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on imf projections, peru will have a bigger economy than chile in 2027 for the first time, measured in dollars. by USD 154 million, out of about 413 billion
that gap is smaller than the USD 1.2 billion bond YPF issued in september. a currency move of less than 0.1% flips the order
the wider gap is in debt. on the same imf series, general government debt in peru is projected at about 29% of GDP in 2027, against 44.5% in chile, where it rises every year from 41.5% in 2025
peru also grows faster on those projections, 3.0% in 2026 against 0.6% for chile
chile still has almost twice the nominal GDP per person, about USD 20,400 against 11,800. a larger population does most of the work for peru
a company raising money in lima or santiago starts from the risk of the sovereign behind it, then adds its own
fiscal room keeps that starting point steadier when a shock arrives. the peruvian finance ministry says it will use that room to protect growth against outside shocks
the imf april update will show how much of it was used
argentina shipped almost 2 million tonnes of wheat in september and october, a record for those two months. the region's biggest wheat buyer will produce only 47% of what it needs this season
argentina expects a 23.8 million tonne crop and will carry more than 5 million tonnes into the next season, according to the rosario board of trade report of november 6
across the border the crop is forecast at 5.73 million tonnes, down 27%, with imports estimated at 7.5 million tonnes by the USDA and up to 9 million in private estimates
demand is there. financing the wait is the harder part
the same @BolsaRosario report puts the december corn premium at about USD 7.4 per tonne over immediate delivery, equivalent to roughly 32% annualized
not every producer can capture that value
a farmer with storage and access to dollar credit can hold the grain and earn the carry. dollar loans to producers ranged from 5% to 13% in a BCR survey published in october
without storage or affordable credit, a farmer has to sell at the lower spot price or borrow in pesos. overdraft rates ran mostly between 40% and 55% nominal in the same survey
the spread looks attractive. the actual return is a different calculation
storage, freight, insurance and financing costs all eat into it. the carry only makes sense if the price difference covers the full cost of holding the grain
the volumes make this bigger than one farm
about 8.8 million tonnes of corn have been purchased but not yet shipped, while more than 14.4 million remain unsold
every tonne sitting in storage needs financing until it reaches the buyer
the december contract will test whether the carry is strong enough to keep grain off the spot market as the wheat harvest fills the ports
paraguay put ueno bank into resolution on november 2. a company with its payroll there is covered up to about USD 38,000
the @BCP_PY board decided unanimously after the bank's solvency index fell below half of the required minimum. deposits are guaranteed up to 75 minimum monthly wages, ₲228.3 million, per depositor and per bank. the limit counts the person or the company, not each account
the guarantee works the same for a family and for a company
the first payment is up to ₲10 million, about USD 1,700, from the deposit guarantee fund. the rest follows a schedule the @BCP_PY sets, and any debt the depositor owes ueno is netted first. by law the guarantee has to be paid within 15 days, extendable by 15 more
for a company the limit is reached fast
a business that runs payroll and supplier payments from one account can pass ₲228.3 million in a normal week. above that, the money waits for the resolution process
the bank that holds a company's cash is a counterparty too
treasuries that split operating cash across two or three banks keep one month of payroll from sitting in a single place
splitting has a cost. a smaller bank may give a company the credit line a bigger bank refused, and it often expects the balances to stay in exchange
payments start in the coming days. how long the balances above the limit stay frozen is what companies in paraguay are watching now
argentina's agro-export sector brought in USD 2.88 billion in october, its best october in 25 years
the CIARA-CEC figure is 10% below september. so far this year the total is USD 25.16 billion, 14% less than in 2025. the jump against october 2025 says little, because a temporary zero export tax in september 2025 pulled sales forward
those dollars come in at the end of the cycle
a farmer pays for seed, fertilizer and fuel months before the harvest. the Rosario exchange projects 44.2 million hectares for 2026/27
the price of that money depends on who lends it
in a BCR survey published in october, dollar credit to producers ran from 5% to 13% a year. peso overdrafts mostly cost 40% to 55%. dollar pagarés guaranteed by an SGR averaged 6.3% to 7.1%, against 7.5% to 9.9% without a guarantee
that guarantee cuts the annual rate by roughly 1.2 to 2.8 percentage points
