Shane Locker (Sjoe! News Panelist) (@lavaheadza) header
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Volunteer Citizen Journalist. Sjoe! News (1-man show) vs algorithm echo chambers. AI Whisperer & hallucination vetter. Content free to reuse attri. preferred

Dogdish
Joined April 2009
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Sjoe! The Residual Chair🪑Who Gets Left Sitting Outside South🇿🇦Africa's Equity Arithmetic? ~ The Boy in the Water Queue🚰A Constitutional Promise Meets an Uncounted Future 📖 ~ Constitutional Dignity, Residual Reality⚖️The Debate South Africa Has Yet to Measure 🇿🇦 Sjoe. You open Government Gazette 52514 of 15 April 2025 and the arithmetic is already incomplete. The five-year sectoral numerical targets under the Employment Equity Act “are not intended to add up to 100 percent.” They exclude white males with no disabilities and foreign nationals from the preference calculation (Department of Employment and Labour, 2025). Preference is applied first. What remains is residual by design. Political scientists have long observed that once a residual category is institutionalised, organisations develop incentives to defend the boundary that creates it. Firms and universities face clear pressure on the preference side and quieter market pressure on the residual side. The result is a sorting mechanism whose cumulative effects on career choices and skills retention remain largely unmeasured at national level. Under high structural unemployment the leftover market becomes zero-sum. Local-search requirements before residual foreign appointments are unevenly enforced. Residual citizen priority after preference is absent by design. A nine-year-old orphaned white boy stands in a municipal water queue. The tanker is late. He was born after the 1996 Constitution. Formal dignity under Section 10 remains intact. The residual market he will later enter treats white citizens and foreign nationals as interchangeable non-beneficiaries once preference has been served. Full citizenship rights stay intact. Residual priority does not. No public residual-occupancy series by citizenship exists. The design therefore continues to score while its effects on progression, emigration decisions and investment location stay opaque. Sjoe! The Gazette draws the line with bureaucratic neatness. The leftover chairs do not care how neat the line is. They simply remain the only ones left. Stirring Questions: If the targets are written not to reach 100 percent, who is the residual category intended to serve once preference has been applied? Does the continued absence of residual-occupancy data by citizenship itself accelerate the political weight of the residual? What mechanism remains to protect citizen priority in the leftover market after preference has already been served? What these questions together reveal is the shift from the existence of the residual—which is statutory—to the time dimension. The longer the residual operates without residual-citizen priority or transparent data, the more the unmeasured costs accumulate as lived experience, even while no official debt exists. 1. After the Ratio The apartheid-era per-pupil spending disparity is a documented historical fact. Research places the ratio near 16.6:1 in the late 1960s and near 4.4:1 by the late 1980s (Christie, 1985; Fiske & Ladd, 2004). Ramaphosa’s R12-to-R1 illustration simply restates that record. Musk left South Africa in that period. The boy in the queue did not. A reply that accepts the historical ratio, refuses to convert it into a continuing personal debt, and conditions further discussion on publication of the missing residual ledger is therefore tighter than one that stops at 1994. Without that series the framing remains partial. Economic implication follows: opportunity costs that are real for individuals but unaggregated at national level still shape behaviour. Skills emigration and firm location preferences respond to the residual gradient even while the national ledger stays empty. SpaceX’s earlier offer of free satellite service, solar power and devices for more than 5,000 rural schools serving approximately 2.4 million pupils, at a cost near R500 million, was not accepted under the ownership rules. That package would have delivered connectivity without residual equity transfer. Additional capital could be conditioned on three outputs: residual-occupancy data by citizenship and local-search compliance; formal-sector growth that reduces leftover intensity; and practical support for the substrates the 9–11 window requires—reliable water logistics and specialised orphan-protection funding. Preference under Section 9(2) can remain temporary while these steps occur. Equity-equivalent programmes already allow multinationals to generate empowerment credit through 100 percent Black-owned suppliers without expanding residual local ownership. Both routes are legal. Both leave residual local citizens outside the preference arithmetic and the optical benefit. Redirecting resources toward measurement tests redesign rather than underwriting the scorecard. The residual market is therefore not only residual. It is selectively permeable to non-citizens through routes that leave the statutory scorecard untouched. Sjoe! The scorecard and the photograph were never required to agree. One keeps the arithmetic. The other keeps the caption. The residual chair does not mind which one sits in it. Stirring Questions: If residual occupancy data by citizenship were published tomorrow, would the give-back claim still rest solely on the pre-1994 ratio? What stops capital from being directed at measurement and capacity expansion instead of scorecard compliance? How many additional years of residual design under current scarcity are required before the cumulative opportunity costs become politically visible enough to force measurement? What these questions together reveal is the conversion of an investment demand into a test of redesign. The school package and the residual ledger are independent. Together they ask whether the leftover market can be made less zero-sum before the next cohort enters it. 2. The Queue and the Gazette Piaget’s concrete-operational stage, confirmed in contemporary Southern African developmental research, identifies the years roughly nine to eleven as a high-leverage window in which children construct durable judgments about fairness, institutional reliability and personal value (Piaget, 1952; Louw et al., 2024). The residual rules crystallised in Gazette 52514, ambient narratives that sometimes racialise ordinary competence standards, and the thinning of specialised protective services for the approximately 2.7 million orphaned children—about 13 percent of all children, most in kinship care (Statistics South Africa, 2025; Hall & Hendricks, 2025)—occupy precisely that window for the boy. Governance