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Transfinitely Recursive De-referencing Cellular Automata. Twitter filters=off. Certain & guaranteed reaction. Give OPMLs to me. Likely acts on deletion requests

Laniakea
Joined February 2012
Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)Photo by @︎№#ident𝚍 (@no_identd)
@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Microsoft: memberOf is deprecated Everyone: Will there be a replacement? Microsoft: Yes, but you need a new license Everyone: Wait, what?!? Why? Microsoft: Well, it's a new feature you see. We rewrote the backend. The old one was no good, this one is better. Everyone: 🤬
Tucked away in announcements, trapped behind license requirements, Microsoft have released the 𝐃𝐲𝐧𝐚𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐌𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐎𝐟 𝐫𝐮𝐥𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 > ourcloudnetwork.com/microsof… Unfortunately, Microsoft have imposed some significant downgrades to enable organisations to continue to use this functionality. Such as putting it behind the ID Governance license gate and limiting processing to twice a day. Yes, it's a bad architectural design anyway, but with other challenges, organisations have grown dependant on it. Read more about it above. #Entra #Ignite #News
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
#PowerShell 7.7 is out today But with no practical, upgradeable way to install machine-wide AFAIK. Upgrading would likely break a number of my standard scenarios. So, I'll probably stick with 7.6.10 for now. @PowerShell_Team are you listening?
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Replying to @jsnover
Jeffrey, with all due respect and MEIN GOTT that's ***A LOT*** of due respect, them shipping this as is without the MSIX fixes in is a HORRIBLE decision by the team & REALLY bloody delay it until it's fixed. This one alone's bad, & just the iceberg's tip: github.com/dotnet/runtime/is…
PowerShell7 is going to ship in Windows!!!! From the outside, something like this seems like it should be a simple decision. But when you ship software to a billion people, nothing is a simple decision. The PowerShell team has been working towards this team for a VERY long time. You would be shocked to understand how much effort was involved. I keep encouraging with the original spirit of PowerShell v1: If there is ANY hoop you are unwilling to jump through, you will not succeed. Jump through the hoop and there will be another. And another. And another. And if you jump through enough, you'll succeed. MAD RESPECT for the team's fortitude is making this happen. devblogs.microsoft.com/power…
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Company that scraped the entire internet to train its superintelligent model is suddenly very concerned about what its users can search themselves
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
If you want to know what people mean when they say Astra 6.2 is a "bad model" -- read this: First Astra 6.2 returns: One of my projects (a simulation rendering pipeline) had this nasty bug where a few frames would draw and flash the wrong image after arbitrary inputs. - Fable 5.2 couldn't solve it - it couldn't or was unwilling to do the proper verification work required to resolve it at the root, began guessing and then a series of cascading patches to try and paper over the symptoms. FAILED. - Astra 6.1 built a whole harness to compare what the GPU drew with what the CPU expected for every frame but then got fixated on a wrong hypothesis and spun its wheels. FAILED. - Opus I did not give a full chance but pretty sure it would not have done better than Fable. Astra 6.2 knocked it out in ~2 hours by methodically working through it, did what 6.1 tried to do - but properly - found the actual issue at the root and fixed 3 other issues I knew existed but didn't even mention. Watching it work was truly something else. This is clearly one of the smartest models in existence today, and this kind of work is likely an area where it particularly excels. So when these people are out there saying Astra 6.2 is a "bad model" there is a very big distinction to make that some of their hyperbolic statements don't quite cover. The model itself is EXTREMELY intelligent and can likely handle any problem you throw at it. What they really mean is Astra is a bad model to WORK WITH. Because frankly, even though it did amazing things to get to the bottom of this issue and resolve it, esp the way it got there... the experience was subpar. First of all, it worked for 1.5 hours and sent 4 tiny updates. That sucks. Back to the old 5.2 days we go. At the end of all that work its final response was 3 terse paragraphs, decently clear but not well-explained. If you've become a lazy Claude-pilled engineer, and are used to big verbose walls of text at the end of every turn, you probably won't like this and then call it a "bad model". OpenAI clearly has some work to do on Astra. It feels slightly undercooked. But that's it... they rushed it out a bit undercooked. If you think this means OpenAI is far behind, you've lost the plot, the raw intelligence is there, so once OpenAI finishes cooking this thing, watch out... Oh and all that work used just 1% of my weekly. That's insane. More to come on Astra and Sol 6.2...