input suppliers also lend, mostly in dollars at 6% to 10%, to be paid at harvest. an older BCR estimate for 2016/17 found suppliers and exporters were the largest outside lenders to farmers, ahead of banks
so part of the harvest risk sits on the supplier's balance sheet
the 2026/27 harvest will show how much of that supplier credit comes back on time
@BolsaRosario
argentina approved a copper project with a USD 6.39 billion investment plan. the first estimate was about USD 4 billion
Glencore announced RIGI approval for MARA, its Agua Rica project in Catamarca, on october 2. the formal resolution came out on october 27, listing USD 3.31 billion in computable assets alongside USD 6.39 billion in total investment
the first figure is the part of the second that counts under the regime
the resolution sets construction for november 2027 and first production for october 2031, with a 23 year life
the number local companies are looking at is 54%
that is the share of spending on supplies and works planned for argentine firms. the regime requires a minimum local supplier commitment of 20%
winning a contract is the easy part to picture
a copper project can hand a supplier an order larger than its balance sheet. equipment, materials and payroll come first, the first payment comes later
suppliers are already looking for ways to reach that size
the first RIGI business round in Rosario brought together 1,800 companies last week, with around 2,500 meetings and spaces for financing discussions. Vicuña's country director said five of its last six large tenders were won by temporary consortiums formed through business rounds
the timeline cuts the other way
construction is a year away, and Glencore's october 2 release did not announce a final investment decision. the nearer work is the Alumbrera restart, with first production in the second half of 2027
so who carries a supplier between the award and the first payment?
foreign direct investment into latin america and the caribbean rose 15% in the first half of 2026, to about USD 108 billion. the value of announced greenfield projects is down 18% so far this year
international project finance fell 35%. cross-border M&A is up 230%, from a low base
those numbers come from UNCTAD and compare with the 2025 average. together they show money buying what already exists faster than it is building something new
the week in Argentina fit that picture
Vista reported production up 33% and adjusted EBITDA up 78%. Pampa placed about USD 220 million in notes, after Aeropuertos Argentina issued USD 400 million due 2036
large issuers with a known credit profile are the ones getting through
UNCTAD says the ten largest recipients took about 95% of the region's 2025 inflow, and new money is leaning toward data centers, digital infrastructure, renewables and critical minerals
for a mid-size company outside those sectors, long-term money is harder to find
extraction is the exception worth noting
greenfield investment in extractive industries in latin america rose by about USD 12 billion, on a few large projects. a handful of deals can move a regional number
the next report will show how much of this capital goes into new productive capacity and how much stays in assets that already exist
latin america has about 20 GW of data centers in the pipeline. almost 1 GW is under construction
Industrial Info Resources tracks 540 projects worth about USD 197 billion across the region. installed capacity today is about 2.5 GW
São Paulo state has over 500 MW, Querétaro over 300 MW operating and under construction, and Santiago roughly 280 MW operating
construction is the fast part
a data center takes one to two years to build. substations and transmission lines take four to ten, and generators, chillers and transformers are running up to 18 months late
OLACDE projects AI-related electricity consumption in Latin America and the Caribbean to grow from approximately 23 TWh in 2023 to more than 120 TWh by 2035
developers have stopped waiting for the grid
many are securing dedicated generation and signing long-term power contracts. in Brazil, Casa dos Ventos and OMNIA signed a 20-year, USD 2 billion agreement for up to 300 MW of renewable power, using a self-production model that gives OMNIA a stake in the generation assets
USD 197 billion is a tracker number
it counts planned projects, whether or not they have secured financing. only about 5% of the pipeline's potential capacity is under construction, and some of the rest may never get built
the megawatts to follow next are the ones with a secured grid connection and a signed power contract
a financing window can look wide open in september and feel very different just a few weeks later
argentine companies and provinces issued around USD 3.3 billion in september. in the first half of october, that figure fell to roughly USD 100 million, according to 1816
then activity picked up again:
- Loma Negra placed USD 150 million for 3 years at 6.25%
- Aeropuertos Argentina issued USD 400 million due 2036 at 8%
- Pampa Energía placed another USD 220 million in late october
the market is moving. but access is still selective
