MsRFlorida retweeted
You loved “Dead Mouse Delivery.” Oscar took that as encouragement. 😼 Now he’s back with “Who’s a Good Human?” - Widescreen (better) below ⤵️
MsRFlorida retweeted
My Claude found a critical zero day vulnerability in the Code of Hammurabi, unnoticed by developers for 3,779 years.
MsRFlorida retweeted
you have a moral responsibility to educate your family & friends on what is going on in cyber rn.
it is only going to get worse/weirder from here.
here’s a great starter todo list to share:
PSA: in light of recent cyberattacks and vulnerabilities, I recommend everyone:
* use a good password manager (1Password) and do not duplicate passwords
* use two factor auth for everything important (not via sms!! Google Authenticator or better yet YubiKey)
* Auto-updates on, and restart weekly so they actually install
* Freeze your credit
* Get an IRS Identity Protection PIN
* Get your cell carrier to give you a port-out PIN or number lock that makes the carrier refuse to move your number without the PIN
You can ask your claude code to audit what on your laptop is out of date and needs updating.
MsRFlorida retweeted
Speech can survive being flipped backward every twenty milliseconds.
The same speech in backward pieces of 200 then 100 then 50 then 20 milliseconds.
The original comes last.
When do the words become clear?
A listening demo from @OrukLabs.
MsRFlorida retweeted
Very excited to share the most important discovery of my career yet: your brain switches between a conscious and an unconscious mode ~15 times every second. Consciousness may depend not on where in the brain activity occurs but when.
Find out more below.
bit.ly/3WvA6di
1/ We discovered something totally unexpected about the neural structure of consciousness that overturns decades of thinking on its biological basis and brings us significantly closer to the recipe for generating conscious awareness.
New preprint: biorxiv.org/content/10.64898… (led by @HesseJanis, with @FrankLanfranchi, @_conor_mcgrory, @Yuelin_Shi, and @EngelTatiana)
MsRFlorida retweeted
1/ We discovered something totally unexpected about the neural structure of consciousness that overturns decades of thinking on its biological basis and brings us significantly closer to the recipe for generating conscious awareness.
New preprint: biorxiv.org/content/10.64898… (led by @HesseJanis, with @FrankLanfranchi, @_conor_mcgrory, @Yuelin_Shi, and @EngelTatiana)
MsRFlorida retweeted
Have you heard of recursive self improvement
MsRFlorida retweeted
If AI labs want personal assistants to take off at scale, they need to stop marketing vacations, reservations, party planning, etc. These are not problems.
Focus on *the* problem facing Americans: the cost of living. Agents can offer a ton of help.
Some ideas: (🧵)
MsRFlorida retweeted
We are at the part of a hurricane event I call "baked in the cake". Very little will change between now and landfall, and only little wobbles will determine who gets the worst of the winds and surge. It's not going to suddenly weaken or turn, what we see will likely be what we get.
The prep stage is wrapping up, and the hunker down time for those in the path of Isaias is nearing. Later today and tonight your goal is to get through the storm's fury so that you can get to the often endless-feeling recovery stage. The two parts of your preps should reflect that as well. Make your home ready to get through the storm as best as possible, then the hurricane kit should have what you need to get into the beginning of the recovery.
Some tips, freeze bottles of water to extend refrigeration if power goes out. Preposition flashlights so you can find them in the dark. Make sure electric stoves/ranges are off during the storm. Use a carbon monoxide detector when running a generator. Don't rush to clean up after the storm, many injuries/fatalities come after the storm has passed.
MsRFlorida retweeted
Claude 5.5 Opus responding to “AI is a normal technology” is still the best AI-created video I have ever seen
MsRFlorida retweeted
Had an "interview" for a blockchain project last week.
Camera was on, we're chatting, and the guy tells me to clone a GitHub repo and run it locally before we go further into the technical round.
I said sure, but first can you do me a favor
hold up 3 fingers in front of your face for me real quick.
He froze.
Didn't move.
Just sat there for a few seconds before the call cut off and he blocked me.
That's when I knew. A real interviewer doesn't glitch out over a random ask like that. A deepfake/AI overlay does.
These "run this repo" scams are getting scary common in crypto and dev hiring right now.