literature has long noted that formal systems and informal care arrangements are not perfect substitutes. When the formal system weakens, the informal system is asked to carry a heavier load without the resources to do so. Differential vulnerability appears exactly where developmental dependence is highest and private buffers are lowest. Thirty years of preference-first arithmetic without residual-citizen priority or published data have already shaped the environment he inhabits. The residual is no longer only an adult labour-market feature. It is an intergenerational inheritance whose developmental cost can be observed inside the non-racial order the 1996 text claimed to establish. Legal scholars have long observed that temporary measures of redress can harden into permanent expectations. Once the expectation of permanent racial accounting takes root, the original constitutional bargain becomes harder to defend in practice even if it remains intact on paper. Section 235 states that the right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude recognition of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way determined by national legislation (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The provision is permissive. Academic commentary has consistently noted that it has never been given operational content through detailed national legislation (de Villiers, 2014). By contrast, the residual targets operate daily. Any investment discussion therefore occurs inside a constitutional text that still contains this opening. An unactivated self-determination provision and an active residual filter now sit side by side. The 9–11 cohort will enter whichever instrument the adults leave in force. Constitutional time runs in legislative cycles. Developmental time runs in windows that close. The mismatch is structural. Sjoe! The scaffolding plans are exquisite. The builders, however, appear to be permanently in a meeting about the symbolism of the scaffolding. The children keep ageing on schedule. Stirring Questions: If the highest-leverage developmental period is being filled with residual narratives and thin scaffolding, what civic culture should we expect in fifteen years? Can a non-racial constitution remain coherent while successive post-1994 cohorts carry permanent collective residual costs? What measurable indicators would show that the 9–11 cohort’s emerging judgments of fairness are improving or deteriorating? What these questions together reveal is the mismatch between constitutional time and developmental time. Constitutions operate in legislative cycles. Children operate in windows that close. The questions force the two clocks into the same conversation. 3. The Neighbouring Settlement Zimbabwe’s 2000 fast-track process extinguished titles. The 2020 Global Compensation Deed established a framework of approximately US$3.5 billion for improvements on the farms, not the land itself. By October 2026 cash payments plus dollar-denominated Treasury bonds had reached roughly US$508–521 million for early batches of claimants, explicitly linked to arrears clearance and capital-market re-engagement (Bloomberg, 2026). South Africa has extinguished no equivalent residual titles or contracts. Gazette 52514 continues to define a residual pool for future opportunities. Ramaphosa’s 29 August 2025 remarks at the Zimbabwe Agricultural Show described the post-1980 reforms as essential for historical redress and food security, and as mirroring South Africa’s own experience. The legal categories remain distinct—completed property extinguishment versus ongoing opportunity sorting. Yet the political signal travels. Crystallised costs can compel instruments while unmeasured ones merely accumulate. International comparisons sharpen the point. Preference regimes that retained residual citizen priority after temporary measures tended to face less political friction once scarcity intensified. Those that treated residual seats as fully interchangeable between citizens and non-citizens often saw residual competition become a durable feature of labour-market politics. Every additional year of residual design under scarcity increases the chance the parallel is later invoked. The boy in the water queue supplies the living measure of the choice still available. Residual costs that remain unmeasured can still shape behaviour and eventually force settlement or redesign once the political calculus shifts. Sjoe! One government is settling yesterday’s residual with bonds and cash. The other is still allocating today’s residual with scorecards. The calendar is the same. The paperwork is not. Stirring Questions: If residual costs only become payable once a political decision crystallises them, what evidence threshold would be required before South Africa’s residual opportunity costs moved from individual experience to national conversation? Does the Zimbabwean precedent alter the political calculus for residual redesign inside South Africa even while the legal categories remain distinct? When a state pays former owners to restore investor trust, what does that imply for the long-term cost of leaving residual competition unmeasured? What these questions together reveal is that the comparison stays inside its proper role: a concrete demonstration that residual costs can force settlement once crystallised, while insisting that South Africa’s residual has not yet crossed that threshold. The questions prevent both denial of the design and premature equivalence. Synthesis Independent lines of evidence converge from different fields. Statutory text creates the residual by design (Department of Employment and Labour, 2025). Developmental psychology identifies a high-leverage window currently occupied by residual rules and thin scaffolding (Piaget, 1952; Louw et al., 2024). Official statistics quantify a large orphan population at elevated baseline risk (Statistics South Africa, 2025). Constitutional text supplies both inherent dignity and an unused self-determination clause (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; de Villiers, 2014). Neighbouring compensation figures show that crystallised residuals can produce instruments (Bloomberg, 2026). Multiple independent witnesses describe the same institutional object from different angles: the residual is consequential as design and experience; the residual total remains a hypothesis; redesign remains available inside functioning constitutional institutions. Think of them as overlapping fingerprints or independent witnesses describing the same event. The claim is falsifiable: publish residual-occupancy data by citizenship, track specialised funding release rates, and measure whether the 9–11 cohort’s emerging judgments of fairness improve or deteriorate. If the indicators move toward competence, trust and reduced intergenerational suspicion, the