and thats where mid-size companies face a different problem
a company can have 10 years of operating history, real revenue, solid cash flows and hard assets, yet still be outside the group of names investors know and readily finance
the question for a company that may need capital in the next 12 months isnt whether the market is open today
its whether the company would be ready to approach it tomorrow
that preparation starts well before the raise:
- financial statements a lender can understand and rely on
- contracts and collateral properly documented
- a clear picture of existing debt and upcoming maturities
- more than one financing route: banks, ONs or private credit
the right structure depends on the size of the company, its cash flows, assets and the purpose of the financing
not every company needs a bond issue. not every company should borrow from a bank
but every company considering external financing should understand its options before it needs the money
the big question now isnt whether argentina can attract capital
its how far down the market that capital is willing to go
an operator in vaca muerta can post record numbers. a supplier in the same chain can still be waiting to get paid
Vista reported its Q3 results yesterday:
- production up 33%, to about 169,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day
- adjusted EBITDA of USD 841.5 million, up 78%
the production numbers tell one story. payment terms tell another
service companies in the basin have long described payment cycles of 60, 90 and even 120 days. last week, according to CEIPA, YPF committed to pay suppliers in 30 days, and Santander signed a financing agreement with Fecene for Vaca Muerta suppliers
that says the gap is real, and its starting to get attention
this isnt a criticism of the operators. long payment terms are normal in the industry
but a mid-size supplier still has to finance the work before collecting for it: people, equipment, fuel, sometimes for a quarter or more
and as activity grows, so does the amount of working capital tied up in that cycle
a record quarter at the top can mean more financing pressure further down the supply chain
the right structure needs to account for three things:
- signed contracts and certified invoices
- financing terms that match the actual payment cycle
- receivables a lender can verify and rely on
vaca muerta is growing. the next question is how its supply chain finances that growth
en los encadenamientos hay un cuello de botella poco visible: el financiamiento de los proveedores. una empresa de servicios en vaca muerta gana un contrato y cobra a 60, 90 o hasta 120 dias. si no consigue capital a plazo para crecer, el derrame se frena en su capital de trabjo
En mi posteo del sábado pasado intenté explicar por qué, para mejorar sostenidamente nuestro nivel de vida, necesitamos aumentar el ahorro, la inversión y, sobre todo, la productividad.
Pero ahorrar más e invertir más no alcanza. Importa también en qué invertimos. Supongamos, entonces, que logramos recuperar la confianza, movilizar el ahorro de los argentinos y atraer capitales del exterior.
¿En qué vamos a invertir esos recursos?
La pregunta es crucial porque no alcanza con invertir más; también hay que invertir mejor. Podemos destinar enormes recursos a actividades poco productivas que sobreviven gracias a subsidios y protección, o podemos orientarlos hacia actividades competitivas, capaces de incorporar tecnología y generar más valor.
Para pensar en esto conviene volver a uno de los conceptos fundamentales de la economía: las ventajas comparativas. La idea, formulada por David Ricardo hace más de dos siglos, es sencilla. Los países aumentan su bienestar cuando se especializan en aquello que producen a un menor costo relativo e intercambian parte de su producción por bienes y servicios del resto del mundo.
Pensemos en una persona que es un excelente médico, pero que también sabe cocinar, pintar su casa y arreglar el jardín. Aunque haga todas esas cosas mejor que quienes podría contratar, probablemente le convenga dedicar su tiempo a ejercer la medicina y pagarles a otros para que se ocupen del resto. No porque no sepa hacerlo, sino porque el tiempo que dedica a esas tareas tiene un costo: es tiempo que deja de dedicar a una actividad en la que es mucho más productivo.
Con los países ocurre lo mismo. Lo importante no es ser mejor que los demás en todo, sino identificar aquellas actividades en las que somos relativamente más productivos.
Eso no significa limitarnos a producir materias primas, ni que nuestras ventajas comparativas sean inmutables. La inversión, la educación y la tecnología pueden transformarlas. Argentina tiene un enorme potencial en el agro, la energía, la minería, la economía del conocimiento y el turismo, pero también en la pesca, la industria forestal, los alimentos elaborados, la biotecnología y los servicios profesionales. Algunas de estas actividades ya cuentan con empresas competitivas internacionalmente; otras están mucho menos desarrolladas. Y seguramente existen oportunidades que todavía ni siquiera imaginamos.
