Anthony Peyton retweeted
Microsoft: Windows Server 2016 reaches end of support in 60 days
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Anthony Peyton retweeted
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below.
We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations.
The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services.
First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments.
The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact.
Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores.
Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts.
Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own.
Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States.
When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive.
Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally.
Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway.
Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change.
After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region).
The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.
Replying to @MSFT365Status
We have released the Preliminary Post-Incident Report of last week’s outage, which is accessible via the Admin center under MO1550821 and EX1550543.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
Replying to @WSJ @WSJopinion
You sort of set him up, didn’t you, by creating the impression that senior government officials anonymously provided information about spying, when in fact the info came from a lobbyist at a competing AI company?
Anthony Peyton retweeted
You get richer by acting poorer is a hill I’ll die on. Flexing is a poor brain mindset.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
Cursor confirms security breach led to malicious Claude Code extension
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Anthony Peyton retweeted
L3Harris has been modernizing the communications infrastructure supporting the National Airspace System in close coordination with the FAA. With safety and reliability as our highest priorities, L3Harris, together with its telco partners and the FAA, has completed more than 70% of the planned airspace communications conversion from legacy copper wires to a fiber optic system. We are supporting the FAA in its investigation to understand the conditions that led to the Nov. 13 ground stop of our nation’s air travel. L3Harris takes the nationwide ground stop and its impact on travelers, airlines and air traffic operations seriously.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12. The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543.
Some of the phishing emails Microsoft detected on November 13 falsely claim that messages were held during the outage and will be deleted within 24 hours unless recipients click to restore them.
Observed subjects follow the pattern "Outage - [six-character code]," with sender display names using organization-specific prefixes followed by "Outage Notification" or "Service Health."
The campaign uses three sender domains, moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com, and newbooker[.]com, with recipient-specific SendGrid click-tracking links redirecting to reallifeaccounting[.]com, including the observed path /themelist0.html. Similar messages targeted organizations across multiple US sectors.
The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed.
Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Threat Explorer and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (EmailEvents, EmailUrlInfo, and UrlClickEvents) to identify suspicious messages, examine embedded URLs, and investigate user clicks.
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links provides time-of-click protection against malicious URLs when properly configured. Organizations should verify their Safe Links policies, investigate potential user interactions, and confirm service disruptions directly through the Microsoft 365 admin center.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
I want to share what we know so far. This was not a cyberattack or an issue caused by AI tooling. Our amazing team was able to work through a very challenging situation to restore service.
Our investigation points to technical challenges and failure modes (cascading failures + thundering herds at our network perimeter) that made recovery more difficult than normal. I'm working closely with the engineering team to complete the full post-mortem. We will publish the post-mortem shortly covering the step-by-step timeline and our many repair items to avoid similar outages in the future.
We take our responsibility to our customers seriously and will do everything we can to learn from this and prevent it going forward.
We are deeply sorry for the disruption this incident has caused our customers and partners. We know the trust they place in our services and take that responsibility extremely seriously. We are seeing broad recovery and stability across our services.
This was a technical issue not related to cyber or AI / agents. The incident was introduced by an issue during an earlier network capacity upgrade that surfaced following a recent network change. We have addressed the underlying issue and continue to restore service to remaining customers and regions.
Given the scale of demand, we restored services gradually, validating stability at each stage. While this took longer, it helped ensure a stable restoration.
We will provide a full post-incident report once our review is complete.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
Replying to @MSFT365Status
We regret that today’s outages caused disruptions for our customers, and we are working to address the issue. We will continue to share more information as soon as we have it, and for now I can confirm that there is no indication this is the result of malicious or cyber activity.
Having this outage with M365 reminds you how critical email still is. It's not just about not knowing who has emailed me or whether my sent emails have been received, I'm now locked out of a bunch of services that use email for login. It's a massive business disruption.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
👇👇
Anthony Peyton retweeted
I wonder if they are scrambling to find the phone numbers of those engineers they let go... #Microsoft365
Anthony Peyton retweeted
National Productivity Skyrockets After Microsoft Teams Goes Down buff.ly/WSXDCpS
Anthony Peyton retweeted
We're investigating reports of users experiencing issues accessing Exchange Online mailboxes through multiple connection methods in the Americas. More details can be found in the Microsoft 365 admin center under EX1550543.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
Attackers are using cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to install rogue clients on managed endpoints.