argument weakens. If they do not, the argument strengthens. The stakes are the civic capacities of the next generation. The scaffolding is either raised around agency or it is left thin while the residual continues to score. Objections Some will argue that white representation at top management remains high relative to economically active population share. The apex figure is accurate and belongs in the same analysis. It does not cancel residual pressure lower down, nor does it alter the statutory fact that white citizens and foreign nationals share the non-preference residual. Others will say larger structural problems must be solved first. Developmental science suggests the opposite sequencing: deficits formed in the concrete-operational stage become harder and more expensive to reverse later. Waiting for perfect conditions is itself a form of the inefficiency under examination. A third view holds that racial consciousness remains necessary indefinitely. The constitutional text speaks of persons. Permanent essentialism and shared standards of evidence and trust pull in opposite directions. Conclusion The residual is not a contradiction in terms. It is the precise description of the system as it currently operates. Formal dignity is inherent, universal and criminally protected. Residual opportunity design, shared material scarcity, thin protective scaffolding and ambient narrative occupy the same childhood without themselves constituting criminal impairment of that dignity. The orphaned white boy aged 9–11 stands in the water queue today and will later enter the residual market. His legal claim remains whole. The conditions that shape its lived formation and future expression are structured by statute, capacity and scarcity. Publish the residual occupancy series by citizenship, or accept that he will inherit an uncounted gradient the 1996 text never named. The chairs are still residual. They need not stay that way. The cumulative evidence demonstrates that residual design is real, consequential under scarcity, and legally distinct from property seizure, with the residual total remaining a hypothesis rather than an established liability. The precise task is to decide, on evidence, whether residual citizen priority after preference should be restored and whether the overall opportunity set can be expanded. The adults still hold the pen. Sjoe. The cumulative evidence proves the residual is real as design, consequential under scarcity for the post-1994 cohort, and still open to measurement or redesign. #Sjoe 😂🇿🇦 #TheResidualChair 🪑 #LeftoverArithmetic 🧮 #WhoGotTheCalculator 🤯 #PleaseExplainTheMaths 😂 #TheMissingPercentage 👀 #BureaucracyOlympics 🥇 #ScorecardSafari 🦁 #GovernmentBySpreadsheet 📊 #TheQueueNeverLies 🚰 #ConstitutionalConfetti 🎊 #PreferenceFirstQuestionsLater 🤔 #ResidualReality 😳 #TheEmptyChairChronicles 🪑 #MathsHasLeftTheBuilding 🚪 #WhereDidThe100Go 💯 #SpreadsheetShenanigans 🤡 #TheGreatResidualMystery 🔍 # #PaperworkAndPrayer 🙏 #ScaffoldingInPerpetuity 🏗️ References: Bloomberg. (2026, October 1). Zimbabwe’s payments to former white farmers reach $508 million. Christie, P. (1985). The right to learn: The struggle for education in South Africa. Ravan Press. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Department of Employment and Labour. (2025). Determination of sectoral numerical targets (Government Gazette 52514). de Villiers, B. (2014). Section 235 of the Constitution: Too soon or too late for cultural self-determination in South Africa? South African Journal on Human Rights, 30(3), 458–483. Fiske, E. B., & Ladd, H. F. (2004). Elusive equity: Education reform in post-apartheid South Africa. Brookings Institution Press. Hall, K., & Hendricks, S. (2025). Analysis of General Household Survey 2024 orphan data. Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town. Louw, D. A., Mampane, R., Bester, S., & Louw, A. E. (2024). Child development for teachers in Southern Africa. Psychology Publishers. Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. International Universities Press. Statistics South Africa. (2025). General Household Survey 2024. Pretoria: Stats SA.
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Shane Locker (Sjoe! News Panelist) retweeted
It’s a honour to be re-elected as the Mayor of Cape Town 🇿🇦 Let’s take Cape Town forward for all 💙
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The French tackles that prompted Rassie Erasmus' tirade against match officials following the Springboks' defeat in Paris have been identified. sarugbymag.co.za/revealed-17…
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Democratic Alliance (DA) federal leader Geordin Hill-Lewis said his party is unlikely to match the coalition offer that ActionSA had received from the African National Congress. ewn.co.za/2026/11/18/hill-le…
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So cheating is fine when you play a South African rugby team. This is an absolute tragedy for World Rugby because it shows the sport is run by those whose interests are not truth and fair competition. Not as if it just happened now. Remember the 2011 Rugby World Cup quarter final between South Africa and Australia.
Dear World Rugby, you can suspend the coach but you can't suspend the footage. 17 tackles. We all saw them. Some of us counted more. FREE UNCLE RASSIE 🇿🇦 @WorldRugby @IrishRugby THE FOOTAGE SPEAKS!! 
#ScrumAtMe #FreeRassie #Springboks #WorldRugby
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We’re about to see the scavengers in South African politics form a chaotic, frenzied pack, so they can pick the carcass clean. Give them no quarter. They’ve taken enough. Do whatever you can to insulate yourself from the state.
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ZAR is pricing in a bigger risk off event - The end of GNU !! Banks leading the risk off! Markets are unwinding the optimism of unified government and pricing in more years of looting , corruption , theft and failed infrastructure rollout. Looks like the banana republic might be coming back ;(
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This would spell the end of the GNU as we know it. The DA can hardly remain in a national coalition with the ANC while the “will of the people” is excluded from city governments. news24.com/opinions/columnis…
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Can sit and moan or make the best of it. I’ll be watching the match at the hotel. Not keen to watch in on my own. So lets give it a go and hope I get the “tech” sorted = TV on, My Laptop camera on, and you’re welcome to join me. Sign up here (adults 18+): watchwithrassie.com. This is personal, not official.
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ActionSA is going to be punished for its behaviour in Johannesburg, basically for allowing Mashaba emotions to dictate the party strategy.
