1/ Years of rumors about Ilhan Omar's marriage went nowhere. Then one man stopped speculating and put his name on it: Abdihakim Osman Nur, also known as Abdi Nur. 🧵

While the El Alamein Joint Declaration explicitly mentions Somaliland, it does not mention Ethiopia by name. Yet its provisions on Somaliland, the Nile and the Red Sea carry direct strategic implications for Ethiopia. So, how long are we going to keep warning Ethiopia? Ethiopia is facing pressure on several fronts at once. Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea using Somalia as tool have long-standing disputes with Addis Ababa, while Ethiopia has increasingly linked external actors to its internal security problems. The Tigray conflict demonstrated how quickly regional rivalries can become intertwined with Ethiopia's domestic instability. Ethiopia has now said so openly. Addis Ababa accused Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea of supporting an opposition alliance led by the TPLF claims they deny. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara, expelled 10 Eritrean diplomats and an Egyptian diplomat. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Then the same countries sat together. On 4 October, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia met in El Alamein and agreed to strengthen consultation and coordination. Their declaration addressed three separate issues: the Nile, the Red Sea and Somaliland. Somaliland was addressed independently, not as an issue concerning Ethiopia. However, its inclusion is significant because Ethiopia has its own strategic relationship and interests involving Somaliland. 👉🏾On the Nile, the declaration rejected unilateral measures affecting Egypt and Sudan's existing water uses. 👉🏾On the Red Sea, it declared governance the exclusive responsibility of littoral states. For landlocked Ethiopia, both positions have direct strategic consequences: one concerns its ability to utilise the Nile for development; the other concerns its pursuit of reliable maritime access. Then comes Somaliland. The same four countries reaffirmed Somalia's claim on territorial integrity that include Somaliland and rejected recognition or support for Somaliland. The opposition to Somaliland has also been advanced through major regional and international institutions, including the Arab League, African Union, IGAD, OIC and the United Nations. The important point is not that these countries necessarily share one secret plan against Ethiopia. It is that their positions are increasingly converging around the same strategic pressure points: Ethiopia's internal security, the Nile, the Red Sea and its potential relationship with Somaliland. Ethiopia should not ignore this convergence. The same countries are opposing Ethiopia on key strategic issues while opposing Somaliland. These are separate political questions, but they are increasingly interconnected: Somaliland could offer Ethiopia a lawful, mutually agreed maritime alternative. And there is another signal: Djibouti was absent. Yet Djibouti is currently Ethiopia's main maritime gateway and is deeply integrated with three of the four countries involved. Its absence matters, particularly as Ethiopia has increased investment in alternative regional options and tensions with Eritrea have intensified. The message for Ethiopia is simple : Do not wait until your options narrow further. Somaliland and Ethiopia may have separate political questions, but their strategic interests can converge around maritime access, trade and regional security.

Qofka reer Somaliland ku eedeeya gabadhan waa qof is yeel yeelaya. Reer Somaliland siday ku ogaan karaan famligeeda iyo inay walaalkeed ku keentay waa ninkaygii? Gabadha dad aad ugu dhow ayaa ka daba shaqeeyey runtii.