Both Washington's record of broken commitments and international law support Secretary @ir_rezaee's refusal to surrender Iran's enriched uranium or negotiate before the United States meets its conditions. In 2018, Trump repudiated the JCPOA, under which Iran had already shipped its enriched stockpile abroad. Iran was bombed in the middle of negotiations in June 2025 and again in February 2026. The Islamabad MoU was broken within weeks of signature. Other countries have fared no better. US forces seized Venezuela's sitting president. Canada and Mexico saw the USMCA, which Trump himself signed, overridden by tariffs, and Canada was told it should become the 51st state. Denmark has been pressed to cede Greenland, and Panama has been threatened over its Canal. A counterparty with this record cannot ask to be paid first. The law supports Iran on four grounds: First, the demand has no legal basis. Article IV of the NPT affirms every party's inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy. Nothing in the Treaty or in Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement requires a state to export safeguarded material. The uranium is Iranian property under Iranian jurisdiction. Second, the demand is the product of aggression, and aggression can produce no rights. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat of force as well as its use. Article 3(b) and (c) of the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression list bombardment of a state's territory and blockade of its ports as acts of aggression. Article 5 of the Definition adds two rules. No consideration of any kind can justify aggression. No special advantage resulting from aggression can be recognised as lawful. This prohibition is not ordinary law. It is a peremptory norm of *jus cogens*. The ICJ acknowledged that status in *Nicaragua*, and the International Law Commission placed the prohibition first in its 2022 list of peremptory norms. Three consequences follow: - Under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention, any agreement procured by the threat or use of force is void. - No consent extracted under blockade can validly transfer Iranian property. - Under Article 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, every state must refuse to recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm, and must not assist in maintaining it. The principle is old and simple: ex injuria jus non oritur, a right cannot arise from a wrong. Third, a party in breach cannot demand performance. Judge Anzilotti recognised the principle *inadimplenti non est adimplendum* in *Diversion of Water from the Meuse*, and Article 60 of the Vienna Convention reflects it: the injured party need not perform while the other remains in default. Washington is in continuing breach of Resolution 2231 and the MoU. It cannot insist that Iran perform first. Fourth, Iran's preconditions are obligations, not concessions. Articles 30 and 31 of the ILC Articles require a wrongdoing state to cease its conduct, guarantee non-repetition and make full reparation, the standard set in *Chorzów Factory*. Ending hostilities, lifting the blockade and sanctions, releasing frozen assets and compensating for war damage are what the law already demands of Washington. Where the breach is of a peremptory norm, cessation is owed immediately, unconditionally and to the international community as a whole. It cannot be traded for Iran's property. Good-faith negotiation presupposes a counterparty that has stopped its wrongful conduct. Until the United States does, Iran's refusal is not obstruction. It is what the law requires.