Hedger

While this is obviously IRGC trolling, it does raise a concern that has been rolling around in my head for some time in the event the United States resumes combat operations against Iran, specifically against Iranian energy infrastructure. Iran has little domestic capacity for developing heavy conventional bombs like the GBU-43/B, mostly because Iran has no domestic capability to deliver such a weapon. However, Iran does have the capacity, the raw materials, and the technical know-how to develop and deliver an improvised explosive device with an energy output far higher than that of the MOAB. Iran is one of the top producers of ammonia globally and operates a well-established petrochemical and nitrogen-based fertilizer industry. Iran has also demonstrated a willingness to use explosive-laden USVs and skiffs against merchant vessels before, including during this conflict. It would not be hard for them to scale that tactic up to an ammonium nitrate/fuel oil-laden merchant vessel. As a point of reference, consider the 2020 Port of Beirut explosion. That was 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate that had been aboard a derelict 86m general cargo vessel that made an unscheduled stop in Beirut before being abandoned. The cargo was eventually off-loaded and improperly stored within the port, where it degraded over the course of 6 years and eventually detonated. The Beirut explosion was the equivalent of around 1 kiloton (1,000 metric tons) of TNT. It was, and remains, the sixth-largest accidental artificial non-nuclear explosion in history. For comparison, the MOAB yields 0.011 kilotons (11 metric tons) of TNT. Even a much smaller improvised device could cause considerable damage and would be even easier to deliver. The Oklahoma City bombing was also an ammonium nitrate/fuel oil-based device containing around 2 metric tons of ANFO mixture that was possibly spiked with acetylene cylinders. That explosion was the equivalent of just 0.002 kilotons (2 metric tons) of TNT and destroyed most of a nine-story reinforced concrete and granite building. Given that the United States seems uninterested or unable to prevent Iranian-linked vessels from operating in and around the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, it would be fairly easy for Iran to slip an ANFO-laden merchant vessel amidst other merchant traffic and even possibly into regional ports and anchorages. A number of Iranian shadow fleet vessels are in these anchorages already. If the indications that the United States will resume combat operations against Iran and specifically target Iranian energy infrastructure after the midterm election come true, this is how I would expect Iran to strike back. Iran will not let attacks against energy infrastructure go without an equivalent response. It is one of the many reasons why the constant narrative that Iran's military capabilities are degraded, if not obliterated, is misleading. Iran does not need an Air Force or Navy to cause immeasurable harm to the United States and its regional partners, and based on what we have seen over the last 8 months, I see little evidence that the United States or its regional partners would be able to prevent such an attack.