Iran hosted Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials for de-escalation talks on October 26. That same day, Reuters reported that Tehran had supplied Hezbollah with tens of millions of dollars to rebuild its military capabilities. Lebanese sources described preparations involving explosives and attack drones. My starting point: any deal must stop Hezbollah from using the ceasefire to rearm. Israeli families deserve more than a pause between attacks. Put yourself at the negotiating table. What is the ONE condition you would demand before giving Tehran anything in return?

Apparently “protect journalists” comes with an asterisk: only the ones who tell the approved story about Israel. If the reporting is wrong, expose it. Publish the evidence. Demand corrections. Threatening prosecution over a disputed account of Gaza is intimidation dressed up as human rights. What happened to defending journalists’ right to challenge a narrative? Or does that principle disappear the moment the narrative being challenged is yours?

Women's rights, voting rights, representation... they are all here in Israel. What say you progressive left?

I listened to Call Me Back with Dan Senor this morning, as I do regularly, and recommend it to anyone interested in Israel and the Middle East. It was a strong episode, but this statement from Haaretz’s Dahlia Scheindlin (@dahliasc) deserves a direct challenge: "I do think that we need to admit and confront the fact that the era of restraint for Israel ended on October 7th. And to this day many Israelis think that what Israel is doing in Gaza is justified. I do think it will force a reckoning. There has been no restraint, the war is essentially ongoing and it has been disproportionate." Dahlia, “no restraint” is an extraordinary claim. It requires ignoring documented decisions to warn civilians, delay attacks, abandon targets, divert weapons, and suspend operations. Consider the record: • 100,000 evacuation phone calls. By March 31, 2024, the IDF reported approximately 100,000 calls, 9.3 million evacuation leaflets, 15.5 million text messages, and 17 million recorded messages. Those efforts required personnel, intelligence, resources, and advance disclosure of where military operations would occur. • Hours spent helping civilians evacuate. Gaza dentist Mahmoud Shaheen told the BBC that Israeli callers spent hours coordinating evacuations before strikes in al-Zahra in October 2023. He described requesting additional time and helping hundreds of neighbors leave. A Palestinian resident’s account documents the effort to get people out before buildings were struck. • Strikes cancelled when civilians appeared. In December 2023, the IDF published footage of attacks called off because civilians were present. This continued practices documented during the 2014 war, when surveillance crews described postponing or abandoning attacks over civilian risk. These precautions did not vanish on October 7. • A weapon diverted after launch. On September 7, 2026, Walla reported IDF footage showing a munition redirected during an attack the previous day after civilians gathered near the intended target. That is a recent, specific example of a military sacrificing an immediate strike opportunity to protect civilians. • Humanitarian pauses that reached almost 560,000 children. WHO documented daily, area-specific pauses enabling the September 2024 polio vaccination campaign. Those children were reached because military operations were constrained to permit the campaign. Those are concrete acts of restraint. “No restraint” cannot be reconciled with a record that includes attacks deliberately stopped to spare civilians. The casualty discussion also needs to reflect what the numbers actually say. On October 7, 2026, the Times of Israel reported approximately 74,200 deaths recorded by Gaza’s Health Ministry alongside the IDF’s reported total of more than 24,000 combatants killed inside Gaza. Using those published figures produces approximately 2.1 civilian deaths per combatant death—even counting every remaining death as civilian. Presenting the entire death toll as civilian deaths erases the fighters included in it. AP’s analysis of the Health Ministry’s own records also documented a changing demographic picture. Women and children’s cumulative share of fully identified deaths declined from 64% in late October 2023 to 54% by the end of April 2024. Among newly identified deaths in April, their share was 38%. AP reported that this shift coincided with reduced aerial bombardment and more limited operations. There have also been concrete corrections to the death lists. In April 2025, Sky News reported that 1,852 names had been removed since October, including people found alive and cases involving natural deaths. The ministry acknowledged that family submissions had previously entered the published list before judicial verification. Those reporting failures belong in the discussion, especially when casualty figures are used to support sweeping accusations against Israel. And Gaza must be discussed in the context of actual urban warfare. AP’s investigation estimated 9,000–11,000 civilian deaths in the battle for Mosul, including at least 3,200 attributed to Iraqi or coalition forces. Fighting an entrenched armed organization inside a city has produced devastating civilian losses in other modern campaigns, including those backed by the United States. Devastation alone does not establish an absence of restraint. “Disproportionate” has a specific meaning under the law governing attacks. It concerns whether expected civilian harm would be excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. It does not demand equal casualties between opposing sides, and a cumulative death toll does not perform that legal analysis. Dahlia, your assessment has to account for the warnings, the evacuation efforts, the cancelled strikes, the diverted weapons, and the operational pauses. Many of these have been reported on, and many we never hear about. Calling all of that “no restraint” erases deliberate decisions made to protect Palestinian civilians. A serious reckoning should begin with an accurate account of what happened. @dansenor @DanielBShapiro

What is he doing? I can't even tell what exactly was captured in this photo...