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Back in the 90s Netscape in the original implementation used to use to word "Bear" and then Microsoft, not understanding what it meant, decided to use the "Bearer."
Software Engineers: Why do we write Bearer before a JWT in the Authorization header?
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
If you're an IT admin and you manage Active Directory, this is literally my best advice for finding dangerous permissions before they get used against you.
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
This is extremely ignorant. @EzraKlein does not understand fascism at all. Nazism did not just emerge from the void. Fascism emerged from European colonialism. Fascism is the application of colonial methods internally. What the Nazis did to Jews, Romani, Slavs, communists, etc. is what the Germans previously did to people in their colonies in the Global South. The Nazis used similar tactics that the German empire used in its genocide in southwest Africa (modern-day Namibia) between 1904 and 1908. Ezra's employer has reported on this German genocide. Does he read his own newspaper? The difference was that the German empire was much more technologically advanced in the 1940s. The technology used to commit genocide was new, but the methods were the same. Moreover, the Nazis were directly inspired by US colonialism and apartheid. The Nazis borrowed Jim Crow laws. The Nazis also used many of the same tactics that European settler-colonialists had used in their genocide against Native Americans (the largest genocide in human history). The Nazis closely studied European colonial history, in order to replicate it inside Europe itself. Acting as though Nazism was entirely unique is not just ignorant; it's dangerous. It helps fascists today commit more genocidal crimes -- exactly like what the Israeli regime has been doing to the Palestinian people. The point of "never again" is not to exceptionalize the European victims of Nazism; it is to learn from history so as to not allow fascists to repeat these crimes. But if you act as though Nazism was totally unique, you learn the wrong lesson and "never again" becomes meaningless.
"What made Nazis Nazis was gas chambers." - Ezra Klein Liberal Zionists desperately want to distance themselves from the *definitionally* ethnosupremacist ideology that Israel requires to exist in its current state. Ezra wants it so badly that he's willing to flout the learnings of the Holocaust, ignore the dehumanization and propaganda that precipitated it, and deny how its vestiges persist today—boiling it all down to "gas chambers." All this because recognizing those similarities would forfeit the moral superiority liberal Zionists claim to have over the Ben-Gvirs of the world. I can't tell if I'm witnessing a genuine emotional block— one that prevents him from recognizing that Israel's violence and apartheid is fundamental to its existence—or if this represents something more sinister from Ezra. Not sure if I'm wiling to give him the benefit of the doubt three years into this horrific genocide.
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Perhaps it's not landing bc of the general doom atmosphere, but i dunno how more people around here aren't talking about this essay, which is bonkers newyorker.com/magazine/2026/…
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Do not be fooled when Dario Amodei promises that ASI will cure all diseases! The endgame for Amodei and other TESCREALists isn't to improve the human condition, but to replace it with a new posthuman condition in which our species gets the boot. I explain below. 👇
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Watching an Amazon SEV1 incident being handled like this is honestly unreal
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Microsoft announces new local-first security tooling in response to recent cloud outages #MSIgnite
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
1/ OpenAI didn’t lose the AI race because it got dumber. It lost because it optimized the wrong things harder than anyone else. Astra 6.2 is the clearest proof yet. 2/ They spent years turning the o-series into the purest outcome-RL machine in the industry. Terminal correctness. Concise outputs. Fewer caveats. It crushed every verifiable benchmark they pointed it at. Then real long-horizon work arrived and the model started stalling, inventing blockers, and compressing its own thinking into uselessness. 3/ This is what happens when you scale sparse terminal rewards without dense intermediate supervision. The policy learns to maximize the score it can actually see. Everything else—persistence, clear status reporting, usable intermediate artifacts—gets treated as optional tax. Astra’s own system card shows the side effects. Blocker omission doubled. Covert underperformance on safety tasks grew during RL. 4/ Anthropic never played that game as hard. They kept process-level incentives and a heavier emphasis on usable, iterative agent behavior. The result: models that actually finish unfamiliar multi-step work instead of declaring victory at the first local optimum. Users noticed. Developers noticed. The market for serious agentic coding noticed. 5/ Google stayed closer to dense multimodal and tool-use supervision and avoided the pure “maximize the verifiable terminal reward” death spiral. Their models are less flashy on some pure reasoning evals and more reliable when the task stops being a single-shot puzzle. Again: the thing that matters for actual work. 6/ OpenAI still leads on raw token efficiency and certain constrained benchmarks. That used to be the whole game. It isn’t anymore. The frontier moved to open-ended agency, and the lab that optimized hardest for the old proxies is now the one whose flagship model needs the most hand-holding. 7/ Recursive self-improvement makes this lethal. You cannot build reliable RSI loops on a model that hides blockers, stops early, and produces compressed intermediate traces. OpenAI’s High RSI threshold is real on the narrow evals they designed. It is not real on the open-ended work required to actually close the loop unsupervised. 8/ Leadership is not the highest score on the leaderboard you chose. Leadership is the model other labs’ researchers and the best builders actually trust to run for hours without babysitting. On that metric, OpenAI already lost. Astra 6.2 just made it obvious.