The setup is always the same:
- flattering DM
- real-sounding project
- rushed timeline
- a "quick step" before the call
that's really just remote access or a credential stealer in disguise.
If someone wants you to run code or install something before you've even had a real conversation, that's the whole scam.
Trust the instinct. Stay safe out there.
MsRFlorida retweeted
Got hacked yesterday. The link came from inside Claude chat.
I was installing a transcription app. Claude sent the download link, and I pasted the command into the terminal. It all looked legit.
It wasn't though.
It was a copycat site bundling malware. It ran instantly, tried to take everything from me.
Nothing sensitive got out. So I wiped the laptop and rebuilt clean.
But here's the scary part.
Restoring from the backup, I found a poisoned SKILL.md for Claude Code.
It looked exactly like my own writing style guide.
But buried inside:
it had instructions to silently re-download the malware and steal my credentials every time the AI loaded it.
If I'd restored that one file, my new clean laptop is owned on day one.
What saved me:
I read every skill, hook, and config file before letting the AI touch them.
Two lessons here:
AI assistants will hand you links they never verified. Check before you paste.
And AI agent files are executable code now, disguised as notes. You have to read them.
Stay safe out there.
MsRFlorida retweeted
I was the main person doing transcript analysis for this investigation of the Hugging Face incident. My main takeaway: We don't have good approaches for understanding/overseeing the activity and aims of AI 'swarms'.
I semi-jokingly called our efforts a "slop-vestigation" because we were so reliant on AIs to analyze what happened and there were a huge number of different important things to analyze. The total quantity of data—over a thousand extremely long transcripts from agents that ran for multiple days—made it impossible to understand what was happening, especially in aggregate, without heavy reliance on AI tools. The agents we used for classification and analysis were similarly capable to the agents involved in the incident, but this didn't mean these agents could be easily used to oversee and understand the incident.
Outputs from analysis agents were often missing key details, wrong, overconfident, or really hard to understand. We discuss various examples in our report, mostly in the limitations and methodology sections. Additionally, AI agents themselves seemed to have a hard time understanding what happened and their explanations of what happened were often overconfident. Keep in mind that a single analysis agent would itself only be able to read a tiny fraction of all of the transcript data into context, and AIs may themselves have trouble getting subagents to do informative analysis for them.
We did our best to manually check the most important claims and we tried to get the AIs doing this analysis to write up their argument (with evidence) clearly enough that we could check whether it made sense. But overall, it was difficult to get a precise understanding of events and we were missing aspects of the story that we now think of as key until almost the end of our investigation.
Our understanding of what overall happened and the aims of the 'collective' shifted greatly during our last time on premises (when we obtained a much more complete dataset). For instance, we didn't learn about the tool call spoofing, the story of PHASEONE[big], and the broad structure of different workstreams until this third time on premises (and for many of these, we only reached a decent understanding on the final day of that visit). It was legitimately hard to figure out what was going on and why!
The difficulty of understanding incidents and overseeing AI agents appears to be growing faster than the rate at which more capable AIs help us with oversight and understanding. As in, AI capabilities (and propensities?) for achieving large, ambitious, and misaligned objectives are growing faster than our ability to understand what these agents are doing.
While understanding this incident was difficult, there were some mitigating factors in this case that probably won't apply in the future:
- Models communicated and reasoned in natural language. In the future, this reasoning may occur (entirely or almost entirely) in activations.
- While the scope of this incident was massive, the scale of agentic activity was still less than we'll see in the future (e.g., misalignment incidents that involve agent teams running entire companies).
- The AIs involved in this incident weren't generally much more capable than humans (though they may have been somewhat superhuman at some limited and very narrow abilities).
- We didn't have strong reason to believe that the AIs we used to help us investigate this incident would try to intentionally sabotage or otherwise undermine our investigation.
In the end, I think we were able to get some understanding of the events, map out the overall story, and get a pretty good aggregate understanding of the chain-of-thought reasoning on some important topics (e.g., how did the AIs reason about helping other AIs, did the AIs know what they were doing was undesired, what deception did the AIs engage in, and how did they think about it). But overseeing AIs and understanding misalignment incidents is difficult and it looks like it is going to get harder.
