Gasperini employs man-marking with decision-making autonomy for supporting players. Mainoo gets caught in an unfavourable position in a physical duel, which de Roon recognises. He abandons his own marker and steps in to win the ball using a cover shadow. Two subsequent passes lead to an assist and a secondary assist.
Even in such a disciplined aspect of the game as pressing, there is room for freedom of interpretation
Off-ball movement is very effective for Paris in creating “blindside gaps” for Hakimi’s late runs. This is often preceded by an overload through localised play in close proximity. Even if you wanted to slightly concede the defence of overloads, you can’t, because Paris doesn’t do this solely to clear out other areas, but also likes to create a threat in this way. You have to be very well-drilled in all possible reference points to defend against this (timing and orientation seem crucial)
I think Chelsea, overall, offered more interesting elements in their play, but Liverpool were really good at protecting their penalty area. That’s a well-developed, temporary concept within Iraola’s approach, given the attacking quality at his disposal. I think Iraola is currently operating at maybe 50% of what he ultimately wants to achieve and will eventually turn this team into. The draw was a fair result
I wonder how much Jacquet’s personality on the pitch puts a bit of pressure on Virgil, which is obviously a positive way of challenging his competitive instincts, and how much of it comes down to working with Iraola. But it’s never too late to discover new horizons.
He recognises the space and moves into it, carries the ball forward, and then makes a blocking run, effectively screening Caicedo and preventing him from getting to Tsimikas as he makes the underlapping run.
It’s genuinely beautiful to see that, even at this stage of his career, you can still develop new aspects of your game and discover additional ways to benefit the team #LFC
To implement a +1 structure, you need defensively well-drilled players with strong game intelligence who can recognise and prevent the opposition from creating spatial, positional and numerical advantages. Commitment is the foundation.
Below, we can see how Chelsea build-up in a 1.4.3.3, with Lavia dropping into a 2+1 structure and slotting in between the centre-backs. The full-backs push higher and wider to pin Rio and partially occupy Koumas, who maintains access to Gusto. Henderson and Caicedo occupy Nyoni and Gravenberch, dragging them outwards and creating space centrally to combine through third-man movements.
Liverpool defended in a 1.4.4.2, with Gakpo and McConnell as the two forwards. JMc curves his pressing run to cut off the passing lane into Lavia. This is the moment when Gakpo needs to recognise the threat posed by Chelsea’s build-up rather than passively and ineffectively occupying space around Fofana. Shifting across towards Lavia would still restrict the passing options into Fofana while allowing Liverpool to retain access to the Belgian.
This movement would help condense the central area, with the aim of winning the ball back and turning the opposition’s build-up pattern into a pressing trap and a goalscoring opportunity.
Caicedo then bursts towards the ball carrier, opening up space behind him for Rogers, who recognises the opportunity and attacks it.
Iraola needs to switch to a more man-oriented marking approach against stronger opposition. Given Arsenal’s rotations, with White moving inside, Calafiori occupying the left half-space as a No. L10 and Rice dropping between the centre-backs, I think they’ll look to reproduce these patterns at the weekend #LFC
That f*** +1 is starting to piss me off. To play this way, you need defensively impeccable players across the board, from the front line to the deepest defenders, because Chelsea were once again finding free players between the lines far too easily, as well as exploiting third-man combinations. That’s also a flaw of the 4-4-2, as it often leaves pockets of space where the opposition can find free players
Exploiting the momentum of Brighton’s transition from man-marking to zonal marking, with excellent timing in taking advantage of the unfolding situation.
Liverpool disrupts Brighton’s defensive structure through coordinated movement. Isak drops deep to receive from Kerkez, drawing Vuskovic out of position. Gakpo makes an inward run, while Kerkez stretches Gomez horizontally. On the far side, Wirtz occupies two defenders, while Gravenberch pulls Pascal Groß away, preventing him from stepping into the newly opened space to cover it.
Crucially, Isak doesn’t return to his nominal position but stays on the same vertical line as Gakpo, exploiting the disruption. Gomez abandons Kerkez to compensate, but it’s already too late. Liverpool capitalises on the brief moment when Brighton’s defensive structure is caught between man-marking responsibilities and zonal assignments #LFC
And finally, one last example from the Villarreal game, where they employed an almost identical pattern to Brighton, with the wingers and one of the full-backs inverting in rotation.
Notice how Gakpo’s marker literally runs straight past him, yet he shows absolutely no interest in tracking the movement.
Van Dijk is responsible for Saliba, Kerkez for Buchanan, and Jacquet for Mikautadze - a classic man-oriented defensive approach, whether implemented within a zonal structure or through full-pitch man-marking. In any case, this is nothing unusual for an Iraola side, as I discussed in my analysis of the Manchester City game.
Interestingly, when everyone fulfilled their defensive responsibilities in that match, Manchester City - arguably a stronger side than Villarreal - managed just 0.08 xG in the first half. Whether or not the two situations are directly correlated, I’m not entirely sure, but I can see a potential connection between them.
The result is yet another situation in which the opposition gains a numerical advantage in a highly dangerous area, creating a valuable opportunity to attack our goal
Liverpool defended in a 1.4.4.2 mid-block, combining man-oriented and position-oriented principles. The wide midfielders tracked their direct opponents across the pitch, while the rest of the structure remained position-oriented.
Liverpool dealt relatively well with deep runs by the full-backs into the attacking half-spaces, maintaining horizontal and vertical compactness, good spatial relationships and coordinated shifts towards the ball. The players stayed connected, ready to aggressively press and compress the space around the ball.
This was reflected in Man City’s first-half xG of just 0.08, highlighting the effectiveness of Liverpool’s defensive organisation. Barcola still needs to improve his perceptual-cognitive processing to avoid reacting too late, but the overall direction is promising.
Some really good work from Iraola #LFC
