
Avraham Levine retweeted
The anti-tank threat is a central threat facing IDF forces (infantry and armored units) operating in southern Lebanon. We assess that Hezbollah possesses thousands of anti-tank missiles of various types. The most advanced missile (precision munition) is the Almas missile (“Diamond” in Persian), manufactured in Iran.
The Almas is the product of reverse engineering based on the Israeli Gil missile family produced by Rafael. The Almas missile has four versions. Each version presents an upgrade in the missile’s range, its warhead, performance, and guidance seekers. The different versions are equipped with an advanced dual anti-tank warhead (“tandem”), enabling deep armor penetration. The known ranges are: Almas-1 up to 4 kilometers, Almas-2 up to 8 kilometers, and Almas-3 and 4 up to 16 kilometers.
This is a missile capable of striking targets beyond line of sight, along an arcing (lofted) trajectory, which ultimately enables a top-attack against the target. The ability to strike a target beyond line of sight allows two things. First, a significant extension of the engagement range. Second, the ability for an operator to guide the missile to its target, similar to the American Javelin missile.
The Almas missiles can be launched from a variety of platforms carrying a tripod operated by a fighter or from a compact launcher. The heavier and longer-range Almas-3 and 4 can also be launched from a vehicle, helicopter, or UAV.
“Fire and forget” — the missile can be launched already locked onto its target, or it can travel using inertial navigation toward the desired area and acquire the target later, with fine adjustments from the operator behind it. In the fourth generation there is a significant change: the transition to wireless control and communication with the missile, as opposed to the fiber-optic link used in earlier generations. This is a lethal missile that caused casualties during the war in 2024.
The threat of a Radwan infiltration might have been overlooked before the Hamas attack on Oct. 7th. This time, the IDF has a new defence line north of the border they would have to penetrate.
We assess that the Radwan Unit, which was deployed mainly north of the Litani River and in the Beqaa during the ceasefire, received instructions, upon Hezbollah’s entry into the fighting on March 2, to move part of its forces to the area south of the Litani and deploy with a low signature in a kind of “defensive strip” in southern Lebanon, at a distance of up to approximately 10 kilometers from the border. From this area, the unit’s operatives are attempting to target IDF forces operating on Lebanese territory from effective ranges of anti-tank fire and mortar shells, combined with UAV launches from more rearward lines.
According to the modus operandi familiar to us in emergency situations, the unit’s operatives have deployed in small cells along the entire sector south of the Litani and operate autonomously in the field, within separate geographic sectors. To our understanding, the cells consist of up to 10 operatives, with a preference for Radwan operatives who are “locals” (originating from southern Lebanon) and who are well familiar with the area. Cell commanders have been granted considerable autonomy in making rapid tactical decisions on the ground.
It should be recalled that the Radwan Unit is capable of attempting focused high-quality operations along the border area in the form of limited ground infiltrations. In our assessment, the eastern sector carries a higher risk of Radwan ground infiltration activity, with emphasis on the Mount Dov, Ghajar, and Metula areas.
Avraham Levine retweeted
Watch me on @ILTVNews with @calevbd and @AvrahamLevine Security Briefing: Defining Our Strategic Objectives youtu.be/pXDjyg6gHsQ?si=0OjX…
Avraham Levine retweeted
🎥 We’ve been in Northern Israel on the border with Lebanon where some tracking the conflict believe Israel will use this moment to try and crush Hezbollah completely. As @AvrahamLevine put it, “this could be the start of something massive.” youtu.be/6CqoxOU1PNg?si=6r2-…
Avraham Levine retweeted
Yesterday @AvrahamLevine told me Israel could be on the cusp “of something massive in Lebanon.” Today it seems that’s already begun. Despite its weakness, Hezbollah pounded Lebanon back into war. It was a huge risk to take and the people of Lebanon are already feeling the impact
Avraham Levine retweeted
Two buildings belonging to the IRGC in Tehran have been completely destroyed by the IDF today, 01 March 2026. This is the second time this IRGC complex has been targeted, with the first strike being on the IRGC's "Thar Allah" headquarters on 23 June 2025. One of the two buildings destroyed today was a Basij headquarters, the internal security force responsible for violently suppressing opposition to the regime. Here you can see satellite imagery and ground photography of the complex before it was destroyed, along with the IDF strike footage. More details on the Basij in our report: israel-alma.org/the-irgc-bas…
Avraham Levine retweeted
Monthly Summary: IDF Airstrikes in Lebanon and Hezbollah Activity – February 2026
February 2026: A 50% decrease was recorded in the scope of Israeli strikes in Lebanon – 44 strikes compared to 88 in January.
Geographic breakdown: 16 north of the Litani, 15 in the Beqaa, and 13 south of the Litani.
In 13 of the strikes, 20 terrorist operatives were eliminated: 16 Hezbollah operatives, 2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives, and 2 Hamas operatives.
israel-alma.org/monthly-summ…
Avraham Levine retweeted
The Iranian terror regime is systematically attacking Arab states and their citizens, while simultaneously attempting to “soften” its actions.
Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, sent a message in Arabic to the regional states that Iran is not seeking to attack the states themselves, but only American bases located on their territory.
In reality, since the outbreak of the war on the morning of February 28, 2026, those same states — the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iraq — have been systematically and deliberately targeted using UAVs and missiles, striking civilian infrastructure directly, including residential buildings, hotels, shopping malls, industrial zones, and ports.
