Emmy (@Emmykeyz) header
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People Leader | Head CX | Digital Innovator | AI & Automation | Telco | Techie | Photography | Music | Art | Food | Fashion

Lagos
Joined September 2009
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Our primary problem lies in how we frame “hardworking”. People believe they are hardworking because they spend time managing chaos, such as traffic.They are quick to note how Nigerian immigrants succeed, yet they fail to grasp that only the best among us migrate, and those systems are built to select that top tier. We are more hustlers than hard workers and it’s quite obvious in our productivity levels
Nigeria lacks HONEST and EXCELLENT HARDWORKERS, AT SCALE at ALL levels. It is soooo easy to stand out ANYWHERE, across all cadres, if you are hardworking, diligent, trustworthy, and you show a spirit of excellent and not that "manage it like that" mindset.
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Emmy retweeted
This is why access should be extremely limited. People will pedestalize you and then punish you for turning out to be human having a human experience like them.
The most dangerous thing about having access to someone’s private life is discovering how ordinary they actually are.
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These GTA 6 clips are sending me 😅
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If you like allow your money finish, anything wey your eye see after that just take am like that
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Problem dey o, this AI agent wey I dey train dey correct and reject wetin I dey tell am. God abeg make I no go build ultron
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Today seemed hotter than usual...
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See the difference between Lewis Hall and Luke shaw on that LB.....
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On Android phones, there's a feature turned on by default that lets them fall back to 2G connections. According to police in Tokyo, a man had been exploiting that feature from a car, and they have now arrested him. On November 7, police closed in on a dark blue hatchback on a Ginza street. Under the back seat was a radio transmitter, still on, with batteries in the trunk. The device, police say, emitted a strong signal on the same frequencies as the carriers, causing every phone within about 500 meters of the car to lose its connection: more than 10,000 phones. When a phone loses its connection, it looks for any network to connect to, and what the car was emitting was a 2G connection. On 4G and 5G networks, a phone checks whether the cell tower it's connecting to is legitimate. On 2G, it doesn't, and so any phone that connected to the car's fake tower had no way of knowing it wasn't legitimate, and trusted everything it saw. What it saw was a text message, in Chinese, saying the recipient's credit card had been suspended and offering a link to fix the problem. Police say 18 people, mostly Chinese tourists, lost around 4 million yen to the scam, or around $25,000. The driver, Yu Hai, a 31-year-old Chinese national, denies the allegations. One man in his 20s told NHK that when he was walking in Shibuya, his phone suddenly switched to 2G, and that exact text message appeared on his phone. He ignored it. Japan doesn't have a 2G network. It shut down its last one around 2012. Why would a phone in Tokyo still connect to one? Because phones are built for the global market, and some parts of the world still only have a 2G connection. That's why the setting is left turned on. If it were turned off for everyone, then a traveler in one of those countries could have no service at all. In Ginza, this backup system let a single car disable over 10,000 phones for an hour, then send them a fake text message. The default setting is set once, by the phone manufacturers, for all countries at once. Japan got rid of its 2G network years ago, but it doesn't get to decide whether phones in Japan still trust a 2G tower, and they still do.
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Emmy retweeted
The green recording dot at the top of your screen tells you no apps are using your microphone. But an app with zero permissions can still eavesdrop on your phone call through the accelerometer. In December 2022, researchers from Texas A&M University, Temple University, and Rutgers published EarSpy, showing that a smartphone's motion sensor can capture the other side of a phone call. Modern phones use stereo earpiece speakers that are louder and wider than older hardware. Because the speaker sits millimeters from the logic board, incoming audio physically vibrates the phone chassis. The built-in accelerometer detects those micro-vibrations. While mobile operating systems require explicit user permission and display a green privacy indicator to access the microphone, motion sensors require zero runtime permissions. By training neural networks on the accelerometer's spectrogram data from OnePlus 7T and OnePlus 9 phones, the researchers identified the caller's gender with 98.6% accuracy, recognized specific callers with 92.6% accuracy, and guessed spoken digits with 56.4% accuracy (more than five times better than random chance). The physical limit is noise and sampling rate. Normal hand tremors, walking, and street rumble easily drown out the faint speaker vibrations. Modern operating systems also mitigate this by capping third-party motion sensor sampling at 200 Hz, which acts as a low-pass filter against human speech. You cannot secure an operating system by locking the microphone API if the speaker right next to it is physically shaking the hardware.