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Sjoe! They Won the Coalition🇿🇦 They May Lose the Country! ~ The Coalition That Could Break South Africa💥Cape Independence and KwaZulu-Natal Balkanisation! ~ 💣 One Coalition Deal, Two Provinces, and the Beginning of a Very Different South Africa! Sjoe. Johannesburg has just demonstrated what finishing first is worth under pure proportional representation. The Democratic Alliance took roughly 34.8 percent of the vote and 91 seats on a 270-seat council. A majority requires 136. ActionSA, led by Herman Mashaba, secured 16–17 percent and 42–43 seats. Within days the ANC, ActionSA, the EFF and the MK Party were constructing majorities that would leave the largest party outside the mayoralty and the executive (Eyewitness News, 18 November 2026; BusinessTech, 18 November 2026). The party that arrived first in the economic capital can be locked out by parties that arrived later. Arithmetic has overridden mandate. That exclusion is the high-salience event that has most likely pushed the Western Cape across the threshold at which independence becomes the lower-risk option, and that has placed KwaZulu-Natal Balkanization firmly on the radar. No post-election poll has yet confirmed a majority for either outcome. The cumulative evidence—seat totals, contemporaneous coalition reporting, multi-year polling ranges, and documented fiscal flows—nonetheless indicates that Mashaba’s conversion of a mid-sized seat total into decisive veto power has updated the risk assessment for both provinces at once. Cape independence is now the more probable path inside the current cycle. KwaZulu-Natal autonomy follows as the logical subsequent pressure once the centre’s inability to protect plurality winners is established as operating fact. 1. The Arithmetic That Nullifies South Africa’s pure proportional representation system multiplies parties rather than concentrating them. Under the Municipal Structures Act the executive mayor is elected by a majority of councillors, not awarded to the largest party. Johannesburg’s numbers therefore permit exclusion: DA 91, ANC 63, ActionSA 43, MK 15, EFF 17. Combinations that exclude the DA reach or exceed 136. Mashaba’s party, holding less than half the DA’s seats, becomes the indispensable partner. This is the institutionalisation of kingmaker leverage. Historical surveys between 2020 and 2026 placed support for the idea of Western Cape independence in the 30–50 percent range of the provincial population; one pre-election poll recorded approximately 34 percent among voters living in the province itself (Cape Independence Advocacy Group, 2026; The Common Sense, 2026). An earlier Social Research Foundation poll recorded support near 51 percent inside KwaZulu-Natal for that province breaking away. The Johannesburg exclusion supplies the missing concrete precedent. Single-issue parties received negligible shares, so organised demand remains limited. The threshold claim is a hypothesis grounded in visible exclusion and prior polling ranges. It is the strongest available indicator that the price of plurality has risen. The 1996 Constitution assumed that national and provincial majorities would largely align. Section 235 recognises self-determination within the Republic yet supplies no procedural path to exit. When coalition arithmetic repeatedly prevents the largest party from governing the largest metro, the practical distinction between assigned provincial powers and residual control narrows for regions that already run their own service systems. The 2021 hung-council wave first revealed the pattern. The 2026 Johannesburg talks have elevated it to the operating rule of the economic capital. Sjoe! Ninety-one seats and still waiting in the corridor while 43 decide whether the door opens. The system has discovered that the power to withhold is more valuable than the power to arrive first. Stirring Questions: If the largest party in the economic capital can be excluded from functional leadership, what remaining incentive exists for voters in diverging provinces to treat national coalition outcomes as binding on their own majorities? When that exclusion is paired with already substantial latent support for greater autonomy? These questions together matter because they test whether the 2026 arithmetic has altered the risk calculus faster than gradual demographic or fiscal drift, and whether protective exit has become the rational default for both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 2. Symmetric Exposure Both provinces already diverge from the coalitions that dominate national arrangements. In the Western Cape the DA retained outright majorities in Cape Town (approximately 56 percent) and in several other municipalities (Rateweb, 2026; IEC results). In KwaZulu-Natal the MK Party emerged as the largest force in 19 of 34 hung councils, including eThekwini with 86 seats. The Johannesburg precedent demonstrates that smaller parties can construct veto majorities against the first-place party. Once that mechanism is normalised, the expected cost of remaining rises symmetrically. Western Cape residents who have repeatedly rejected the parties that form the bulk of national coalitions face the prospect that future multi-party deals could override their local majorities. KwaZulu-Natal residents who have shifted support toward a regionally dominant party face the parallel risk that national coalition logic could still constrain or exclude that party’s preferred outcomes. Protective calculations therefore apply equally: convert temporary local strength into more permanent control before the same exclusionary arithmetic is applied. The provinces differ in party colouring, demography and institutional capacity; symmetry exists at the level of incentive structure, not identical political content. Comparative experience adds precision. In Belgium the repeated construction of national majorities that sidelined the largest Flemish parties accelerated demands for fiscal autonomy. In Canada the perception that federal coalitions were unresponsive to Quebec majorities preceded the 1995 referendum. Neither case maps exactly onto South Africa, yet both show how the normalisation of veto politics raises the relative attractiveness of exit options for regionally concentrated electorates. Mashaba’s success in Johannesburg has performed the same demonstration function for South African provinces. Sjoe! Two provinces, two different parties, one shared discovery: the centre can no longer guarantee that finishing first means governing. The arithmetic does not care about the colour of the jersey. Questions Stirring: Can the same veto logic that operates in Johannesburg be replicated against Western Cape majorities or against MK-led arrangements in KwaZulu-Natal? And what threshold of repeated exclusion would be required before protective demands become majority positions? These questions together are important because they determine whether the 2026 outcome remains a Gauteng-specific negotiation or becomes the template that makes independence or deep autonomy the lower-risk path for both provinces. 3. Salience Without New Polls Multiple surveys established substantial latent preference. The Johannesburg talks supply a high-salience event capable of moving soft or undecided respondents. Once residents in either province update their beliefs to include a non-trivial probability that local preference can be nullified by coalitions assembled elsewhere, the expected cost of the status quo rises relative to the expected cost of testing independence or deep autonomy. Salience can shift preferences faster than slow drift. The absence of a confirmatory post-election poll means the crossing remains unmeasured. The DA’s exclusion is identified as the trigger precisely because it is immediate and observable. Research on demonstration effects indicates that a single, highly visible failure of representation can compress timelines previously assumed to be multi-cycle. The Johannesburg outcome functions as that demonstration. For the Western Cape, Mashaba’s role in ousting the largest party supplies a concrete reason to treat independence as insurance against the same fate. For KwaZulu-Natal the same logic applies with a lag: once the centre’s inability to protect plurality winners is established, regional parties face stronger incentives to lock in local control. An unintended consequence is that kingmaker success in one metro can accelerate exit pressures in distant provinces, regardless of the kingmaker’s own national ambitions. Practical consequences follow for ratepayers: metro paralysis raises the relative value of provinces that can still convert majorities into consistent service delivery. Sjoe! No new poll is required for the calculation to change. Residents simply watched the largest party in the economic capital being told that its 91 seats were insufficient. That is enough to update the ledger. Stirring Qestions: How many additional high-salience exclusions would be required to convert the existing 30–50 percent band into a measured majority? What form would a confirmatory survey need to take to falsify or support the hypothesis? These questions together matter because the claim is explicitly testable; without them the argument remains coherent but unconfirmed, and the distinction between latent preference and organised demand remains decisive. 