TYF Oyo State Chapter

TRUE STATE POLICE DECENTRALIZATION IS THE ROLE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATORS, NOT THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE Issued by Think Yoruba First Political Action Committee (TYFPAC) 
Date: April 2026 Introduction Think Yoruba First Political Action Committee (TYFPAC) notes recent media reports indicating that the newly appointed Inspector General of Police, Tunde Disu, has unveiled a 60 month reform agenda aimed at decentralizing the Nigeria Police Force and accelerating the creation of state police in response to the country’s worsening security crisis. A committee has reportedly been constituted to drive this process. While this initiative may appear bold at first glance, it is fundamentally flawed. It is built on weak legal foundations and driven by procedural shortcuts that risk undermining genuine and sustainable reform. Policy Inconsistency and Selective Urgency Nigeria’s policy approach continues to reflect troubling inconsistency. When politically convenient, reforms are executed with remarkable speed. Electricity governance was decentralized through the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Fifth Alteration Act No. 33 of 2023, which expanded state authority in the electricity sector. Similarly, the Electoral Act Amendment Bill 2026 was rapidly passed by the National Assembly on February 17, 2026, and signed into law by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu within 24 hours. However, the same urgency is absent when it concerns the protection of lives and property, which remains a primary responsibility of government under Section 14 subsection 2 paragraph b of the Constitution. This disparity is unacceptable. The Constitutional Position. The current constitutional framework is clear and unambiguous: Section 214 subsection 1 establishes a single Police Force for Nigeria and prohibits the creation of any other police force except as provided by the Constitution. Item 45 of the Exclusive Legislative List places police and other government security services under exclusive federal control. Section 4 subsection 2 vests legislative authority over these matters in the National Assembly, while Section 4 subsection 7 limits state powers to the Concurrent List. Accordingly, the decentralization of policing can not be undertaken by the Inspector General of Police. It requires constitutional amendment and legislative action. Any attempt to bypass this process is ultra vires and constitutionally defective. Why the Current Approach Is Misguided Efforts to introduce state policing through administrative mechanisms within the Nigeria Police Force do not constitute reform. They represent improvisation. State policing is not an internal restructuring exercise, a committee driven initiative, or an administrative adjustment. It is a fundamental restructuring of Nigeria’s federal system. Without constitutional amendment: No state can lawfully establish a police force.
No federal authority can delegate policing powers downward.
No administrative process can override constitutional provisions. Proceeding otherwise risks creating institutions that are legally weak, operationally ineffective, and politically compromised. The Required Constitutional Pathway Think Yoruba First calls for immediate constitutional amendment to transfer policing from the Exclusive Legislative List to the Concurrent Legislative List. This process must comply with Section 9 of the Constitution, requiring: A two-thirds majority of the National Assembly
Ratification by at least two-thirds of State Houses of Assembly Following the constitutional amendment, the reform process should proceed as follows: Federal Framework Legislation
The National Assembly must establish a clear framework defining federal and state crimes, jurisdictional boundaries, inter-agency coordination, and national standards. State Level Legislation
State governments must enact laws addressing structure and command, recruitment and training, funding, and civilian oversight mechanisms.