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None of them actually know the plan. Each one pulls where it wants but mostly conforms to the force it feels through the load, so the object becomes the communication channel. Group keeps its heading (memory), new ants joining keep perturbing it (randomness). That's enough to solve it. None of them intended anything.
For the life of me, I will never understand how this is possible. Individually, none of the ants could ever articulate the steps of solving the problem in any sense. Yet somehow in the collective, clear teleological movements emerge.
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There is no cool way to chase your dreams , it is ugly , difficult and embarrassing.
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People wonder why I'm so obsessed with donkeys. I've looked into it, and my only finding is that the rest of you are underdoing it. The donkey was built for the ground where everything else gives up. It lives on thorn and scrub that a horse would starve beside, climbs rock on hooves like chisels, cools itself through those ears, and can lose nearly a third of its body weight in water, carry on eating, then drink 25 litres in three minutes and walk off as if nothing happened. We tamed it 7,000 years ago in the dry country of East Africa, and it has been the animal of the hard places ever since. So it was the donkey, long before the horse, that carried civilisation on its back. One of Egypt's first pharaohs was buried at Abydos with ten donkeys laid in graves beside him, every spine worn from a lifetime under loads. The grain, the salt, the copper and the news of the ancient world moved at a donkey's pace, and wherever a hill is still too steep for a wheel, they still do. The same animal fed our babies. Donkey milk is the closest milk on earth to a human mother's, Hippocrates prescribed it, and the foundling hospital in Paris kept a stable of jennies so the orphans could be put straight to the udder. A fair share of Europe's abandoned children owe their first month to a donkey, and most of those donkeys carry a dark cross down the back and across the shoulders, which the old story says was given to them on Good Friday. It carried our wounded too. On the beach at Gallipoli a stretcher-bearer from South Shields found a stray donkey, and for 24 days the two of them walked up and down Shrapnel Gully under fire bringing broken men down to the boats, until a machine gun got the man. The donkey went back up with the next one. Of everything the Anzacs brought home from that campaign, the thing they chose to remember was a donkey. Then there is the stubbornness, the one fact everybody is sure of, and it is the opposite of the truth. A horse meets danger by bolting, which is why horses die on cliff paths. A donkey stops, looks at the thing in front of it, and makes a decision, and it will refuse to step into water it cannot see the bottom of because it is right not to. For 7,000 years we have been calling a risk assessment an attitude. Put one in a field of ewes and it appoints itself. A fox or a loose dog comes through the hedge and the donkey goes at it, head down, front feet first, and keeps going until the thing has gone. Nobody trains that in. It decided they were its sheep. It remembers a face and a field after 25 years. It will stand over a dying companion for a day. It lives to 40 and outlasts half the people who ever owned it. There are about 50 million of them alive, carrying water, firewood and children for the poorest people on earth, and close to 6 million a year are now killed for their hides, boiled down into a gelatine sold as a tonic. The animal that did the most work for the least thanks is being melted into a wellness product. Seven thousand years of hauling us uphill, feeding our orphans and carrying our wounded, and the best we managed in return was to turn its name into an insult. So no. Not nearly obsessed enough.
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Emmy retweeted
Kaspersky called Operation Triangulation the most sophisticated attack chain it has ever seen, and one link in it is still a hardware mystery. It was a zero-click iMessage attack that chained four zero-days. A malicious attachment gave no sign to the user, and the chain ended in spyware. It worked on iOS up to 16.2. The strangest link was CVE-2023-38606. iPhones from the A12 to the A16 protect sensitive kernel memory with a hardware-based layer. The attackers got around it by writing data, a destination address, and a hash into chip registers that no firmware or device tree references. That let them write straight to physical memory. The registers belong to the GPU coprocessor. Kaspersky first guessed a debug or factory test feature. Later analysis showed the "hash" was an error-correcting code, which points to a cache debugging feature. Nobody knows how the attackers learned about it. They either worked it out themselves or the information leaked somewhere. Apple fixed it in iOS 16.6 by blocking those address ranges. Kaspersky's conclusion is that hardware protections fail when a hidden hardware feature can bypass them.