4. Parallel Pressure The identical coalition arithmetic that can sideline the largest party in Johannesburg can generate concurrent demands in KwaZulu-Natal. Functional separation—local power arrangements, fiscal retention efforts, resistance to selected national policies—need not wait for one province to complete a formal exit before the other advances. Historical processes of fragmentation show that once central enforcement capacity is visibly impaired, multiple regions move on overlapping timelines. Placing the Johannesburg demonstration beside KwaZulu-Natal’s 2026 electoral results and earlier secession polling makes the multi-regional prospect a direct implication of the same mechanism. Legal, economic and security constraints differ sharply between provinces; parallel movement is probable only in the limited sense of simultaneous pressure for greater autonomy, not simultaneous sovereign exit. The practical consequence is that the Western Cape need not succeed first for KwaZulu-Natal to accelerate. Each province supplies the other with evidence that the centre cannot reliably enforce uniform outcomes. Once that evidence is public, the cost of waiting declines for both. Governance analysis notes that when the centre loses the ability to convert electoral outcomes into consistent policy, sub-national actors rationally invest in alternative institutional arrangements, including independent generation capacity and localised revenue retention. Broader societal implications include the hardening of regional identity as residents recalculate the returns to national participation. Sjoe! The centre’s inability to protect the largest party in Johannesburg has become a shared reference point. Two provinces can now move without waiting for the other to finish the journey. Questions Stirring: Can functional separation in one province accelerates or dampens pressure in the other? What institutional responses from the centre would be required to reverse the impairment of uniform enforcement? These questions together are important because they distinguish between sequential and concurrent pathways and therefore shape whether Cape independence and later KwaZulu-Natal autonomy become mutually reinforcing rather than isolated experiments. 5. Conditions Already Present Western Cape provincial majorities already supply the legislative capacity to table a motion invoking self-determination or for the premier to initiate a referendum. Comparable provincial arithmetic exists in parts of KwaZulu-Natal. November 2026 fiscal-flow analyses, including the Econometrix report released with the Cape Independence Advocacy Group, documented substantial and growing net outflows from the Western Cape to the national fiscus; the province has simultaneously expanded independent generation capacity. These conditions lower the practical cost of greater autonomy. When combined with the Johannesburg signal, the previous multi-cycle assumption shortens. Legal pathways remain contested, fiscal models are projections rather than guarantees, and political will inside the dominant provincial parties has not yet been tested by a formal motion. The equal weighting of institutional readiness with the political demonstration shows only that the conditions for testing the question are more favourable than before the 2026 coalition talks. Mashaba’s success in Johannesburg has therefore done more than rearrange Gauteng metros. It has supplied the high-salience event that makes the existing legal and fiscal conditions in the Western Cape actionable inside the current cycle, and that makes parallel pressure in KwaZulu-Natal more probable rather than remote. Economic reasoning indicates that sustained net outflows combined with demonstrated local capacity create a measurable incentive to retain revenue streams once the political risk of remaining has risen. The broader implication is that repeated nullification of plurality winners erodes the expectation that electoral participation will produce corresponding governance, thereby lowering the cost of exploring alternatives. Sjoe! The door was already unlocked. Johannesburg simply showed everyone the key was never required. Stirring Questions: Is there concern whether any provincial majority will actually table such a motion inside the current cycle? What fiscal or service-delivery thresholds would make the cost of inaction exceed the cost of action for those majorities? These questions together matter because they convert structural possibility into observable political choice, and because the answer will determine whether the 2026 exclusion remains a Gauteng story or becomes the moment at which Cape independence, and later KwaZulu-Natal autonomy, moved from hypothesis to active pursuit. Synthesis The sequence is coherent. A documented exclusion in Johannesburg raises symmetric expected costs in two diverging provinces. The salience of that exclusion can update preferences without new polling. The same impairment of central capacity makes parallel pressure probable. Pre-existing legal and fiscal conditions make action inside the current cycle feasible. The collective strength lies in the independence of the sources—IEC seat totals, contemporaneous coalition reporting, multi-year polling ranges, and fiscal-flow analyses—each reinforcing the others like independent witnesses describing the same event. The argument is falsifiable: a post-election survey showing no movement in support, or the failure of any provincial majority to table a motion, would weaken it. The stakes are the continued capacity of the centre to enforce uniform outcomes once plurality winners can be nullified in the economic capital. Mashaba’s positioning of ActionSA as the indispensable partner has made that nullification the operating fact of the moment, and has thereby raised the probability that both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal will treat protective exit as the rational response. The cumulative evidence indicates that the Johannesburg coalition outcome has most likely pushed Cape independence over the threshold and placed KwaZulu-Natal Balkanization on the likely radar. Objections One objection holds that coalition exclusion is normal and temporary, and that Johannesburg will eventually produce a stable government. The arithmetic shows otherwise: combinations that exclude the largest party already exist and have been actively negotiated. A second objection notes that independence parties received negligible votes, so latent polling support is irrelevant. Polling and electoral organisation are distinct; the former measures preference, the latter measures mobilisation. A third objection claims the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal lack the capacity for meaningful autonomy. Existing majorities, documented fiscal outflows and independent generation capacity supply evidence to the contrary, even while legal and political tests remain outstanding. Conclusion The 2026 Johannesburg outcome has measurably altered the risk calculus for both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Finishing first no longer guarantees functional leadership. The price of plurality is now visible in the economic capital, and the conditions that would allow diverging provinces to test alternatives are already present. Mashaba’s role in ousting the DA has supplied the demonstration that makes Cape independence the lower-risk option inside the current cycle and that makes parallel pressure in KwaZulu-Natal more probable than sequential. Whether those provinces act remains open; the arithmetic that makes action more rational is not. The cumulative evidence indicates that the threshold has likely been crossed, and that the visible exclusion of a plurality winner in Johannesburg constitutes the clearest available signal that coalition arithmetic has raised the expected cost of remaining inside the unitary state high enough to accelerate demands for greater autonomy or exit in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, with the claim remaining a hypothesis pending confirmatory post-election polling. #SjoeNews 😂 #TheyWonJohannesburgLostSouthAfrica 🇿🇦 #TheGreatSAUnravelling 🧶 #OneCoalitionTwoDivorces 💔 #MashabaButterflyEffect 🦋 #JohannesburgDominoEffect 🎳 #CapeExitStrategy 🧳 #KZNPlotTwist 🤯 #TheUnionHasLeftTheChat 🚪 #DemocracyByCalculator 🧮 #91SeatsAndAConstitutionalCrisis 🪑 #KingmakerGoneWild 👑 #TheGreatPoliticalShuffle 💃 #CoalitionKaraoke 🎤 #OopsWeBrokeTheRepublic 🤡 #TheRepublicOfOops 😱 #CapeOfGoodDivorce 🏖️ #KwaZuluNatalAndChill 😎 #ThePoliticalDivorceCourt ⚖️ #PassTheMovingBoxes 📦 References: BusinessTech. (2026, November 18). ActionSA, ANC, EFF and MK looking ready to sweep Gauteng and leave the DA with nothing. Cape Independence Advocacy Group. (2026, November 16). OP-ED: What now for Cape Independence? [capeindependence.org/post/op…](capeindependence.org/post/op…) Eyewitness News. (2026, November 18). DA refuses to drop Helen Zille as ActionSA edges closer to ANC coalition deal. Rateweb. (2026). Western Cape local election results 2026. The Common Sense. (2026, November 4). LGE 2026: Latest polling. Social Research Foundation polling cited in The Common Sense. (2026). Attitudes to secession in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. IEC results as reported in multiple outlets, November 2026.
