Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
New series alert 🚨🔔
Welcome to The DETH Row.
Security is getting real personal when attacks are happening every day, back to back.
Want to know what the blue team is dealing with these days? It looks very different depending on the industry.
📺 First stop: Media
🚗 Next: Auto Insurance
🏈 Then the freaking NFL
Different industries, different crown jewels, different problems to solve.
I’m taking Detection Dispatch on the road to find out what defenders care about, what they’re up against, and what the rest of us can learn from them.
🎙️ Subscribe on YouTube. We’ve got some interesting stops ahead.
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites.
This is staggering.
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
#SupplyChainAttack suspected against #QDir
PSA tweet as it does not look like this will be investigated by the author.
On Nov 9, #MDE started flagging binaries dropped by Q-Dir on an endpoint. Further investigation shows we're most likely dealing with a supply chain.
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
I keep hearing the words "behavior detections for ARTEX" but the majority of the stuff I see when I look under the hood is string matching on "markers" (lol, which is an AI word) of ARTEX, which is fine, do that, but lets not act like those are durable behavioral detections.
SMDH that folks think he should be reinstated when you take a look at the full picture of what happened and what it means. SV has a one track mind 🧑🚀 always has
‼️ Elon Musk says he has signed an open letter demanding Nvidia bring back Jensen Huang, the founder and visionary who led it for 33 years.
The Stand with Jensen site lists 77,700+ names, including 4,470 self-described current Nvidia staff and 41,800 shareholders.
Epic Games CEO Tim Sweeney, Y Combinator boss Garry Tan and Replit CEO Amjad Masad are listed too.
Binance co-founder Yi He is also on the list, with the comment "I wear a leather jacket. I disagree."
Huang was ousted on 12 November after admitting an affair with a woman US intelligence officials deemed a Chinese spy.
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Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
This is a good reminder that phishing follows the news cycle. The moment a real outage hits, lures like this appear almost immediately.
Two takeaways:
1. Urgency + "click to restore" = red flag, even when the incident ID is real.
2. Verify service health in the admin center, not from an email.
Threat Intelligence report also includes IOCs, very useful for detection teams and instructions for defenders.
#MicrosoftSecurity #ThreatIntelligence
Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12. The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543.
Some of the phishing emails Microsoft detected on November 13 falsely claim that messages were held during the outage and will be deleted within 24 hours unless recipients click to restore them.
Observed subjects follow the pattern "Outage - [six-character code]," with sender display names using organization-specific prefixes followed by "Outage Notification" or "Service Health."
The campaign uses three sender domains, moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com, and newbooker[.]com, with recipient-specific SendGrid click-tracking links redirecting to reallifeaccounting[.]com, including the observed path /themelist0.html. Similar messages targeted organizations across multiple US sectors.
The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed.
Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Threat Explorer and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (EmailEvents, EmailUrlInfo, and UrlClickEvents) to identify suspicious messages, examine embedded URLs, and investigate user clicks.
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links provides time-of-click protection against malicious URLs when properly configured. Organizations should verify their Safe Links policies, investigate potential user interactions, and confirm service disruptions directly through the Microsoft 365 admin center.
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
So many possible phishing pretexts around the Microsoft outage and Defender xdr issues 👀
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
This is good info about Microsoft Defender internals.
protokol-7.github.io/dfir/20…
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
Basically InstallerFileTakeOver but superior
github.com/MSNightmare/SignD…
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
A developer who writes a fork of ARTEX messaged me today to call me very naughty name for releasing spikestrip
He didn’t have the dev chops to fix ARTEX to think hard enough to not honor the traps.
github.com/Arcanum-Sec/Spike…
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
For those still interested in the fridges, @sekoia_io captured an attack on four different honeypots this Sunday evening at 10 PM, potentially linked to the latest wave. It didn't use to "code of the day" but another unauthenticated vuln. 178.83.226[.]215 / 37.16.75[.]128
Since the folks at ThreatBook developed both Artex and CyberStrikeAI, we figured we should contribute a bit to defending against and tracking AI agent attacks by sharing two feeds of instances running these agents on the public internet.
Grab them if needed. Feeds:
threatbook.io/hubfs/Feeds/AR…
threatbook.io/hubfs/Feeds/CS…
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
Google is now threatening America's schools, saying they will turn off their core search functions if schools choose to entirely block AI.
nytimes.com/2026/11/03/us/go…
Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
Everyone was afraid of being left behind or being the security team holding up AI implementation, so they threw out a lot of their normal policies and controls. Even many coding agents lacked enterprise controls until midyear. Now they’re sorting it all out.
teapaw.org/bradmenezes/status/211…
“Desktops are dirty,” a CISO told me.
Everyone rolled out Claude on the desktop, now every CISOs I speak with wants development and AI agent execution off employee laptops as a p0 priority.
The recent LiteLLM compromise and today’s reports of a malicious Claude Code extension in Cursor’s marketplace show why: trusted desktop tools can become paths to credentials and corporate systems.
My prediction for 2027: a major shift toward isolated, ephemeral compute sandboxes with tightly scoped credentials and controlled network access for all development across engineers and non-engineers suing coding agents.
Builders keep their preferred tools. IT and Security control where the code runs and what it can access with a kill switch.
Been trying to learn circuits and honestly get an elementary grasp on electricity, radio waves and frequencies yada yada.
Built this one with some help from the kids too. Just look at that beautiful Lego enclosure. It’s cool to have something we’re both learning in real time.
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Recently got my N39 kit /w GPS. I fear I’ve become addicted to “collecting” as many nodes in my area as possible. Upgrading the antenna and looking for a base station with coax I’ll feed down to the upstairs office.
Been on Meshtastic but looking to try out Meshcore as well
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Dylan🛡️AttacktheSOC retweeted
Last month, Trump’s DHS asked its cyber division to try and a hack voting machines.
BUT:
-They directed them to NOT alert voting machine companies if flaws were discovered. Violating policy.
-Order to only report directly to White House.
That’s NOT typical at all!!
ProPublica: Trump Appointees Wanted a Voting Machine Hacked
A few months into President Donald Trump’s second term, political appointees at the Department of Homeland Security made an unusual request of its agency focused on cybersecurity: Secretly acquire a voting machine and hack it.
The appointees wanted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to procure the machine, examine it and report back the findings so they could be given to the White House, according to two former administration officials with knowledge of the request.
propublica.org/article/cisa-…

