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You are more productive when you are in a happy place. You make more money when you’re happy. Optimism is an asset.
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Can't pass. Can't keep ball. Can't shoot. Can't cross. Can't defend. Can't score.
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Yet another week. Can't pass. Can't keep ball. Can't shoot. Can't cross. Can't defend. Can't score.
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And yet nother week. Can't pass. Can't keep ball. Can't shoot. Can't cross. Can't defend. Can't score.
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That’s because food prices have gone through the roof.
The tradition of cooking food to share with people around when roofing a house has finally gone extinct
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Outstanding work. #U17WWC
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Emmy retweeted
Apple didn't store a plaintext list of forbidden words in iOS. Instead, researchers discovered a compiled minimal perfect hash table of 32-bit fingerprints buried inside the keyboard's language-model files. When you swipe-type or use autocomplete on an iPhone, the keyboard converts your input into token IDs and evaluates sequences of two to six words. It hashes those candidate n-grams using Bob Jenkins's public-domain hashword() function. If that 32-bit fingerprint matches an entry in the table, the predictive engine refuses to suggest it, or the swipe model actively diverts the word to an alternate match. On November 6, researcher Derik Kauffman published Swipeblocked after exhaustively enumerating candidate word combinations against the table to reverse-engineer the hidden phrases. His conservative estimate is roughly 100,000 entries across 28 languages. In English, the prediction list holds 4,525 phrases and the swipe-typing list holds 2,794. Most entries cover violence, slurs, and sexual content, but the table also silences geopolitical phrases like "Tibetan independence", "United Ireland", "dictator Trump", and Hebrew for "the occupied territories". In testing, swiping "United Ireland" consistently resolved to "United Iceland". You can still type any phrase letter by letter. The suppression only touches autocomplete predictions and gesture paths. Apple told Reuters the system avoids offensive suggestions, but never addressed the political entries or the existence of the table. Apple never published the list because it was never meant to be read. It took brute-forcing the hash table to show what the keyboard was quietly dropping.
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Emmy retweeted
Public warnings about airport USB ports stealing your photos through juice jacking have never had a documented real-world victim. The better-documented threat to a plugged-in phone is an electrical exploit inside the charger itself. Fast charging does not just dump current into a battery. It relies on a digital negotiation protocol called USB Power Delivery (USB-PD). When you connect a device, the charger defaults to a safe 5 volts on the VBUS power line. The charger and phone then exchange messages over a single dedicated Configuration Channel (CC wire) using Biphase Mark Code at 300 kbps. The sequence follows four packet types: Source_Capabilities, Request, Accept, and PS_RDY. Only after the phone receives PS_RDY does it close its internal switch to accept higher voltages like 9 or 20 volts. In July 2020, security researchers at Tencent's Xuanwu Lab demonstrated an attack called BadPower. They audited 35 commercial fast chargers across 234 market models and found 18 vulnerable across 8 brands. Many fast chargers use microcontrollers with exposed, unauthenticated firmware update routines accessible through the USB port. An attacker can connect a reprogrammer to the charger for a few seconds to rewrite its firmware, or malware on a connected phone can reflash it silently. The modified charger abuses the fact that copper wires cannot enforce digital promises. A corrupted charger can report 5 volts while ramping its internal power converter to 20 volts. A 5-volt-only device never participates in USB-PD negotiation, so it cannot verify the voltage. When 20 volts hits front-end components rated for only 6 volts, the excess voltage punches through the gate oxide of the input transistors, permanently destroying the power management chip. Physical USB data blockers offer zero protection here. A data blocker cuts the D+ and D- data lines to prevent file transfers, but leaves the VBUS power and ground pins connected to allow charging. A phone only survives if it has hardware overvoltage protection (an analog switch tripping before the 6.6-volt breakdown mark) or a post-negotiation check that continuously compares live VBUS voltage against the agreed contract. An untrusted charger can lie about its voltage over the wire, leaving device survival entirely to on-board overvoltage hardware.
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