Prague Pulse News

Poland’s constitutional crisis has reached the “turn the presidential plane around” stage. Karol Nawrocki interrupted his flight to Senegal tonight as a confrontation escalated over the Constitutional Tribunal, the court responsible for reviewing whether laws comply with Poland’s constitution. Apparently, following Polish politics now requires Flightradar24. Here’s what happened: judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska issued orders suspending the tribunal’s president, Bogdan Święczkowski, and his deputy from their duties for a month, asserting her authority to lead the institution. Their camp rejects her authority and the legality of those decisions. Police deployed on the tribunal’s grounds amid protests. They say they did not enter the building. Tusk says decisive action is necessary to restore the rule of law. PiS politicians are calling it a coup. The background matters. The abuses behind Poland’s court crisis are documented: in 2021, the European Court of Human Rights found that an irregularly appointed Constitutional Tribunal judge had denied an applicant its right to a tribunal established by law. More recently, Nawrocki refused to swear in three parliamentary nominees, while Święczkowski blocked judges elected by the current majority from taking up their duties. But those problems do not automatically make tonight’s response lawful. That needs its own legal justification. For me, the test is whether this produces an independent court whose authority survives the next election. Otherwise, Poland risks another round of politicians defending judicial independence primarily when their opponents are choosing the judges. What would it take to rebuild public trust in this court?

Six months after Orbán lost Hungary, Vučić has lost Serbia. How did a leaderless student movement, born from the Novi Sad station collapse that killed 16 people, beat a man with a firm grip on national TV? And is Serbia now turning West? Not so fast. What does the result mean for Central Europe anyway? youtu.be/iag6LH9xt0U

Viktor #Orbán is being considered for UN Secretary-General. Apparently, losing an election can come with quite the relocation package. According to the Wall Street Journal, #Trump officials are pushing the idea, potentially with Russian and Chinese backing (yeah, you heard me. The US, Russia, and China TOGETHER). One interesting benefit: the job comes with diplomatic immunity. And back in May, VSquare reported that its sources considered immunity a central attraction of securing Orbán a senior UN position. Orbán himself has insisted that he follows and enforces the law. If VSquare’s reporting is right, that’s an impressive amount of effort to arrange legal protection for someone with apparently nothing to worry about. We don’t know that immunity is his motive, sure. But for a political camp that dismisses corruption investigations as persecution, the alleged interest in additional protection from immunity does invite a few questions. Presumably, the opportunity to serve humanity is also somewhere in the benefits package. Then there’s the proposed backing from Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Lovely to see Trump investing in his alliances. For anyone still wondering where his political sympathies truly lie, that would be quite the group photo.

Bulgaria topped the EU’s fertility ranking in 2024. More people are moving in than leaving. Yet its population keeps shrinking. Why aren’t those gains enough—and can Bulgaria turn things around? Watch the latest Prague Pulse episode: youtu.be/qNy7Jq7Jt10

Poland has reinforced its crossings with Ukraine. Donald Tusk warns that a Russian strike on NATO territory could be presented as an “accident”. Germany has attributed an attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia. Is Moscow testing NATO? What do we know, and what would the alliance do if an incident’s cause were disputed? I take a closer look in my new Prague Pulse video: youtu.be/05q_ExPMj3c I’m also trying a new way to animate the infographics and motion graphics. Did you notice the change? Does it work for you?

Exactly what I talked about in my last video. The AfD, together with other fringe parties, are openly Russia-friendly. That's honestly the biggest danger to CEE, should these parties get real power on the federal level. Do check the video out. youtu.be/0fom5gIMSIY

Germany’s AfD keeps winning big — and may still get zero governing power. So how much power does it actually have, and when does that start to matter for Central Europe? New Prague Pulse video 👇 youtu.be/0fom5gIMSIY

RT @PiratkaSramkova: FSD 💪🏻 Už druhý den po spuštění jsem měla tu čest se projet s FSD, FSD svezlo mě. Samozřejmě, že nemocné děti a ned…

🇸🇰 Robert Fico says Slovakia would be better off militarily neutral. “I don’t believe in this solidarity. Why should French soldiers go die for Slovaks?” Because if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine taught us anything, it’s surely that staying outside NATO is a foolproof way to make Russia leave you alone.

Folks, as you’ve probably heard, a vote on #FSD at October’s #TCMV meeting looks unlikely: it’s not on the agenda. And, predictably, the hate towards “evil Brussels” is doing the rounds again. So I am back with a reality check, straight from the European capital. What does it actually mean if the vote doesn’t happen? It’s simple: formally, approving anything in EU working groups requires a “qualified majority”: at least 15 member states representing at least 65% of the EU’s population. So there are basically two possibilities. Either that majority simply isn’t there yet, and negotiations need to continue. But I suspect there’s another explanation: member states are trying to achieve UNANIMITY. Let me explain. Yes, formally, “just” a qualified majority is enough. But historically, EU working groups overwhelmingly try to reach agreement unanimously, even when they don’t have to. Have a look at past voting results. Why? Pretty simple, really. For one thing, it helps prevent accusations of “Brussels dictating to us” or the majority imposing its will. It also reduces the risk of dissenting countries challenging the decision, publicly questioning it or, in extreme cases, taking it to court. So what’s most likely happening is that one or more countries still have reservations about FSD. I’ve heard from my sources that at least one or two large member states aren’t entirely satisfied yet. And that’s why we’re waiting. Maybe a qualified majority already exists. Who knows. But unanimity isn’t there yet, and member states would probably like to get there. What this definitely DOESN’T mean is that “Brussels postponed the vote” or “banned it”, or that “some officials don’t want it to happen”, and so on. I’ve seen all of these claims on social media. They’re nonsense. In TCMV, member states vote and decide on the agenda. And they’ve simply decided it’s not time for a vote yet. We don’t have to like it. But if we’re going to blame anyone, it should be the governments of the countries blocking it. No “Brussels bureaucrat” is trying to take FSD away from us. @robotinreallife @elegantnikuryr @teslanerdX @TeslaMotorsCZ @bruna_miroslav

#Czechia's Petr #Pavel told the #UN that #Russia’s aggressive posture directly threatens #European security, with the risks growing every day. European governments are also dealing with airspace incursions and hybrid attacks beyond the war in #Ukraine.

Obrovské díky panu ministrovi @BednarikIvan a celému týmu @min_dopravy. Jsem opravdu šťastný, že Česko je jednou z prvních zemi v EU, kde přispějeme k bezpečnosti dopravy. A hlavně jsem teď přesvědčený, že hlasování o FSD v TCMV projde. Česko čekalo na jistotu.

Obrovské díky panu ministrovi @BednarikIvan a celému týmu @min_dopravy. Jsem opravdu šťastný, že Česko je jednou z prvních zemi, kde přispějeme k bezpečnosti dopravy.