Call me Dave

The 9/11 attacks were one of the greatest intelligence and policy failures in American history. Nineteen hijackers entered the country, trained in our flight schools and seized four airliners. Three struck their targets, killing nearly 3,000 people. But not every part of the system failed. One immigration inspector did his job and denied entry to a twentieth hijacker. His decision may have prevented a fourth target from being hit. Mohammed Kahtani was a 25 year old Saudi al-Qaeda operative, recruited for the September 11 attacks. He swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden, who personally selected him for the operation. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed prepared him for it, then sent him to obtain a new passport and visa for the United States. On August 4, 2001, Kahtani arrived at Orlando International Airport, posing as a tourist. He was intended to join the fourth hijacking team as the fifth hijacker aboard Flight 93. Waiting for him at the airport was Mohamed Atta, the tactical commander of the 9/11 operation inside the United States. At the immigration checkpoint, the primary inspector immediately found Kahtani unusual. In four years on the job, she had never encountered a Saudi who claimed to speak no English, and his forms were incomplete. And something about him made her feel uneasy. Unable to communicate with him properly, she referred him for secondary inspection. The man waiting in secondary inspection was José Meléndez-Pérez, a 26-year Army veteran with a decade of experience questioning travelers. Nothing in the government databases flagged Kahtani, and his documents appeared genuine. But his behavior immediately raised Meléndez’s suspicions. He was arrogant and hostile from the moment his name was called. Over the ninety minute interview, Kahtani’s answers kept changing. He first claimed someone was waiting upstairs, then said no one was meeting him. He had no return ticket or credit cards, and most of his $2,800 would be needed for the flight back to Dubai. When Meléndez asked why he had no return ticket, Kahtani pointed a finger in his face and said he did not know where he would go after leaving the United States. The answer reminded Meléndez of a hit man deliberately kept in the dark so he could reveal nothing if caught. Kahtani gave him the creeps, and Meléndez decided not to ignore it. Meléndez could not prove that Kahtani was dangerous. But the missing return ticket and implausible travel plans gave him grounds to deny entry as an intending immigrant. Turning away a Saudi was unusual and could bring repercussions. Another inspector warned Meléndez that he would get into trouble for refusing a Saudi national. “I have to do my job,” he replied. Meléndez secured his supervisor’s approval and sent him home. Meléndez’s decision to deny Kahtani entry left Flight 93 with only four terrorists, the smallest hijacking team on any of the planes and the only one that failed to reach its target. This was the flight whose passengers rushed the cockpit and fought to retake the plane, forcing the hijackers to crash in Pennsylvania, just 18 minutes flying time from Washington. A fifth trained man could have guarded the door, blocked the aisle or helped suppress the revolt. Kahtani’s absence left Flight 93’s team uniquely undermanned and may have helped the passengers prevent the plane from reaching its target.