Field CTO @soloio_inc | AI Reliability Engineering | Cloud Networking | Author | International Speaker
Phoenix, AZ
Joined January 2011
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It's official! Today @rinormaloku and I announce the release of our (long-awaited!) book, #Istio in Action with @ManningBooks and forward written by @eric_brewer! With 450+ pages built over 3.5 years... we are both very proud of this work to help the @IstioMesh community.
Christian Posta retweeted
The sustained info war assault on open models is an agenda driven, self sabotage for our society.
The PHP vulnerabilities were found by Sol 5.6 as part of a defensive audit, for example, not abliterated models.
Putting our head in the sand and pretending vulnerabilities do not exist is idiotic. Better we find all these old, human written mistakes and fix them with AI. If you have a pair of magic glasses that show you what buildings will fall down the answer is to fix the buildings, not smash the glasses.
When HuggingFace was under attack and when OpenCode was under attack they needed open models to defend them because closed models refused.
Eventually OpenCode, because they're a prominent project, were granted access to OpenAI Daybreak Blue. Many individual researchers get denied with obscure errors and no explanation. To be clear, DayBreak is a fantastic project, and OpenAI is doing their best to be responsible here, but not everyone gets access and everyone has a right to defend themselves.
Nobody should have to beg for permission to defend themselves from cyber assault. When you're under attack, waiting to see if you get granted access to defend yourself via a black box KYC process is how we end up helpless, watching as our shop burns while raging looters storm it and destroy our life's work.
AI can be used for attack and defense and many of the recent attacks used both open and closed models, by the lab's own admissions.
Open models are often the only thing standing between us and the new reality of cyber assault.
If we ban them or restrict them in the US, then US companies will just be defenseless against global cyber assault actors who are not going to respect those bans.
I strongly believe a part of why so many critical vulnerabilities are happening all over the proliferation of "abliterated" models, or models with safeguards removed.
You can access an abliterated GLM 5.3, a near frontier AI model, on @abliteration_ai today. And it's a world class penetration tester for like $10.
Christian Posta retweeted
Honestly I feel like cyber had largely become checklists, compliance, reporting, insurance etc over the last decade.
But now we're back to fighting the badies. Let's goooooooo!!!!!
So LiteLLM supply chain compromised AGAIN ?!? This looks nasty!!!
research.jfrog.com/post/lite…
Christian Posta retweeted
Crazy 72 hours in security. Three major incidents dropped back-to-back: eMudhra, PingCAP (TiDB Cloud), and PHP.
Here is the short version of what happened and who got hit.
1. eMudhra (Trusted CA compromise)
eMudhra generated 8 intermediate CA certificates in April 2025 (cross-signed by Sectigo). A bug in their HSM key-wrapping test script created a second set of P-384 keys where the private keys were single-byte numbers under 256. Operators picked the wrong key labels and signed them into real CA certs.
One of the intermediate CA private keys was literally the number 4.
The other seven: 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
Three weeks later (May 2025), their CRL signatures started failing because the CRL signer was using the real keys instead of the weak ones. Instead of asking why the keys didn't match, someone switched the CRL signer to the weak keys and closed the ticket.
• Browsers are safe: Chrome, Firefox, Apple, and Microsoft already blocked them, and zero rogue certs hit CT logs.
• Servers are not: curl, Python (certifi), Go binaries, and Docker base images don't check CRLs. Update ca-certificates, certifi, and Go (1.27.3 / 1.26.10).
• 10-second check on any server:
curl dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-pro…
(TLS error = safe. 200 OK = still vulnerable.)
2. PingCAP / TiDB Cloud (10.6 TB breach)
Attackers found GCP and Azure credentials committed inside PingCAP's own repos. They set up a replication feed of TiDB Cloud's production control plane and exported the entire database every 6 hours for 22 straight days. 88 full exports, zero alerts. 200 GB is already out on torrents.
Beyond the 413 private repos and 20.6M customer SQL queries logged from their web SQL Editor, PingCAP engineers were pasting customer secrets into Jira tickets.