Tampoco significa renunciar a la industria. Puede significar desarrollar una industria distinta, más sofisticada y competitiva.
Veamos algunos ejemplos.
Durante décadas protegimos el ensamblado de productos electrónicos en Tierra del Fuego mediante beneficios fiscales y barreras comerciales, a costa de los contribuyentes y los consumidores. Aunque algunas de esas barreras se redujeron, buena parte del régimen promocional sigue vigente. ¿No sería más interesante desarrollar capacidades en instrumentación, monitoreo y automatización para la minería, la energía y el agro, combinando ingeniería, software y tecnología aplicada?
En la metalmecánica, en lugar de intentar fabricar de todo detrás de barreras comerciales, podríamos profundizar capacidades que ya tenemos en maquinaria agrícola, equipos de precisión, sistemas de riego, bombas, válvulas y componentes industriales especializados.
Algo parecido vale para la industria textil. Ya existen experiencias en textiles técnicos, como geotextiles, mallas para el agro y otros materiales especializados. ¿Por qué no ampliar esas capacidades y explorar nichos de indumentaria técnica y productos diferenciados, en lugar de depender indefinidamente de aranceles elevados?
También tenemos capacidades importantes en biotecnología agropecuaria, genética, semillas, bioinsumos y salud animal, donde podemos combinar nuestra experiencia agropecuaria con investigación e innovación. Y el desarrollo de la energía y la minería abre oportunidades para empresas de ingeniería, software, mantenimiento y servicios especializados que, eventualmente, podrían exportar a otros mercados.
Por supuesto, no sabemos de antemano cuáles de estas oportunidades serán rentables. Serán los empresarios quienes deban descubrirlo, compitiendo, innovando y arriesgando su capital. Tampoco es cuestión de fabricar localmente todos los insumos y equipos que utilizan nuestras actividades exportadoras, sino aquellos en los que podemos ser realmente competitivos.
No se trata de reemplazar una política industrial que elige sectores protegidos por otra que elige sectores supuestamente prometedores. Se trata de crear las condiciones para que surjan actividades que puedan sostenerse por su productividad y no por los subsidios y la protección.
Hay, además, costos del proteccionismo que rara vez contabilizamos.
Cuando protegemos una actividad, vemos las fábricas y los empleos que preservamos. Lo que no vemos (o preferimos no ver) son los precios más altos que pagan millones de consumidores, los insumos y bienes de capital más caros que deben usar otras empresas y, sobre todo, las inversiones, las empresas y los empleos que nunca llegan a existir porque destinamos recursos a sostener actividades que no logran competir.
El costo para los consumidores suele perderse en la discusión argentina, que tiende a pensar el comercio exterior sólo en términos de exportaciones. Exportamos para obtener los recursos que nos permiten importar bienes de consumo, insumos, maquinaria y tecnología, adquirir activos externos o cumplir nuestras obligaciones con el resto del mundo.
En última instancia, exportamos para poder importar.
Una economía abierta nos da acceso a una mayor variedad de bienes, muchas veces mejores y más baratos, y a maquinaria, insumos y tecnología que aumentan la productividad. Pensemos en los salarios reales. Su poder adquisitivo no depende solamente de cuánto cobramos, sino también de cuánto cuestan las cosas que compramos. Si los productos son mejores y más baratos, nuestro bienestar puede aumentar aunque el salario nominal no suba.
No necesitamos fabricar todo lo que consumimos, ni todos los insumos que utilizan nuestras industrias. Necesitamos ser muy buenos en algunas actividades para poder acceder, mediante el comercio, a lo mejor que produce el resto del mundo.
Hay que reconocer que la transición no será sencilla. Las transiciones rara vez lo son.
