As expected, talks on ending Russia's war against Ukraine have shifted to talks on a new division of Europe. In his statement on 22 October, Putin said that future negotiations should determine guarantees for Russia as well as the broader rules of European security. According to him, it was Witkoff who proposed widening the agenda. Europeans are not yet being invited to the conversation about European security. Peskov specified that representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the US will meet in Abu Dhabi. He acknowledged that European countries cannot be left out going forward, but tied their participation to the position they take (whether they behave themselves). Some Russian experts have a quite concrete picture of what the coming talks should cover. Valdai Club expert Stanislav Tkachenko speaks openly of a return to the demands of December 2021: limiting NATO's military presence to pre-enlargement levels, removing new bases and military facilities from the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, and halting further enlargement. To this he adds recognition of territorial seizures, the lifting of sanctions and the return of frozen assets. His reasoning is that Moscow regards the European Union as a losing party as well, and therefore expects concessions from it too. Tkachenko even suggests new claims on Odesa, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv, arguing that Putin's references to "historical territories" leave room for them. At the same time, it is possible to negotiate and continue the war. Dmitri Trenin, president of the Russian International Affairs Council, believes that freezing hostilities along the current front line does not suit Russia. Talking to the US is nevertheless worthwhile, since it is already producing some results. He notes that Moscow has agreed to discuss, first and foremost, the future post-war security system. The fighting itself, he predicts, may continue into 2027. He links the concrete terms of any agreement to the situation on the battlefield: talks can happen now, while decisions will depend on military outcomes. Explanations for the case that negotiations once again lead nowhere are also already being prepared. Fyodor Lukyanov interprets the new Ukrainian proposals as Zelensky's attempt to ease pressure from Trump. He suggests that Kyiv may walk away from agreements already reached, with the Europeans backing it. For that reason, in his view, Witkoff's arrival with new ideas does not yet mean anything. Meanwhile, Moscow is finding reasons to celebrate even before any deal. Duma deputy Oleg Matveychev considers it a success in itself that the US talks to Russia as an equal and discusses a wide range of global issues with it. A concrete outcome of the meeting is not even necessary for this assessment. He takes the comparison of a possible Putin–Trump–Xi meeting with "Yalta-2" as recognition of Russia's special status: it is once again among the states that shape the future order. Practical gains are added to the symbolic success. Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky calls the meeting with Witkoff a diplomatic "master class" by Putin and points to sanctions relief and the diesel deal with the US. For him, this is already evidence of a successful restoration of relations with Washington. He envisions further negotiations taking Russia's interests fully into account. Trump is also seen as a partner for exerting influence on Ukraine and Europe. Political commentator Gevorg Mirzayan suggests that Moscow and Washington are discussing a coordinated policy towards them. In his view, Trump wants to show voters a foreign-policy success, bring the Europeans back into greater obedience, and establish energy cooperation with Russia. The rush ahead of the US elections is also viewed as an opportunity for Russia. Boris Mezhuev openly calls Trump an ally on the question of a settlement. He believes the US president needs a peace plan he can present to voters, even if it has not yet been signed. Russia can help him secure such a political result while advancing its own demands. And yet there are still some in Moscow who remain dissatisfied, such as Dugin, Malofeev and Karaganov, united by a shared mental disorder: a passion for using nuclear weapons. In their latest interviews and publications, they openly call on Putin to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and Europe.