Don’t triage infected hosts with ScreenConnect. Connecting can spread the malware to your workstation and other panels you can access.
Details and IOCs: okt.to/XnlhWg
Anthony Peyton retweeted
🎉 The first edition of Purview News is live!
A roundup of the latest Microsoft Purview updates and some fantastic contributions from our amazing community!
Just in time for the pre-Ignite madness! 👀
Check it out 👇
Purview News #1 → This week in Microsoft Purview open.substack.com/pub/purvie…
Featuring @andresbohren, @DavidMDrever, @ragnarh, @Ra_Koellner, @rucam365, @daoudi_samir, @12Knocksinna, & more!
#PurviewNews #MicrosoftPurview #MicrosoftNews #CommunityContributions #MVPBuzz
@merill
🤖 Made with AI
Anthony Peyton retweeted
Just so we’re all clear, cheating on your spouse is for losers. A billion dollars isn’t cool, you know what’s cool? Not cheating on your spouse.
Anthony Peyton retweeted
🚨🚨 N-able has taken its hosted N-central servers offline worldwide and is urging on-premises customers to shut down their servers after a researcher published 30+ alleged zero-days.
The exploits include unauthenticated remote code execution and administrator account creation.
The security researcher, @seankbales, told BleepingComputer that he disclosed the flaws publicly without advance notice because N-able allegedly failed to patch vulnerabilities he reported in a different product five to six months ago and ignored repeated follow-up emails.
No mallace intended with this post :P
The Railway incident is dumb, unethical, and the person responsible deserves the ribbing he’s getting. That said, based on what’s been shared publicly so far, it doesn’t appear there’s much that’s actionable, either civilly or criminally, at this point.
From the public posts I’ve seen, the situation seems to be this: over roughly a 15-minute window, an AI agent performed aggressive probes and infrastructure scanning. This violated the customer’s terms of service, but no actual breach occurred, and no technical control was successfully circumvented. If that’s an accurate summary, this may not be criminal or even civilly actionable in the United States under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
So wayyyyy back in 2021, the EFF and ACLU did a lot of work on a case that the Supreme Court took up. As a result of that case, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that really narrowed the CFAA: Van Buren v. United States - supremecourt.gov/opinions/20…
The Supreme Court’s decision in Van Buren v. United States significantly narrowed the CFAA. A few key points from that ruling:
1. It narrowed the “exceeds authorized access” provision. You generally cannot “exceed authorization” merely by misusing access you already have or by ignoring an acceptable use policy.
2. The Court specifically noted that treating terms of service violations as CFAA violations would criminalize ordinary online activity, which it rejected. The statute requires circumventing an actual technical control, not just violating a written policy.
3. It also tightened the damages requirement. Recoverable harm generally needs to involve specific technical damage or impairment, not just annoyance or blocked attempts. It’s unclear what technical damages would realistically be claimed from 15 minutes of noisy probes that were blocked.
After Van Buren, a number of pending CFAA cases involving scanning or web scraping were dismissed or dropped because the decision undercut the theory that those activities alone violate the statute. This included several lawsuits that were initiated by LinkedIn, if memory serves me correctly.
The EFF has highlighted the ruling for this reason, arguing that the CFAA had long been used (or threatened) against legitimate security researchers doing beneficial testing: eff.org/cases/van-buren-v-un…
I’m not a lawyer, so take this with a grain of salt. But there’s a reason the large majority (over 75%+ in the 9th Circuit, where Josh and I both live) of civil CFAA cases end in favor of the defendants.
Anyways, continue ribbing Jake and Railway. It's certainly deserved at this point, but I just wanted to highlight that, unlike the Hugging Face incident, where there was an ACTUAL breach and circumvention of technical controls and real damages they can definitely define, this is quite a bit different.


























