SWJ Community of Interest & Practice - Irregular Warfare & Related Issues, National Defense & Foreign Policy. RT/Like ≠ Endorsement.
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Small Wars Journal and the Future Security Initiative at Arizona State University (@asu) invite you to a screening and panel discussion of NOORI, a forthcoming documentary presented by Honor the Promise (@Honor_Promise).
NOORI follows Mr. Ahmad Khalid Noori, a former Afghan Special Operations soldier who escaped the Taliban and is rebuilding his life in America before the birth of his daughter. The film explores service, sacrifice, transition, identity, and belonging through the eyes of Afghan partners and U.S. veterans whose bonds endure beyond the battlefield.
Following a preview screening, film participants and national security practitioners will join a moderated panel discussion and audience Q&A.
📆 Friday, November 6, 2026
⏰ 4:00–6:00 PM
📍 The event will be in-person, live-streamed, and recorded.
Drinks and light refreshments will be provided.
Registration is available through Small Wars Journal. In-person seating is limited and by invitation only. Livestream access is available for all remote participants.
🔗 Register here to attend virtually: smallwarsjournal.com/2026/10…
🔱 A huge and heartfelt thank you to fellow ASU Alumna Dr. Lyla Kohistany (Ed.D), Mr. Ahmad Khalid Noori, Global SOF Foundation (@GlobalSOF), and Global War on Terrorism Memorial Foundation (@GWOTMF) for their support.
🖱️ Visit noori.film
IG: @NooriFilmOfficial (instagram.com/noorifilmoffic…)
#SWJEvent #SmallWarsJournal #NOORI #NOORIFilm
A mosquito-sized drone can conduct reconnaissance. 🦟
A 33-gram platform gives a soldier organic aerial awareness. Fiber-optic FPV systems ignore electronic warfare.
What does a battlefield of tiny machines mean for deterrence❓
📖Read "The Miniaturization of Military Robots," a #SWJPerspectivePiece
Abstract
Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), sensors, electronics, and navigation technologies are transforming military robotics, enabling the development of increasingly smaller, lighter, and more autonomous systems. From insect-sized drones and miniature ground robots to coordinated robotic swarms and loitering munitions, these technologies are reshaping intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat operations.
This article examines global developments in military robotic miniaturization across the US, China, Europe, Russia, India, and Pakistan, highlighting their technological advances and emerging military applications. It also explores Pakistan’s indigenous research capabilities and the potential of miniaturized robotics to strengthen its defense innovation. As modern warfare increasingly relies on autonomous and networked systems, robotic miniaturization is becoming an important dimension of military modernization and technological competitiveness.
Small Wars Journal retweeted
Robert J. Bunker @CO_Futures_LLC @Future_of_War @smallwars , "The Emerging Need to Protect Critical Infrastructure and VIPs from Weaponized AI Drone Threats." INTELBRIEF-The Soufan Center. Published in partnership 2026 Global Security Forum. 19 Oct 2026, thesoufancenter.org/intelbri…
Small Wars Journal retweeted
My new publication with @smallwars: "Correcting Techocentric Myopia: Rebalancing Maritime Intelligence to Counter Shadow Fleet Networks"
Link: smallwarsjournal.com/2026/10…
Lt. Col. Nathan Jennings, PhD., takes us back to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to show why the @USArmy's new warfighting guidance– laid out in General Christopher LaNeve’s directive earlier this month– rests on four elements: convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance.
Strike alone doesn’t deliver outcomes. Instead, ground formations that can seize, hold, and sustain terrain are what actually turn tactical success into campaign advantage.
#CGSCPartnership #SWJxCGSC #SWJEssay
smallwarsjournal.com/2026/10…
Twenty-five years after 9/11, al-Qaeda operates as a dispersed network shaped by local conflicts.
Its affiliates finance themselves, exploit porous borders, embed within local political economies, use encrypted communications, field commercial drones, and experiment with AI-enabled propaganda.
They exercise significant operational autonomy across multiple theaters, including al-Shabaab in Somalia, JNIM in the Sahel, and AQAP in Yemen, while maintaining ties to the broader network.
