Founder @ Terton Capital. Personal account of Ryan Albert. Everything said here represents my personal opinion. Do your own due diligence.
Joined September 2025
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Golfzon Holdings post. Will be migrating posts to this account
teapaw.org/terton_capital/status/…
Golfzon Holdings (121440 KS) is one of the most egregious attempts at a take-under that I have seen in recent memory. The Kim family, which owns ~54%, want to tender for the remaining shares at 6,700 KRW. The price before this tender offer was ~4,250 KRW. I have fair value at ~27,000 KRW. Full disclosure: we own shares and do not believe that a fair value is being offered. Please reach out to [email protected] if you feel similarly and want to discuss. Due your own due diligence.
biz.chosun.com/en/en-finance…
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Pretty stark comments from Korea FSS Governor Lee, regretting allowing single stock levered ETF’s @MikeFritzell @kedglobal @fintergirl
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In Korea, a new dividend rule kicked in for 2026-2028, which provides discounted tax rates if companies payout >40% of their separated net income in dividends or >25% and growing 10% per year. Instead of ~50% tax rates, now controlling families pay 25-30% tax rates on dividends. So what did Ace Bed do? It paid out 42% in dividends, which after 27% taxes, equals ~7B KRW of post-tax dividends (the two sons have 4.4m shares combined). This significantly bridges the gap between what the two sons owe in gifting taxes (5/7)
So why doesn't Ace Bed pay out 50% or 60% and the two sons can cover the entire installment? Probably because from their perspective, that is extra tax leakage (the father/CEO has to pay taxes on these extra dividends when he doesn't need them) and because it will INCREASE THE SHARE PRICE. The CEO probably still needs to gift 3.8m shares to his sons, so the incentive is to maintain as much cash on the balance sheet and keep share prices low. We are now back to share prices where prior gifts were made (6/7)
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So while Ace Bed is valued at a significant discount to its NAV, investors are fighting these headwinds. On the plus side, regulatory changes have incentivized families to increase dividend payouts. We get paid a 7% dividend yield in KRW to wait. On the downside, until the gifting is done, which is likely to happen only when share prices are depressed, there is no incentive for controlling families to boost shareholder returns and increase share prices (7/7)
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In July 2025, Ace Bed's CEO Ahn Seong-ho gifted each of his two sons 815k shares and in December 2025 gifted each of them 1.1m shares. His two sons now own 40% of Ace Bed and he still owns 34.6%. To simplify, gifting taxes are calculated as 50% of the average daily closing value of the gifting stakes for the two months before and after the gifting. At an avg price of 31,000 KRW, the combined gifting taxes for the two sons are ~58B KRW (3/7)
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Gifting taxes can be paid in six installments spread over five years (first one at filing deadline). Shares need to be put up as collateral, so the two sons have pledged 2m shares, which are sitting with tax authorities. With deferred interest, the total installment payments (after the initial one) for the two sons are likely ~10-11B KRW per year. So, how do they come up with that cash? (4/7)
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Ace Bed (003800 KS) is a classic case study of how gifting/inheritance taxes is the primary motivation for governance and capital allocation decision making for many Korean companies. Collect a 7% dividend yield with optionality down the road. I saw @kjnkjp @AltayCapital @evantindell discussing 9867 JP and how inheritance tax has influenced corporate behavior; given that there are significantly more family-run businesses in Korea vs Japan, I think it's important to understand these dynamics in Korea and what to look for. THIS IS NOT AN INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION AND DUE YOUR OWN DUE DILIGENCE @MikeFritzell @AnotherKoreanX @DeepvalueK @DaBao_ @ClarkSquareCap @douglaskimkorea (1/7)
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Ace Bed manufactures mattresses and furniture and sells them through dealerships. Market cap of 355B KRW. Revenue of ~320B KRW and ~50-55B KRW of normalized net income. Revenue has grown slowly at ~2-3% annually since 2019. Overall, an average to above average business in my opinion. ~220B KRW of net cash and other financial financial assets (investment funds, bonds) and ~70B KRW of investment real estate. It is easy to see how Ace Bed is valued at a ~50% discount to NAV. Core operating business is probably worth 8x net income, so 400B KRW + ~300B of non-core financial assets. But investors are highly unlikely to ever see this cash. (2/7)
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The massive divergence between KOSPI and KOSDAQ performance really took off at the end of April 2026, aligning with IBKR opening up access to the market. It is also striking that KOSDAQ is flat over 5 years! @MikeFritzell @douglaskimkorea @AnotherKoreanX @DaBao_
Interessante que o Seth Klarman esta mergulhando no Brasil youtube.com/watch?v=AbZYb11A…
@cckeleti @Tiagogreis $RAIZ4 $BRKM3
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Is there any data that supports the claim that K-Pop songs have enduring popularity? Virtually none of the top 200 most streamed songs of recent years have legacy K-Pop included in the list. Yet the growing popularity of K-Pop in the US and other int'l countries is quite evident, relying on CDs, DVDs, and other merchandise to drive industry revenue. What is K-Pop back catalogue (like BTS, Blackpink, Big Bang) likely worth and is there any data on this available? @MikeFritzell @DaBao_ @koreaobserver @kedglobal
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This article in @TheKoreaHerald has some great stats but when you take a step back, many Korean companies probably deserve an emerging market multiple today. I think this will change but it completely ignores the current reality.
1. Comparing aggregate multiples to other countries is irrelevant when cyclical and holding companies dominate the list of largest companies in Korea, regardless of how fast they are currently growing and how systemically important they are.
2. While the government has been quickly enacting new corporate governance reform policies, corporate behavior is still greatly lagging. Some companies are actually making drastic changes due to “value-up”, but many are doing the bare minimum. It is akin to being forced to go to the gym, but all you do is check in and check out without even exercising. Many listed companies still have no investor relations websites or materials, and will not speak to shareholders. “Investability” is very low. Companies in the Philippines and Indonesia are more willing to engage with their stakeholders based on my experience.
3. This continuous touting of KOSPI 8000, 9000, 10000, 11000 will ultimately backfire. The incentives to reach this goal will ultimately lead to more concentration and focus on just a handful of dominant companies, rather than uplifting the entire market. Focus should be on inputs rather than outputs, like improving disclosure, return on equity, governance guardrails, and alignment of compensation and performance.
4. I would characterize corporate reluctance to improving return on equity and best practices as quite “emerging market”. This upcoming 2027 AGM season will be the testing ground for how many investors are willing to challenge Korean corporates and how potential change is enforced, which to me will be the key variable for how the Korean market is viewed by many investors
@MikeFritzell @AnotherKoreanX @DeepvalueK @douglaskimkorea @DaBao_ @valuedrift
How many of these 2nd order effects from GLP-1s will compound vs be more one-time in nature? Pretty insane stats coming out of Korea regarding increases in fashion and botox purchases and decreases in alcohol. There are likely other factors coming into play though @MikeFritzell @daniel3point0 @acidinvestments @DaBao_ @kedglobal
The Korean government has effectively pushed credit card industry revenue from businesses to low-quality consumers stuck in a credit loop. This seems to be an increasing issue that is hidden by the new semiconductor wealth creation @MikeFritzell @douglaskimkorea
STIC Investments, 026890 KS, is a top 5 asset manager in Korea and might be the most statistically cheap asset management firm globally. Two leading engagement/activist funds own 34%. With a market cap of ~270B KRW and ~190B KRW of General Partner commits + net debt, STIC trades at ~4x after-tax fee-related earnings. DUE YOUR OWN DUE DILIGENCE (1/8)