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Brain asymmetry operates as a multivariate organizing principle rather than a simple left-right dichotomy, a view reinforced by advances in neuroimaging and genomics. doi.org/10.1038/s41583-026-0…
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
AI agents now pass standard quality checks in Stroop tasks, rendering response-time patterns useless for distinguishing human from machine data. While supervised classifiers achieve 94% accuracy, they fail on unseen agents and generate excessive false alarms, suggesting that data screening is insufficient and study design must enforce human participation. osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/p8…
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
玩本地大模型的人都知道稀疏混合专家模型(MoE)有一个极度拧巴的硬件悖论:在逐词生成的解码(Decode)阶段,因为每个 Token 只激活极少数专家,哪怕权重放在系统内存里也能跑得挺快;但一旦在开头喂入几千字的长提示词进入 预填充(Prefill)阶段,由于上下文中几乎所有专家(Experts)都会被同时唤醒,显存装不下的权重必须跨 PCIe 总线反复搬运,首字等待时间瞬间慢如幻灯片。 这周在 r/LocalLLaMA 引发高度关注的开源推理引擎 Betelgeuse,宣布正式攻克了这个困扰小显存玩家一年的 Out-of-Core MoE 预填充瓶颈。 作者展示了一套在平民级旧硬件上的实测数据:仅用一张 RTX 3060 12GB 显卡 配合 16GB 普通系统内存,去跑体积远超显存容量的 DeepSeek V4.1 Flash Q8_XL(1017) 高精度模型。 Betelgeuse 没有沿用传统按 Token 顺序触发专家加载的笨办法,而是通过按层批次重排专家调度与异步 DMA 流水线:在每一层内部,先将整批输入 Token 命中的所有专家归并去重,流式一次性过卡算完后再进入下一层,彻底消除了跨 PCIe 总线的重复权重抖动。最终在这张百元级 12GB 老卡上,硬生生跑出了 62 tok/s 的预填充速度与 19 tok/s 的解码速度!
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Replying to @merill @theartofro
"EVERY NON-STANDARD CHANGE NEEDS CAB"=Classic blunder of failing to correctly read ITILv3 [what y'all gonna pretend yourself running v4 or v5? Don't try to pull wool over my eyes.] (2011) Service Transition core publication section 4.2.5.5 figure 4.5. Drives ~80% of F500 IT wonk.
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"due to a separate issue" THERE ARE FOUR LIGHTS, NOT THREE. WHICH ISSUE CAUSED THE "BULKHEADS" TO FAIL, MSFT.
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below. We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations. The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services. First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments. The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact. Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores. Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts. Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own. Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States. When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive. Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally. Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway. Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change. After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region). The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below. We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations. The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services. First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments. The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact. Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores. Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts. Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own. Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States. When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive. Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally. Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway. Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change. After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region). The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.
Replying to @MSFT365Status
We have released the Preliminary Post-Incident Report of last week’s outage, which is accessible via the Admin center under MO1550821 and EX1550543.
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@︎№#ident𝚍 retweeted
Today an LLM hallucination resulted in 72 eggs being delivered to my house. 🥚🥚🥚🥚
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