🤖 Made with AI
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Elon Musk says Neuralink’s next product, Blindsight, will enable people who are completely blind to see: “Our next product is what we call Blindsight.” “Blindsight is a neural implant that interfaces directly with the visual cortex and enables people who are completely blind to see.” “You’re wearing glasses or something like that that have a camera. That camera is transmitting to the Neuralink device that then transfers the signals to your visual cortex.” “Enabling someone who is completely blind, meaning blind in both eyes or lost the optic nerve, potentially someone who has been blind from birth, to see.”
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imho, in the next 2 years 50%+ of what we watch will come from AI influencers Welcome @claudia_popstar by @anabology: the first AI influencer on unfair.so! Made with @heyglif
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California Post Opinion Editor @joelpollak explains Elon Musk’s battle with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and the lesson California can learn from it.
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📢 WE ARE HIRING! ActionSA is seeking patriotic and talented South Africans to join its team in Parliament. We have the following vacancies available: 🟢 Parliamentary Researcher 🟢 Parliamentary Research and Administration Officer 🟢 Parliamentary Operations and Media Manager Apply by 3 December 2026 👉 actionsa.org.za/vacancies
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President Cyril Ramaphosa has argued that much of the knowledge and education that helped make Elon Musk successful came from South Africa. businesstech.co.za/news/gove…
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Elon Musk’s explosive feud with South Africa’s president — a ‘woke’ warning for California trib.al/hqP2mvy
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Sjoe! The Selective Light🔦When Universal Principles Meet Selective Scrutiny ~ Excellent Principles🎭Interesting Exceptions ~ ⚖️ When Principles Become Preferences. The light is selective. That quiet, measurable fact explains more about the distance between declared principle and operational practice than most official reports. Institutions that speak the language of universality with impressive fluency apply that language with systematically uneven intensity. The result is not ordinary prioritisation. It is an operating system that shapes historical memory, present judgement, and the gradual expenditure of soft-power legitimacy. This investigation follows the pattern from a concrete agricultural programme to the deeper architecture of constitutional practice, historical education, institutional culture, and international authority. The evidence is cumulative. Agricultural statistics, constitutional text, historical demography, organisational studies, and the observable distribution of institutional attention reinforce one another like independent witnesses describing the same event from different angles. The claim is falsifiable: equal intensity of scrutiny across comparable cases would dissolve the observed asymmetry. Until that test is met, the light remains selective. 1. The Accountability Gap Large philanthropic interventions can miss their own public targets by wide margins even when the money is measured in billions. AGRA mobilised more than $1.5 billion, the majority from the Gates Foundation, and set explicit public goals of roughly doubling yields and incomes while substantially reducing hunger in focus countries. Independent analyses drawing on FAO undernourishment statistics later showed that absolute numbers of undernourished people rose markedly in those same countries. Yield growth did not accelerate in line with the stated ambitions. The foundation subsequently accepted a degree of shared responsibility and the need for course correction. The pattern is instructive precisely because the intervention was well-resourced, high-prestige, and publicly measurable. Volume of capital and stated good intentions do not automatically produce the promised outcomes when soil constraints, market realities, and farmer-level adoption barriers intervene. Side-effects such as increased input dependence further complicate the ledger. When private foundations help shape national agricultural policy at scale, the absence of robust, independent accountability mechanisms becomes a structural feature rather than an unfortunate oversight. Political science has long observed that external actors who fund and design policy at national scale create principal-agent problems that ordinary democratic oversight struggles to correct. The foundation answers primarily to its own board and donors; the governments that adopted the model answer to voters who experience the results. Equal methodological scrutiny of both successes and shortfalls is therefore required for any intervention of comparable ambition, regardless of the funder’s reputation. The evidence does not support treating philanthropic capital as self-validating. Performance data remain performance data even when the intentions were admirable. Sjoe. The money arrived with excellent stationery. The targets were published with confidence. The results were measured with the same calm that later required a quieter admission of shortfall. The gap is still on the record. Stirring Questions: What standard of evidence should apply when a private foundation helps design national policy and then misses its own public benchmarks? Why does the scale of resources sometimes function as a shield against ordinary performance scrutiny? How should societies weigh stated intentions against measurable outcomes when the two diverge? What these questions together reveal: They establish the baseline demand for equal intensity before the argument expands. Without that baseline, every subsequent claim about consistency floats free of evidence. They force attention onto the difference between intention and result, which is the only place where accountability can actually begin. 2. The Uneven Beam Universal language is routinely paired with systematically uneven intensity of application. Both the United Nations system and South African constitutional practice retain the full formal vocabulary of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination. In operation, the intensity with which those standards are applied varies according to the identity of the actor and the narrative convenience of the case. High-resolution scrutiny is directed at selected historical wrongs, certain solidarity claims, and visible protest flashpoints. Parallel historical records, domestic capacity failures such as extreme unemployment, and measurable costs arising from asylum and migration systems receive comparatively softer treatment. This is not transparent prioritisation. It converts constitutional and charter text from a binding constraint into a rhetorical instrument that can be intensified or dimmed. The asymmetry appears in the distribution of institutional energy, the emphasis of educational curricula, and the ranking of elite commentary. Once publics internalise the uneven light as normal, legitimacy declines because the declared principle no longer matches lived practice. Constitutional design itself creates incentives that reward the pattern. Foreign policy offers high symbolic return and relatively low immediate domestic accountability. Delivery portfolios generate constant friction and visible failure. Rational political actors therefore protect the former and treat the latter as more negotiable. Comparative work on democratic backsliding identifies selective enforcement of liberal norms as an early indicator of institutional erosion. The conversion of text into narrative instrument is already measurable in the contrast between high-profile international litigation and the continued non-elevation of certain domestic security and service categories. Sjoe. A principle that applies only when convenient is not a principle. It is a preference with excellent stationery. Stirring Questions: If the Constitution and the UN Charter are supreme, why does critical intensity vary so systematically across comparable cases? What institutional incentives reward narrative fidelity over consistent application? At what point does the gap between constitutional language and operational practice itself become a legitimacy problem? What these questions together reveal: They test whether the founding texts still function as limits on power or have become vocabularies available for selective deployment. The answer determines the practical meaning of constitutional democracy and international normative authority. Abstract consistency becomes visible only when the costs are named and located. 