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Joined December 2008
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NPEC retweeted
Saudi Arabia reportedly offers Houthis $1 billion in Iran-brokered deal to halt attacks
israelhayom.com/2026/10/26/s…
Francis “Fordward Deterrence” initiative nets 10 European partners tinyurl.com/3259th9h
Satellite photos reveal Saudi Arabia is building long-range, Chinese-designed, nuclear
-capable missile factories tinyurl.com/4y29j4u9
Iran details, threats to sever major underseas cable systems in the Gulf if war resumes tinyurl.com/43zw6u4n
America’s European allies scramble to establish their own space service alternatives to Musk’s StarLink and StarShield systems tinyurl.com/5y46jyru
NPEC retweeted
🚨🇬🇧 El Gobierno británico acaba de decirle a la gente que guarde efectivo, agua y latas en casa.
El Secretario de Defensa Wes Streeting apareció en BBC Newsnight y recomendó a todos los hogares que tengan provisiones para tres días. No es un simulacro ni un consejo de siempre: es la nueva campaña oficial “Be Ready”.
El mensaje es directo. Si se cae la luz, si un ciberataque tumba los sistemas de pago o si un evento climático corta el agua y la electricidad, cada familia debe poder aguantar sola al menos 72 horas.
Lo que pide el Gobierno
• 3 litros de agua embotellada por persona al día.
• Comida enlatada o que no necesite nevera ni cocinarse.
• Efectivo en efectivo (por si las tarjetas y los cajeros dejan de funcionar).
• Radio de pilas o a cuerda, linterna, mantas y botiquín.
Streeting lo dijo sin rodeos: las amenazas “no son hipotéticas” y “están aquí”. Habló de “terrorismo patrocinado por Estados”, ciberataques cada vez más sofisticados y la posibilidad real de que los supermercados o los bancos no funcionen durante días. El Gobierno insiste en que “no hay un ataque específico en marcha”, pero también reconoce que el mundo es más peligroso e inestable que antes.
En un país donde casi todo se paga con el móvil, el Estado acaba de admitir que el efectivo vuelve a ser un recurso de emergencia. Y que la dependencia total de internet, electricidad y cadenas de suministro globales tiene un punto de ruptura.
La campaña ya circula fuerte. No es una orden militar, pero sí una señal clara: las autoridades ya no dan por hecho que los servicios esenciales van a estar siempre disponibles. Y le están pidiendo a la población que se prepare como si no lo fueran.
NPEC retweeted
FORTRESS: The Pentagon is preparing every major U.S. military base to survive 90 days without outside support — no civilian power grid, no global supply chains, no outside fuel or water.
The initiative, revealed in documents reviewed by Fox News Digital, envisions portable nuclear reactors, massive battery storage, and microgrids that can disconnect installations from civilian electricity entirely. Strategic reserves of munitions, fuel, critical minerals, and medical supplies would be stockpiled based on wartime consumption rates. Civilian factories are being pre-identified to shift to defense production during a crisis.
Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell put it bluntly: "Power is combat now. Without electricity, you lose communications, water, logistics, assembly lines and just basic military command structures."
Full story here foxnews.com/politics/inside-…
Nuclear engineering professor at MIT identifies Plutonium as Iran’s best option for a bomb tinyurl.com/mwn34nxu
Saudi elite drive up demand for private jets to flee the Kingdom tinyurl.com/yzxf3kfj
John Batchelor-NPEC weekly review examines the Saudi Kingdom’s fragility, the military vulnerability of nuclear power & fuel making plants & trend toward protecting assets against attacks by building them underground, can the Golden Dome protect itself against rendezvous satellite attacks tinyurl.com/y3ru643j
Taiwan in the Philippines agreed cooperate on under sea cable defense tinyurl.com/37dwud2u
The Quad Report showcases NPEC analysis , “Defanging the Saudi Nuclear Deal”
thequadreport.com/guest-comm…
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icont.ac/51ofk
NPEC retweeted
Via @ragipsoylu, the full text of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan has now been published, with the agreement being sent to the Turkish Parliament for ratification by the government.
In the recent past, when amidst Houthi attacks, Saudi Arabia invoked the agreement, and Türkiye’s lacking response was questioned by critics, with Turkish officials responding by saying that the deal was not yet legally operative.
Former VP and chief security officer for North American Electrify Reliability Corporation spells out what Congress must demand to assure safe operation of nuclear systems in the Saudi Peninsula war zone before the US build anything for the kingdom tinyurl.com/2upcz26w
Hungry considers replacing Russian reactor with another vendor tinyurl.com/bdk8bw5y
Soon, if the critics of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperative agreement have their way, Congress will vote on a resolution of disapproval. Whether that resolution passes or not, the question will remain: can the United States trust Saudi Arabia with nuclear fuel-making activities that could bring the Kingdom to the brink of bomb-making? That question goes not simply to the Saudi regime of today but to the Saudi regime that might follow the one currently in power.
As Yoel Guzansky, a leading expert on the Saudi regime, and I write in the attached piece “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Program Could Outlive Its Government, So Plan Accordingly” that Breaking Defense just posted, Congress needs to consider what the security consequences might be of helping the Saudis enrich uranium when and if the current Saudi regime gives way to a different regime.
The question is hardly academic: in 1979, the United States was still backing the Shah of Iran’s nuclear program; shortly thereafter, Iran and the nuclear program came under the rule of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Is such a drastic change in store for Saudi Arabia? Over the lifetime of a nuclear program — 60-80 years — the jury is out. Significant change is possible. Congress should conduct a political durability assessment of its own.
Who would control enrichment capabilities during a future succession crisis? Could nuclear facilities be secured during prolonged regional conflict? What happens if relations with Washington deteriorate? And what political forces might ultimately inherit the infrastructure and expertise the United States helped establish?
If Congress cannot get the answers it likes, it should definitely condition the agreement—at least with regard to promoting or helping the Saudis enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel.
As always, I’m curious to get your take on the attached
breakingdefense.com/2026/10/…
