It is very interesting to read the reactions to buying PCOR at $40/sh in June.
Filing this one away as a reminder.
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And we went with a secret third option.
Bring down expectations but don't tell people how bad '27 will be. Will probably guide 14% rev growth and hit 15%.
Would have been smarter to get the low guide out of the way, but now sitting at ~3x '27e ev/rev
This afternoon we get to see if $ALKT decides to report that they will win DCU/First Tech vs blame bookings on the Q3 deal process & use this qtr to reset expectations.
Never a dull moment in digital banking apparently
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This afternoon we get to see if $ALKT decides to report that they will win DCU/First Tech vs blame bookings on the Q3 deal process & use this qtr to reset expectations.
Never a dull moment in digital banking apparently
Having spent way too much time looking at US-Mexico corridor, I now think $NU subsidy is even less a big deal for $RELY.
1) US-Mexico has been inundated with free offers for the past year. Revolut began advertising 'free' in Jan '26, BOSS Money giving 5 free transfers, TapTap subsidizing rate. Nu 'free' offer isn't a major differentiator vs the market. FT Partners calling this an 80-100 bps revenue headwind to $RELY under the most punitive assumptions.
2) Remittance COGS will eat Nu unit economics unless all the sends are Nu US to Nu Mexico. Think this is why Nu has already marked up free transfers to a 30 bps take rate -- and will likely increase the rate if send volumes grow to make sure the cost doesn't break their US profitability.
So we're back to the $RELY case really depending on send volume growth from high value senders, Business, Access (opening up rails, eg the Etsy deal) + upside if Remitly's wallet works for their receivers.
I took a closer look at Nu’s US entry before deciding what it meant for $RELY
My guess: <1% of '27 revenue growth.
US–Mexico is the major overlapping corridor, but Nu isn't supporting high value senders or cash pickup. Rough guess ~5% of revenue exposed, and exposed customers probably don't churn for years (pain of switching, Remitly can adjust pricing week to week after seeing customer behavior, etc).
The more interesting question is the cost of “free.”
Nu has run US-Mexico through Felixpago since 2024. Felix has a 2.4% revenue take rate & 1.2% RLTE take rate. Assume Nu pays 2%-2.4% depending on Felix's discount pricing. If a core remittance customer sends ~$5k/yr, Nu would be paying $100-$120 per customer every year.
Those unit economics don't work, especially bc Nu doesn't require subsidy customers to make Nu US their primary account.
I love Nu as a business, but I doubt this subsidy lasts indefinitely. Glad for the entry point.
.@Pray4Equity mind opening your DMs? Started customer checks on gift card fraud & curious if it's lining up with your work too
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If personal finance agents help more consumers switch to cheaper loans & better deposit rates, the obvious AI beneficiaries here are... credit unions.
And the companies best placed to drive this change & accelerate bookings are $ALKT (public) and Lumin (private).
Take a look at how the avg bank customer could save 200 bps on an auto loan & 25-50 bps on a mortgage:
ncua.gov/analysis/cuso-econo…
Yesterday I uploaded my auto insurance policy to Meta @Muse and asked for a better rate with identical coverage. In ~5 minutes, it found a policy saving me $3,500 /year, bought it, and canceled my old one.
I knew I was overpaying. I’d abandoned several attempts to switch because insurance websites and aggregator portals are so painful.
Why fill out forms, compare quotes, and field sales calls when an agent can finish the entire job in five minutes? Killer product.
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I took a closer look at Nu’s US entry before deciding what it meant for $RELY
My guess: <1% of '27 revenue growth.
US–Mexico is the major overlapping corridor, but Nu isn't supporting high value senders or cash pickup. Rough guess ~5% of revenue exposed, and exposed customers probably don't churn for years (pain of switching, Remitly can adjust pricing week to week after seeing customer behavior, etc).
The more interesting question is the cost of “free.”
Nu has run US-Mexico through Felixpago since 2024. Felix has a 2.4% revenue take rate & 1.2% RLTE take rate. Assume Nu pays 2%-2.4% depending on Felix's discount pricing. If a core remittance customer sends ~$5k/yr, Nu would be paying $100-$120 per customer every year.
Those unit economics don't work, especially bc Nu doesn't require subsidy customers to make Nu US their primary account.