Algunas empresas desaparecerán, otras se reconvertirán y surgirán actividades nuevas. Muchos trabajadores necesitarán capacitación, y hará falta infraestructura, financiamiento y condiciones que faciliten la creación de empleo. Tampoco todos se beneficiarán de la apertura al mismo tiempo ni en la misma medida. Pero esos costos deben compararse con los de mantener indefinidamente una estructura productiva que limita nuestra productividad y encarece lo que consumimos.
Queda una gran pregunta de fondo.
Nuestras mayores oportunidades están en sectores como la minería, la energía y buena parte del agro, que usan mucho capital y relativamente poca mano de obra directa. ¿Alcanza con ellos para construir una economía próspera, que genere buenos empleos e ingresos para todos los argentinos? ¿Cómo puede la riqueza que generan impulsar nuevas industrias, servicios y actividades que den trabajo a millones de personas?
La respuesta tiene que ver con los encadenamientos productivos, los efectos sobre los ingresos y la inversión, y las oportunidades que abre una economía más integrada al mundo. Es lo que habitualmente se conoce como el “derrame”. Pero esos efectos no son automáticos, ni se distribuyen de manera uniforme, ni se materializan todos al mismo tiempo.
La experiencia internacional tiene mucho que enseñarnos sobre la magnitud de esos efectos y los tiempos que requieren para materializarse.
Y de eso quiero ocuparme en mi próximo posteo.
Hasta entonces.
P. S. Para quienes quieran profundizar en estos temas, en el capítulo XIII del tomo III de Economía conversada (economiaconversada.com) dediqué toda una sección al comercio internacional: desde las ventajas comparativas de Ricardo hasta los aportes de Paul Krugman, los beneficios de la apertura y los costos, muchas veces poco visibles, del proteccionismo.
argentina has record USD deposits. a mid-size company can still struggle to finance a 5-year investment
at the end of september, private USD deposits stood at USD 41.9 billion, a record high according to the BCRA. in october they moved above USD 42 billion
USD loans to the private sector at the same date: USD 26.2 billion. roughly 75% were documentos a sola firma, instruments used mainly for trade financing
the dollars are there. but are they available for the term a business actually needs?
banks manage deposits, liquidity, credit risk and regulatory constraints. having more dollars on deposit doesnt automatically mean being able to lend them for 3 to 5 years
and even with the expanded BCRA framework for USD lending since august, eligibility and lending limits still matter
thats the gap: a company can be profitable, have a decade of operating history and own hard assets, yet struggle to find financing that matches its investment horizon
the options usually look like this:
- ONs, for companies ready to access the capital market
- private credit, structured around cash flows, collateral and contracts
- a combination, with bank debt for working capital and longer-term capital for investment
which one fits depends on the size of the company, its repayment capacity, collateral and needs
record deposits are a good signal. how much of it reaches long-term investment is what im watching next
winning a contract with YPF can be a growth opportunity. it can also expose a financing problem the company already had
look at Vaca Muerta
YPF, Vista Energy, Pan American Energy and other major operators drive demand across a vast network of local suppliers and oilfield service companies
but the money doesnt move as fast as the work
in an interview with Más Energía, Edgardo Phielipp of Fecene, Neuquén's federation of energy-sector chambers, described payment terms of 60, 90 and even 120 days for local SMEs
read that again
𝗮 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗻𝘆 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗺𝗲𝗿 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘂𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗴, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗴𝗴𝗹𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗺𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗵 𝗼𝗳 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀
equipment, fuel, payroll and subcontractors need to be paid while invoices are waiting to clear
and when certification delays postpone invoicing itself, the gap gets even longer
𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗸 𝗶𝘀𝗻𝘁 𝘄𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁. 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗿𝘂𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗵 𝗯𝗲𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘁
the answer is to structure the financing before the pressure hits
that means mapping the full cash conversion cycle, forecasting the cost of delivery, assessing receivables and collateral, and arranging working capital that matches the contract's actual payment schedule
a signed contract is part of the credit story. its not the whole story
𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘁𝗵 𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗼𝗽𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘁𝘆. 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗲𝘀 𝗲𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲
a business can be profitable, own valuable assets and still be difficult to finance
because lenders dont just underwrite what a company says it earns. they underwrite what they can verify
three developments this month show why that distinction matters
𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗱𝗶𝘁. Moody's found that about 65% of corporate defaults in 2025 were distressed exchanges, not conventional payment defaults. how you define a default changes the picture of credit risk
𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗴𝘆. on october 22, the European Parliament voted to delay certain methane requirements for importers by three years. the proposal still needs to be negotiated with EU governments. the deadline may move, but the underlying verification challenge remains
𝗺𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗰. Musixmatch acquired Music Reports, owner of the Songdex copyright registry, with financing from Tikehau Capital. meanwhile, Amazon Music brought in MusicInfra to manage rights for its music video offering. MusicInfra's CEO says a process that used to take a month to a quarter now takes about 28 minutes on average
different markets. the same shift
capital providers need more than reported numbers. they need reliable evidence behind them
in lending, that means traceable cash flow, collateral that can be valued, and contracts that support repayment
in energy, it means verifiable compliance
in music, it means matching usage, ownership and royalties
the technology and rules differ. the underlying question doesnt
𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗰 𝘃𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗲 𝗯𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗱?
