Peter Kohanloo

Regime officials spared in the first war to keep negotiations alive may not survive the next, as the United States and Israel could wipe out entire layers of the Islamic Republic’s leadership. Hamzeh Safavi, the son of former IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, warns that the next attack could expand from targeting roughly 40 senior officials to eliminating between 1,000 and 1,500 members of the regime. He calls it the “lawnmower” strategy. The objective would no longer be limited to removing the Islamic Republic’s highest commanders. The campaign could move systematically through the regime’s provincial IRGC commanders, intelligence officials, Basij leaders and other functionaries responsible for maintaining control across Iran. Safavi considers this one of the most serious scenarios for the next phase of the war. Its purpose would be to paralyze the regime’s command structure and force it into absolute surrender. This is not a confirmed American or Israeli plan. It is a warning from a regime-connected figure that reveals how vulnerable the Islamic Republic now believes its entire governing class has become. Safavi admits that officials were caught off guard during the previous attacks. They did not believe the United States and Israel would locate and eliminate senior figures so quickly, freely and without hesitation. The next phase he fears would scale that model dramatically. Precision strikes could target officials as they move, meet and communicate. Cyber operations could disrupt command networks while simultaneous attacks on missile facilities and underground headquarters prevent surviving leaders from coordinating an effective response. Safavi also warns that missile cities and command centres buried between 60 and 120 metres underground could be targeted. Such an operation would likely require American bunker-busting weapons, sustained intelligence coverage and continued air superiority over Iran. The political calculation may also be changing. Earlier in the conflict, some officials were reportedly spared because the United States needed interlocutors capable of negotiating. Figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Abbas Araghchi retained value as channels through which a ceasefire or settlement could be reached. The “lawnmower” scenario assumes that restraint has ended. Instead of preserving negotiators, the next campaign could dismantle the governing layer that allows the Islamic Republic to repress unrest, mobilize loyalists and rebuild military power after every round of strikes. Eliminating 1,000–1,500 officials would be vastly more difficult than targeting several dozen senior leaders. The regime can disperse personnel, restrict communications, move officials underground and rapidly appoint replacements. Such an operation would also risk civilian casualties, retaliation and institutional fragmentation rather than an orderly surrender. But Safavi’s warning exposes the deeper crisis. The Islamic Republic built its deterrence around the assumption that its leaders, underground facilities and security hierarchy were beyond the enemy’s reach. The previous war shattered that assumption. Regime insiders are no longer debating whether senior officials can be reached. They are warning that the next campaign could move from leadership decapitation to the systematic destruction of the regime’s entire command structure. The Islamic Republic spent decades threatening to destroy its enemies. Its own elite is now discussing how much of the regime may survive the next attack.