I love Nu as a business, but I doubt this subsidy lasts indefinitely. Glad for the entry point.
If you're looking for new ideas after this software & non-AI rally, think worth looking at $EVLV $ALKT $NCNO
$EVLV is facing a tough YoY comp + accounting shift that defers revenue recognition. Units should grow 30% this year, but GAAP revenue will be 6%-8% in Q3. They think 25% organic revenue CAGR over 5y. 3x in 4y if you think they exit at a 20x NTM EBITDA multiple.
$ALKT is a sneaky AI beneficiary + bookings beat. Personal finance AI agents should make more consumers more rational, i.e. people should shift from bank loans to credit unions loans (CUs avg 25-75 bps cheaper on mortgages, 75-200 bps cheaper on auto loans). ALKT helps CUs open accounts & monetizes on CU customer growth. On bookings, their #1 customer First Tech was acquired by DCU, and I think DCU should flip in next 6 quarters. Would be ~1.1m new logo users, nearly a full year of new logo bookings in a single deal. Trades '28e 12.5x EV/uFCF with cash buildup for high teens growth outlook. Jana pushing to sell this now (probably to MeridianLink), but I think the standalone story even more interesting.
$NCNO has finally reclaimed LDD organic growth ex mortgage + will soon monetize their new AI Intelligence Units. Document-heavy loan origination is a perfect fit for LLMs, and ~half the client base is on NCNO's solution. Early monetization starts H2 this year, but I think we see 2+% revenue growth uplift as monetization hits NTM (upside much higher, depending on product execution). Sales reorg last year, so I think effective sales capacity up mid teens for H2, meaning we should see material gross bookings improvement. Lastly, maturation of new pricing model means FCF conversion should improve from ~63% last year to 80+ by CY28. Trades CY '28e 9.5x EV/uFCF.
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$WEAV taken out for $7.40/sh.
Assuming Francisco Partners runs it for free cash flow instead of making product bets, likely means the AI Receptionist upside flows to Dentrix in $HSIC
May be worth a follow in coming quarters
$WEAV Q2 in short.
Company likely for sale, comps ~ $9-$12/sh.
Record location adds, AI Receptionist released, EBITDA margin inflecting.
Naturally that's the time for a sales reorg. Now using full-time SDRs for leads. Bookings interruption means weaker Q3 revenue growth. Not fatal but a bit annoying.
AI Receptionist remains the big upside here. Weave is 1 of 2 compliant telephony rails that can deliver this at scale today in dental & other healthcare practices (Mango is the other). For a dentist billing $1m/yr, an agent should lift bookings 3%-7% + collections 2%-4% + cross-sell + reduce labor cost. At 2 dentists/practice, $150k+/yr in value easily. Weave currently charges $6k/location to give you an idea of potential pricing upside.
H2 '26 is the real test for whether they execute or sell to someone who will take better advantage here
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$ARX definitely taken out too soon. Think everyone was analogizing incorrectly to old risk exchanges that blew up in the 80s and 90s.
Cheers to @masayoshisson for pointing it out & look forward to Thoma re-IPOing the business at 2x the price in 2028.
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$WEAV Q2 in short.
Company likely for sale, comps ~ $9-$12/sh.
Record location adds, AI Receptionist released, EBITDA margin inflecting.
Naturally that's the time for a sales reorg. Now using full-time SDRs for leads. Bookings interruption means weaker Q3 revenue growth. Not fatal but a bit annoying.
AI Receptionist remains the big upside here. Weave is 1 of 2 compliant telephony rails that can deliver this at scale today in dental & other healthcare practices (Mango is the other). For a dentist billing $1m/yr, an agent should lift bookings 3%-7% + collections 2%-4% + cross-sell + reduce labor cost. At 2 dentists/practice, $150k+/yr in value easily. Weave currently charges $6k/location to give you an idea of potential pricing upside.
H2 '26 is the real test for whether they execute or sell to someone who will take better advantage here
$RELY Q2 in short
'26 growth upside from high value sends + taking legacy share.
23% Q2 Adj EBITDA margin. Headcount flattish, so continued EBITDA beats vs H2 '26 and FY '27 consensus.
My '27/'28 Qs are (1) how much can they rip from WU/MGI and (2) receiver card adoption
$RELY and $WSE could see a huge volume boost from the collapse of $WU and MoneyGram.