3. The Missing Continents Incomplete historical maps distort present judgement and policy. Identical categories of human behaviour—territorial conquest, hierarchical rule, and long-duration systems of coerced labour—receive radically different moral and linguistic treatment according to the civilisational source. European overseas expansion and the Atlantic slave trade are subjected to dense, continuous annotation in curricula, public discourse, and institutional memory. Parallel processes of Islamic imperial expansion after the seventh century and the eastern slave trades that moved millions across the Sahara, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean over more than a millennium are more frequently treated as background conditions or cultural diffusion. The selection is not neutral. It is the product of twentieth-century historiographical and political priorities. Successive cohorts are trained in high-resolution pattern recognition for one set of records and low-resolution recognition for others. Present-day policy, risk assessment, and moral reasoning inherit the distortion. Foreign-policy alignments and the pathologising of certain demographic concerns while equivalent preferences elsewhere remain unlabelled all rest on this incomplete map. Collective memory research shows that selective pattern recognition, once institutionalised in education and media, is remarkably durable. A constitutional order that announces equal standards cannot keep producing clear judgement if successive generations are trained on unequal factual foundations. The filter does not stay in the classroom. It travels into the memos that decide which partners are worth the friction and which silences are affordable. Societies that cannot name parallel patterns across civilisations lose predictive accuracy precisely where open institutions most need clear-eyed evaluation of competing doctrinal and geopolitical incentives. Sjoe. It is remarkable how efficiently a moral vocabulary can develop selective amnesia when the alternative would require redrawing the approved map. Stirring Questions: Why do identical factual categories of conquest, hierarchy, and coerced labour produce opposite linguistic outcomes? What predictive capacity is lost when societies refuse to notice recurring patterns across civilisations? How can open institutions be defended if the standards used to evaluate historical and present threats are applied unevenly? What these questions together reveal: They expose the cost of incomplete maps. Societies that cannot name parallel patterns across civilisations lose the capacity to evaluate risk and continuity with clear eyes. Education that filters the past produces policy that filters the present, and a constitutional order built on equal standards cannot long survive unequal factual foundations. 4. The Lock-In Cultural and institutional lock-in makes selectivity feel like common sense rather than a choice. Selective intensity does not remain a temporary elite preference. Feedback loops of homogeneous professional recruitment, overlapping foundation funding streams, shared academic vocabularies, and narrative rewards for certain diagnostic frames steadily reduce internal error-correction. What begins as prioritisation hardens into cultural expectation. Educational and media environments that reward recognition of preferred historical grievances while discouraging equivalent examination of present capacity failures or parallel historical records train citizens to experience uneven scrutiny as ordinary. Soft-power institutions are particularly exposed because their residual authority rests on the perception of consistency with universal language. Once the public itself accepts selective light as the natural order, formal constitutional or charter remedies alone cannot restore operational force. The lock-in is measurable in grant databases, organisational studies, curriculum content, and the ranking of political attention. Political science has long observed that foundation ecosystems shape the opportunity structure of civil society more effectively than any single directive. By consistently resourcing organisations that already diagnose the world in compatible terms, funders create the conditions under which certain interpretations become the default public language. The power is architectural rather than conspiratorial: it determines who is equipped to speak with institutional authority when events unfold. Breaking the lock-in requires deliberate recovery of the full-record standard across every domain rather than further accumulation of paper victories under uneven maps. Elite choices can be reversed by new elite choices. Cultural formation is slower, more durable, and harder to see while it is happening. Sjoe. A closed loop does not announce itself as closed. It simply experiences every external critique as further proof that the outside world has not yet caught up. Stirring Questions: At what point does institutional continuity become institutional insulation? How does a sector that prizes critical theory lose the capacity for critical self-examination? What measurable indicators would show that internal error-correction has fallen below the level required for public trust? What these questions together reveal: They move the discussion from motive to mechanism. If the feedback loop is real, then good intentions are insufficient. The structure itself must be examined. Homogeneity is not a side-effect; it is the active mechanism that converts institutional continuity into progressive insulation from contrary evidence. 