The difficulty lies in understanding the relationships, grievances, economies, and ambitions that sustain the network.
Counterterrorism must understand the al-Qaeda that exists today.
📖Read "Al-Qaeda Twenty-Five Years After 9/11: A Changing Network, a Changing Security Challenge," a #SWJEssay, 👤By Uma Miskinyar
Abstract
This article revisits al-Qaeda 25 years after the September 11 attacks and examines how the organization’s modus operandi has reshaped after years of sustained counterterrorism pressure. Al-Qaeda’s central base remains less central to the network’s day-to-day functioning than in 2001, and regional affiliates are now able to exploit local political economies, porous borders, and emerging technologies with less dependence on a central node, changing the network’s internal balance across Somalia, the Sahel, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Although al-Qaeda’s capabilities are increasingly visible, its strategic intent within the post-9/11 era is more opaque, creating a growing intelligence blind spot that security analysis alone cannot address.
Why call autonomous #drones the “new Kalashnikov”❓
The concern is proliferation.
Commercial components, accessible software, global supply chains, and scalable production can distribute increasingly autonomous strike capabilities across armed groups.
Gerald Mako examines where governance can intervene in that ecosystem.
📖Read "The New Kalashnikov: Governing the Poor Man’s Autonomous Drone," a #SWJEssay
#DroneWarfare
Abstract
Cheap commercial drones, fitted with readily available guidance software, are giving militias and proxies a form of precision strike once reserved for States. Ukraine has already shown the method, which China’s hold on civilian airframes and components makes hard to shut down. UN talks in Geneva can set rules for high-end state systems, but they were not built to police dual-use parts that become weapons only after conversion. The practical response is therefore supply-side: tighter controls on the hardware that makes onboard autonomy work, obligations on manufacturers whose platforms are routinely militarized, and a small coalition of component-producing allies that can move faster than a treaty
The operation ends when the force returns to base. Its consequences remain in the civil environment.
🇦🇫 #Afghanistan showed how civilian casualties, property damage, and lost livelihoods could turn tactical action into operational friction.
Assad A. Raza explains how Civil Affairs, culturally informed engagement, and consequence management help commanders preserve freedom of action after the force departs.
📖Read "Maintaining Freedom of Action: Civil Affairs and Consequence Management in Afghanistan," a #SWJEssay
Abstract
This article draws on #CivilAffairs support to US Special Operations Forces in #Afghanistan in maintaining a commander’s freedom of action by helping mitigate the unintended civil consequences of military operations. It examines consequence management as part of a broader process of assessment, culturally informed engagement, coordination, and command involvement. This article also argues that lessons learned from Afghanistan remain relevant to future operations, where anticipating and responding to civil consequences can help prevent tactical actions from creating subsequent operational constraints.
Michael Schmitt and Ryan Goodman of @just_security argue that the U.S.-Russia diesel deal exposes the U.S. to legal responsibility, according to laws of war and even @DeptofWar's own doctrine.
In their view, you can’t argue that oil infrastructure is “war-sustaining” and therefore a lawful target in your own wars... but then call on Ukraine to avoid them, while you go and buy Russian diesel.
That would mean you’re supporting a belligerent’s war machine. And that, on paper, is illegal.
See our take in #TheDiscourse:
@rgoodlaw
smallwarsjournal.com/2026/10…
At AUSA 2026, @SecWar Pete Hegseth joined @SecArmy Adam Telle, @SECNAV Hung Cao, @SecAFOfficial Troy Meink, and Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Derek Anderson ( @ASWAndersonSOF) to outline #ProjectAgincourt.
@OwenWest91, chief executive of Project Agincourt, moderated.
Project Agincourt pushes funding, decisions, testing, and development to operators working directly with commercial builders. 🧵
@DeptofWar @DIU_x @AUSAorg #DroneWarfare #DroneDominance #DefenseIndustrialBase
Read more and watch the historical panel at the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting in Washington, held on October 14, 2026.
#AUSA2026 @secwar @DeptofWar @POTUS @AUSAorg