Who is affected in the leaked records:
• Live credentials exposed in support tickets:
- Pinterest: AWS keys for their pingcap-logs S3 bucket
- CardX / Silverlake (NPCI-linked env): AWS admin key in a backup log with full access to 258 external S3 buckets
- DeBank: 38 presigned S3 URLs
- An unnamed AI/dev platform: a 314 MB slow-query log attached to a ticket containing 8,027 live customer secrets (an AWS root key, a GitHub admin PAT over 1,701 repos, 7,485 AWS STS tokens, and 192 OpenAI/Anthropic/Gemini keys)
• Tenants with infra metadata, VPC CIDRs, app-server IPs, or contract pricing exposed:
- Tech: Atlassian, Databricks, Airbnb, Baidu, LINE, Nylas, Persona, PatSnap
- E-comm & Travel: Booking.com, Shopee, Flipkart, Mercari, ZOZO, AEON, Delhivery, Klook
- Gaming: Capcom, Square Enix, Konami, Bandai Namco, Cygames, Colopl, DMM
- Finance: PayPay, SoftBank, SBI, SB Payment Service, Fujitsu, TOPPAN, Bank of China, China Life
- Crypto: Bitget (said only public trade logs were on it and they already left), Pionex, DigiPlus, NFTscan, Chainbase
• Developer profiles leaked (from a purchased reo.dev table in PingCAP's BigQuery):
- 24,900 personal emails + GitHub/LinkedIn profiles of engineers at Tencent (3,327), Huawei (2,726), ByteDance (2,475), AIG (2,140), Mastercard, Flipkart, and bKash.
If you use TiDB Cloud: rotate your console API keys, DB passwords, and anything you ever pasted into a support ticket.
3. PHP "PHP2Shell" (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619)
Two CVSS 9.2 pre-auth RCEs leaked yesterday ahead of today's 14:00 UTC patch.
Public writeups trace it to a heap Use-After-Free in PHP's native C multipart/form-data session upload-progress handler (ext/session/session.c).
Because C-level multipart parsing runs before line 1 of index.php:
• App auth, Laravel/WordPress middleware, and file_uploads = Off do not stop it.
• Only PHP 8.2–8.5 get official patches today (59% of PHP servers on Shodan are on EOL <= 8.1).
• Until you patch php-fpm: lock php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = off and block unexpected multipart requests at Nginx/Apache/Cloudflare.
Christian Posta retweeted
🚨 @NVIDIAAI just quietly dropped its own local inference server...
No announcement. Single-digit stars
It's called Flare and Apache 2.0
Built for SM120/SM121 GPUs RTX PRO 6000 Blackwell and DGX Spark
>PyTorch + FlashInfer at build time
>Rust runtime at serve time. No Python.
>CUDA graphs captured before serving
>FP8 KV cache by default
>Recipes for Qwen Flash, GLM and DeepSeek
github.com/NVIDIA/flare-loca…
Christian Posta retweeted
When markets are growing quickly, moats don't really matter. It doesn't make sense for leaders to invest in new spaces. And tons of whitespace gets created.
When markets slow down, most moats can't save you anyway.
Don't worry too much about moats.
Christian Posta retweeted
AI agents like Meta’s Muse are on your side in exactly the same sense HR is on your side.
"Sandboxes are commodity" ... sure, microVM / firecracker are... /yawn... but the more people yell "commodity" the more I am seeing opportunity. Starting... with the garbage OSS being hurled over the fence with no real community.
Christian Posta retweeted
We wrote up how our sandbox platform serving daily traffic on Perplexity handles millions of executions a day with a low error rate while still using multiple machines to lower serving costs.
Our sandbox, SPACE, handles millions of executions a day with an error rate below 0.0002%.
We’re sharing how it uses cryptographic identity to keep requests tied to the right execution as sandboxes pause, resume, and move.
Read more: perplexity.ai/hub/blog/how-s…
Christian Posta retweeted
btw once Anthropic goes public, the #1 goal of the company will be to satisfy investors.
what do you think happens then to sub prices? usage limits??
Christian Posta retweeted
Any startup that hires enough ex-Googlers ends up with an ad hoc, informally-specified, bug-ridden, slow implementation of half of Google infra
New on our Engineering blog: Creating in-house source control.
In May, we merged around 2,500 code changes per day. In September, we merged more than 30,000 per day. As a result, we became bottlenecked by developer infrastructure built for human (rather than agent) scale.
Here, we share how we built a new version control system—and fully migrated our monorepo from git—in five months: anthropic.com/engineering/re…
Christian Posta retweeted
I'm ready for the "interview with ex employee of a frontier lab" era to end.
David Robinson tells me why he quit OpenAI: "I didn’t think that we were going to be able to create something fundamentally smarter than we were...when it became clear to me that we were on track to build something that could think circles around us — and we were this far from being ready for that at a safety and alignment level — it just became apparent to me that my time helping build it was over."
We talk about this in the episode, but is the "good" outcome here...actually good?