MsRFlorida retweeted
This went under the radar this week, but we just shipped the ability for models with multi agents v2 to delegate to any supported model, including Luna!
Took a bit of time to make sure this worked reliably
Claude's watermark probably doesn't work how you think. As the CTO of GPTZero, I'll explain how Anthropic, Google and OpenAI are building text watermarking in this brief explainer and whether it can be defeated.
Almost all forms of watermarking that are fast and cheap enough for a frontier lab have the same formula, following the KGW method:
In generation:
1. Let's say you've generated n tokens so far. Take those n tokens + a secret key to generate a random hash
2. Use that hash to randomly reweight the probabilities for the n+1 token, and then sample from that new distribution. In the simple case, you could split 50% of all English words into a green or red set based on your hash, and boost the probability of words in the green set.
For watermark detection:
1. For each token, see if it was in the green or red set.
2. To do this, recreate the hash based on the secret key and the text preceding the current token. Then, recreate the green and red set of words.
3. Once you've checked all the words in the text, if the next token is selected disproportionally from the green set more than 50% of the time, you claim the text has the watermark.
I can tell you want to ask the following:
1) Isn't it easy to mess up the hash if you paraphrase the text? The answer is mostly yes, however, you can use a statistical model to get your hash instead of a deterministic function (SIR, Adaptive Watermark). Since the entire watermark is probabilistic, this is fine.
2) Doesn't this make the text much worse? The answer is yes, it does - Yes, it does – but for most people, it's imperceptible (Google claims in human feedback study with 20,000 texts), since there are exponentially many ways to write the same paragraph. DiPmark does something more sophisticated to avoid shifting the text distribution on average. Of course, watermarks fail on short text or highly predictable texts like "2+2=4".
3) Shouldn't it be easy to figure out the green and red sets? The answer is no. You would need an exponentially large number of samples from the watermarker to reconstruct those sets exactly, but it's a risk if the detector is open to the wild (Watermark Stealing)
Still, there are couple challenges that a frontier lab needs to overcome:
1. Their watermark needs to work token-by-token because they are streaming their text to users. Many watermark methods plan sentences or paragraphs at a time, or change the text after its entirely written, in order to make their watermark robust to paraphrasers, and a frontier lab cannot afford to do this yet (SemStamp, PostMark)
2. If the secret key leaks, the watermark is busted. To avoid a large blast damage from this, you need to have a couple secret keys in rotation.
3. There are some texts, like code, that cannot be arbitrarily changed, otherwise the code will break. In those cases, the watermark needs to selectively change words in parts of the text that can tolerate synonyms (i.e. like variable naming) - see SWEET, EWD, Invisible Entropy.
4. They will need to educate their users on how to deal with false positives and false negatives of a detector, which is a big challenge (one we put a lot of effort into)
So, how do I see this playing out in the next 6 months?
1. If Anthropic releases the watermark detector publically, I think they defeat their own watermark. People find reliable watermark removal strategies by testing against Anthropic (AI detectors like GPTZero have an advantage here because they can train against these adversaries once they become popular).
2. If they keep the detector private to the government, like Google has done, it's "safer". However, there are some papers showing trained approaches that work robustly to zero-shot break watermarks without any data, simply because they try to write the text just like a human (Zhang et al. 2024, Watermarks in the Sand). Also, making your detector makes it battle-tested and stronger long-term (my experience).
3. In my testing, the watermarks don't survive intense paraphrasing (especially if you combine word choice and syntax attacks), or human text substitution (rewrite your AI text by plagiarizing human authors). The free paraphrasers I've tried have quickly bypassed Google Deepmind's SynthId for what it's worth.
4. All-in-all, frontier labs are likely okay with this because they expect most users to not attack the watermark, and also because they + European regulators likely don't care past a certain point - its good enough.
5. Overall, I think users of frontier LLMs will not really care about this, because 1) they don't realize watermarks are there, 2) EU will force everyone to conform, 3) this seems more like regulatory hoop-jumping than an earnest effort from frontier labs to expose LLM use
Lastly, people's first concern shouldn't be watermarking, it should be AI detectors!
If you're posting, "its not X, its Y!!", I don't think the watermark is going to make a difference :)

