5. The Legitimacy Ledger Soft-power legitimacy is spent faster by selective standards than by open failure. The United Nations cannot reliably compel determined states. Its remaining influence depends almost entirely on moral authority derived from consistent application of the universal language it proclaims. Persistent asymmetry—high intensity for preferred grievance frames, lower intensity for capacity failures or parallel historical records—trains member states and domestic publics to treat the institutional light as selective by design. Paper victories continue to accumulate while the practical capacity for consistent critical inquiry thins. The identical dynamic appears in South African constitutional practice when prestige foreign-policy portfolios are protected while domestic delivery metrics stagnate. Historical experience shows that societies and institutions that allow selective standards to become culturally ordinary eventually discover that their universal language has lost its universal force. Preferential trade arrangements concentrate export success in specific sectors; their possible withdrawal concentrates pain. When presidential statements describe potential exclusion as “devastating,” abstract solidarity postures are converted into concrete employment risk for workers who possess limited exit options. The ranking of priorities becomes visible in the most concrete currency available: livelihoods. The only durable corrective is the restoration of equal intensity: the same full-record standard applied without fear or favour to every actor, every historical chapter, and every present ledger of costs and benefits. Anything less converts principle into theatre. Sjoe. Paper victories are the most efficient form of progress. They require no change in the underlying map, only a change in the lighting. Stirring Questions: How many paper victories can accumulate before the gap between language and practice becomes a structural feature of legitimacy itself? What remains of soft-power authority when the public learns that the light is meant to be selective? Can a constitutional democracy sustain legitimacy when the domestic ledger and the international stage tell different stories about the same set of choices? What these questions together reveal: They translate constitutional principle into the concrete arithmetic of trust. Abstract consistency becomes visible only when the costs are named and located. A principle that cannot survive equal application was never a principle; it was a preference wearing the language of universality. Synthesis Independent lines of evidence converge. A high-profile agricultural programme under-delivers relative to its own public targets. Universal language is retained while intensity of application varies systematically. Incomplete historical maps train successive cohorts in selective pattern recognition. Feedback loops harden that selectivity into cultural expectation. Soft-power legitimacy is spent in the process. Independent observations from FAO statistics, constitutional text, historical demography, grant databases, organisational studies, and the observable distribution of institutional attention converge on the same diagnostic. Multiple independent witnesses describing the same pattern are harder to dismiss than a single eloquent advocate. The full record is simply the assembled testimony. Strands that begin in different fields become a single rope when pulled together. The claim remains falsifiable: equal intensity of scrutiny across comparable cases would dissolve the asymmetry. Until that standard is met, selective light continues to function as a coherent operating system. The stakes appear in the distance between the language of the Bill of Rights and the lived experience of equality, between international paper victories and domestic capacity metrics, between the prestige of speaking to the world and the unglamorous work of keeping services reliable and factories running. Objections One objection holds that solidarity narratives are themselves a legitimate form of principle after historical injustice. Historical grievance is real and politically potent. The full-record standard does not deny grievance; it requires that the same intensity of scrutiny be applied to the present conduct of all parties. Narrative legitimacy does not exempt any actor from consistent examination. A second objection argues that perfect consistency is impossible and prioritisation is inevitable. Prioritisation is indeed inevitable. The question is whether prioritisation is acknowledged as such or presented as the pure application of universal principle. Transparency about trade-offs is compatible with constitutional democracy; the conversion of selective scrutiny into the language of universality is not. A third objection suggests that focusing on methodological consistency distracts from urgent material crises. Methodological consistency is not a distraction from material outcomes. It is one of the conditions under which material outcomes can be pursued without eroding the institutional capacity required to sustain them. Conclusion The Constitution remains supreme on paper. Whether it remains supreme in practice depends on the recovery of equal intensity—the same full-record standard applied without fear or favour to every actor, every portfolio, and every ledger. Until that recovery occurs, the light stays selective, and the legitimacy gap widens in plain sight. South Africans who still regard the founding text as more than excellent stationery have a practical choice: continue accumulating paper victories under uneven maps, or begin the slower work of applying the same light to every corner. The evidence is open. The test remains available. The next chapter of the record is still being written. Sjoe. The full record does not care which story is preferred. It only records whether the same light is applied to every corner. #Sjoe 🔦 #SelectiveLight 💡 #SpotlightPolitics 🎭 #UniversalPrinciplesSelectiveApplication ⚖️ #EqualityWithConditions 📜 #TheInstitutionalDimmerSwitch 🔌 #MoralHighBeams 🚨 #ConvenientlyBlind 🙈 #HistoryWithMissingPages 📚 #TheGreatMoralSpotlight 🎪 #SelectiveAmnesia 🧠 #AccountabilityHasLeftTheBuilding 🚪 #PrinciplesOnPaper 📄 #PracticeInTheDark 🌚 #InstitutionalHideAndSeek 🔍 #TheUniversalExceptionDepartment 🏛️ #OneRuleManyExceptions 🤹 #EvidenceIsAwkward 🧐 #PleaseMindTheNarrative 🚧 #FootnotesUnderInvestigation 🕵️ References: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (various years). The state of food security and nutrition in the world. FAO. Lovejoy, P. E. (2012). Transformations in slavery: A history of slavery in Africa (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Segal, R. (2001). Islam’s black slaves: The other black diaspora. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown. Wertsch, J. V. (2002). Voices of collective remembering. Cambridge University Press. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations
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South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has called on Elon Musk to “contribute” to the country’s development, noting that the country played a role in shaping his education. The irony in Ramaphosa’s words will not go unnoticed by many members of the country’s White minority population. Such language has long been used by ANC politicians since the end of Apartheid to justify the radical anti-White policies of the “new South Africa.” Companies that wish to operate in South Africa must sell a significant share of their ownership to Black individuals, usually around 30%. In sectors such as telecommunications and mining, this is legally mandated. In sectors where it is not legally required, companies receive DEI points for doing so, and failing to score enough points means losing access to licences and contracts, without which it is impossible to operate. There are also strict laws that mandate discriminatory hiring practices based on race. A new law called the Employment Equity Amendment Act sets hiring targets for 2025–2030 across 18 economic sectors. Some workforce targets aim for 90–96% of employees to come from designated groups, which include Black people, women, and people with disabilities (minimum 3%). This means that if a company has more than 5% White men, it could face penalties of up to 10% of its income. Musk has also noted that he was offered a licence for Starlink to operate in South Africa if he pretended that a Black person ran the company, which he says he refused to do on principle, adding: “Racism should not be rewarded, no matter to which race it is applied.”
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