for a business seeking debt, that question can matter as much as the revenue itself
before asking how much capital your business can raise, ask what a lender can actually underwrite
thats where financing starts
europe just gave the gas industry three more years
that sounds like relief. it could also be a very expensive way to lose time
today, the european parliament voted 341 to 225 to push back key methane obligations for fossil fuel importers. but this is parliament's position, not final law. the details still have to be negotiated with member states
and heres what i think people are missing
a delayed deadline doesnt mean a delayed market
under parliament's proposal, importers would have until may 2031 to demonstrate equivalent methane monitoring, reporting and verification for supplies covered by contracts signed or renewed since august 2024
lng contracts can run for 10, 15, even 20 years. if argentina wants to build a serious export business this decade, methane verification belongs in that conversation now, not in 2030
because the infrastructure is already taking shape:
- MiQ certifies gas production, including shell's gulf of mexico portfolio
- Project Canary and Equitable Origin verify upstream operations
- Kayrros and GHGSat measure emissions from space
- Xpansiv provides the marketplace infrastructure for environmental commodities
these arent hypothetical future solutions. the pieces already exist
and neuquén has another piece in motion: vaca muerta operators must report methane emissions under OGMP 2.0, the framework referenced by europe. the first reports, covering 2025, are due before year-end
but theres a gap i keep coming back to
where is the vaca muerta producer already connected to a recognized gas certification system?
reporting emissions is one step. independently verifying them, turning that verification into a recognized certificate, and making it commercially useful to a buyer is another
that bridge is where the opportunity sits
three extra years may ease the pressure on producers today. but they also give competitors more time to build the systems, relationships and market access that buyers will eventually expect
argentina doesnt need to panic about the deadline
it needs to decide what it wants to be ready for when the deadline arrives
private credit's default rate is 4%. or 5.8%. depends on what youre willing to call a default
moodys looked at 607 middle-market borrowers last week. 4% defaulted the way we usually count it: a missed payment, a bankruptcy
then they counted two other things as what they are:
- loans where interest is now paid in more debt instead of cash
- maturities pushed out for borrowers who couldnt pay
the number went to 5.8%
106 of those 607 companies pay at least part of their interest in kind. thats one in six. and the weaker names hold more than half of what comes due in 2027 and 2028
none of this is hidden. its disclosed. it just doesnt make the headline, because the headline counts events, not cash
i spend my days getting companies to the point where a lender says yes. and the first question ive learned to ask isnt "will they default". its "when the coupon comes, what pays it"
cash pays it: thats a loan
more loan pays it: thats a bet that the next lender shows up
an extension pays it: thats time, and time is only worth what you do with it
none of these is automatically wrong. pik can bridge a real business through a real gap. an extension can be the smart call. but theyre three different risks wearing the same label
the default rate measures who stopped. it doesnt measure who's still standing because someone kept moving the line
everyone will read the headline: $3.2 billion, another RIGI project in Vaca Muerta
the more interesting story is what TGS is actually building. not new production, but the infrastructure that makes more of the existing resource exportable
the project connects three things: processing facilities in Tratayén to separate liquids from the gas, a 577 km pipeline to Bahía Blanca, and a plant to fractionate, store and export propane, butane and natural gasoline
that matters because a resource underground is not the same as a product a buyer can use. Vaca Muerta needs more than production capacity. it needs the infrastructure to move, process and monetize what comes out of the ground
the financing angle is even more interesting
in june, TGS reached its final investment decision after securing agreements with YPF, Pluspetrol and Chevron covering more than 80% of the project's capacity
in other words, the project had already secured commitments for most of its planned throughput before construction began. that gives the investment a commercial foundation that a standalone infrastructure announcement would not have