Only WU is public, but these concerns apply to MGI as well.
1) With the new 1% tax, in-person cash remittances (WU/MGI) cost ~2x digital remittances (RELY/WSE) depending on corridor.
2) Cash remittance economics are deteriorating. Remittance = sender pay-in, transfer, recipient pay-out. WU's payout mix is shifting from cash to bank accounts, which WU can't charge as much for.
3) WU gave up on the transition from cash remittances to digital. WU's app is *losing* MAUs in spite of the shift to digital, and they have publicly paused customer acquisition spend bc they can't make the LTV-CAC math work. Note that RELY outspends all major remittance competition on marketing & maintains <12mo gross profit payback & 5+ yr lifetime.
4) So WU's digital economics are deteriorating too. WU shifted to white-labeling behind other front-end wallets, who pay WU a smaller cut and who can swap out to any other backend transfer provider in the future... like WSE/RELY
5) WU is no longer generating enough FCF to cover the dividend & will bust a credit covenant within 5 years without opex cuts. So WU is doing their 4th major opex cut this decade, which means worse service for their end customer. Degradation should mean increasing revenue churn to RELY/WSE.
6) Lastly, headline risk could create a 'snap bankruptcy' as Mario notes below. The key to money transfers is trust. MoneyGram did not see sending pause in 2008 with genuine balance sheet distress, but the 2020s are different with instant communication & much cheaper digital alternatives (see First Republic / SVB for how quickly trust can break in the smartphone era). If "Western Union may go bankrupt" hits diaspora media channels today, that could cause a major behavior shift.
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$RELY and $WSE could see a huge volume boost from the collapse of $WU and MoneyGram.
Only WU is public, but these concerns apply to MGI as well.
1) With the new 1% tax, in-person cash remittances (WU/MGI) cost ~2x digital remittances (RELY/WSE) depending on corridor.
2) Cash remittance economics are deteriorating. Remittance = sender pay-in, transfer, recipient pay-out. WU's payout mix is shifting from cash to bank accounts, which WU can't charge as much for.
3) WU gave up on the transition from cash remittances to digital. WU's app is *losing* MAUs in spite of the shift to digital, and they have publicly paused customer acquisition spend bc they can't make the LTV-CAC math work. Note that RELY outspends all major remittance competition on marketing & maintains <12mo gross profit payback & 5+ yr lifetime.
4) So WU's digital economics are deteriorating too. WU shifted to white-labeling behind other front-end wallets, who pay WU a smaller cut and who can swap out to any other backend transfer provider in the future... like WSE/RELY
5) WU is no longer generating enough FCF to cover the dividend & will bust a credit covenant within 5 years without opex cuts. So WU is doing their 4th major opex cut this decade, which means worse service for their end customer. Degradation should mean increasing revenue churn to RELY/WSE.
6) Lastly, headline risk could create a 'snap bankruptcy' as Mario notes below. The key to money transfers is trust. MoneyGram did not see sending pause in 2008 with genuine balance sheet distress, but the 2020s are different with instant communication & much cheaper digital alternatives (see First Republic / SVB for how quickly trust can break in the smartphone era). If "Western Union may go bankrupt" hits diaspora media channels today, that could cause a major behavior shift.
Replying to @mario_cibelli
If media reports/viral scare of liquidity issues at a legacy provider caused just 15 to 20% of customers to pause sending, it would be absolutely devastating to their P&Ls. On the other hand, it would likely be a windfall to the top of the food chain digital players like Remitly.
$LPRO take private before I posted the writeup! Great buy for Amtrust.
TLDR:
LPRO began booking certs below profitability in 2025. True runrate EBITDA is >$65m, so they paid <6x.
LPRO also won Toyota for used vehicle & may expand to new / other brands.
investors.openlending.com/ne…
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Really thought we would get to ride this to $8-$10 as the auto lending market continues to normalize + the conservative accounting flows into EBITDA. Will be looking for related ideas in the space too.
Kudos to @CorneliaLake as well on this
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Update: Amtrust only paying ~3.25x '27e EBITDA for $LPRO. Management case was >$100m EBITDA including synergies.
Tender likely goes through, though a topping bid would make sense for numerous buyers if they could move quickly enough. (cc @CorneliaLake)