the lesson goes beyond energy
the strongest infrastructure investments don't just solve a physical bottleneck. they connect capacity to demand
the resource creates the opportunity. infrastructure makes it deliverable. contracted demand helps make the investment financeable
the week in one read: what gets promised, and what actually gets paid
last week, three seemingly unrelated stories pointed to the same underlying problem: the growing distance between capital committed and value actually delivered
ai credit came under pressure. coreweave bond yields climbed to around 15%, while roughly $18 billion in loans tied to an oracle data center were quoted near 89 cents on the dollar. the signal was hard to miss: investors were becoming more selective about the debt financing the ai buildout
at the same time, the US ran into a more physical constraint. chips can be ordered in a quarter. power infrastructure takes years, permits, and construction. capital can move faster than the systems required to turn it into productive capacity
and in argentina, the opportunity remains substantial. YPF has projected that energy exports could reach $50 billion annually by 2031, driven by Vaca Muerta, LNG, and the infrastructure required to bring those resources to market. yet the distance between that ambition and execution remains significant, while sovereign risk continues to shape the cost of capital
three different markets. one question underneath all of them: who actually pays, and what actually gets built?
the problem isn't new. it was simply easier to ignore when money was cheap
for a decade, low rates allowed the promise to run ahead of the underlying asset. you could finance a data center before the power required to operate it. a cargo before the documentation needed to clear it. an export forecast before the investment decision that would make it real
when the cost of capital approached zero, time itself became cheap. the distance between a commitment and a return could be treated as someone else's problem
that distance is becoming harder to ignore
the market is returning to distinctions it had blurred: a contract is not cash. a backlog is not free cash flow. collateral that looks sufficient today may not cover the outstanding debt when repayment falls due
a delay in power infrastructure can undermine the economics of computing capacity already purchased. a resource underground does not generate export revenue until financing, infrastructure, permits, and final investment decisions align
the same principle applies across all three markets. the existence of an asset is one thing. the ability to turn it into predictable cash flow is another
my read is that this isn't necessarily bearish. it's a repricing of execution risk
capital isn't disappearing simply because the story has become more complicated. it's demanding a clearer account of how that story translates into repayment. who pays, in what order, against what collateral, and what remains if the plan stops working?
the story financed itself for years. now the price of time is forcing the economics back into the conversation
that's what i'll be watching next: not who announces the largest investment, secures the biggest contract, or controls the most impressive resource
but who can demonstrate, project by project, how the money comes home
the line that matters: data centers and export terminals bidding for the same molecules. thats the whole 2027 story
if US gas gets pulled into feeding domestic ai load, the US gets less reliable as the swing lng supplier to europe. a tailwind for everyone else holding gas and a coastline. argentina spent last week pitching exactly that in brussels. the chips get financed first, but the power and the molecules decide who actually wins
🇺🇸 America’s AI build-out is 24 GW short of its own plans.
The 18 biggest AI campuses are planned at 30 GW.
About 6 GW runs today, according to Epoch AI estimates.
The largest is Meta’s Hyperion in Louisiana, planned at 5 GW, and none of it runs yet.
Its power plan is 10 gas-fired plants of 7.5 GW, an $ 11bn deal that Meta pays for.
Seven of those plants still need regulator approval.
None of the 18 campuses is in California.
They cluster in Texas, Louisiana, Ohio, Tennessee and the Midwest, close to gas supply and with room to build turbines.
If that 24 GW gap ran on gas around the clock, it would burn 3.6 Bcf/d.
That’s about the feedgas for 25+ Mtpa of LNG, more than all of Alaska LNG.
Data centres and export terminals are now bidding for the same US molecules.
The question for 2027 is whether turbines, pipelines and Henry Hub can keep up with the chips.