Where is the world's outrage? Where are the endless UN statements and resolutions?!

🇮🇱 Inside Israel Intel: Daily Strategic Brief 10/22/26 Iran’s shrinking oil cushion, Hamas’s threat, and the demands of Jewish security 🧭 The strategic picture Iran has reportedly exhausted the offshore oil stockpile that helped sustain its sales despite the American blockade. Meanwhile, Ynet reports that Hamas conveyed a threat to repeat October 7 through a UN intermediary, and an Israeli security official says Hezbollah is rebuilding military capabilities in Lebanon. Meanwhile in NYC, London, and elsewhere across Europe antisemitic attacks continue. 🌍 1. Iran’s financial pressure is growing. Its capacity to cause harm remains. The Wall Street Journal, citing Kpler tracking, reports that Iranian crude stored in Asian waters was depleted by mid-October. Those inventories had supported sales while the blockade restricted replenishment. On October 21, Treasury sanctioned additional businesses and vessels it accused of facilitating Iranian trade and sanctions evasion. Saudi authorities reported two people killed and eight injured in an October 21 attack at Dammam’s King Fahd airport. The Houthis claimed responsibility on October 22. Separately, Kpler estimates showed non-Iranian regional oil exports recovering to prewar levels in the week ending October 18, before the latest attacks. My assessment: Washington should maintain the pressure and require verified concessions before substantial relief. Exhausting offshore inventories reduces Iran’s cushion; it does not establish imminent insolvency or regime collapse. Protecting Gulf partners helps sustain that pressure by limiting the damage attackers can inflict on the coalition. The export recovery shows that disruption can be overcome. Giving Tehran renewed income while leaving its nuclear and military threats unresolved would squander the leverage now being created. 🎯 2. Hamas’s reported threat demands enforced disarmament. Ynet reported October 22 that Hamas officials told UN humanitarian coordinator Ramiz Alakbarov last week that they were prepared to repeat an October 7-style attack wherever an opportunity arose, including Israel, the West Bank and abroad. According to the report, Alakbarov relayed the warning to Israel’s military liaison chief on October 21. Independent public confirmation from the UN or the liaison office is not yet available. In an October 22 interview, Netanyahu said he expected the IDF would ultimately have to finish disarming Hamas. That states his expectation; it does not announce an operation. My assessment: Hamas carried out October 7. A reported threat to repeat it must be treated with the seriousness that history demands. Israel should never again be asked to base its security on the assumption that Hamas will choose restraint. Disarmament cannot depend on Hamas volunteering to surrender its power. The objective must be to dismantle its military infrastructure, interrupt its financing and weapons supply, and prevent it from retaining the coercive control needed to recruit and rebuild. The report does not establish an imminent attack. It does reinforce the case against any arrangement that preserves Hamas as an armed authority. Mediators need to explain who will enforce disarmament, with what powers and what consequences for refusal. 🛡️ 3. Lebanon must deliver Hezbollah’s disarmament. Israel cannot live on assurances. An Israeli security official told Walla on October 21 that Hezbollah was rebuilding military capabilities in Beirut and Tyre, alongside continuing infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The report also said the Lebanese Army had recently discovered a Hezbollah tunnel near Beirut. The broader rebuilding claims remain attributed to the Israeli official. Lebanese military sources told The New Arab that the Tampa discussions had produced no breakthrough, with disagreement over direct coordination and third-party verification. No official concluding readout was available at the cutoff. My assessment: Lebanon’s government must be held responsible for ending Hezbollah’s independent military power. Discovering a tunnel is useful only if it leads to dismantling the network behind it. Moving weapons farther from Israel’s border cannot qualify as disarmament. Beirut cannot credibly claim restored sovereignty while Hezbollah retains the ability to decide when Lebanon goes to war. International assistance and diplomatic concessions should be tied to verified weapons removal, access to suspected sites and action against rebuilding. Israel should condition withdrawal on demonstrated security gains. Lebanon’s inability or unwillingness to enforce its commitments cannot become an obligation for Israelis to accept another armed buildup across their border. Effective enforcement also serves Lebanese citizens by ending Hezbollah’s power to drag their country into war. ✡️ 4. New York and London must confront the lies that make Jews targets. A visibly Jewish man was attacked from behind in Manhattan’s Diamond District on October 21 and hospitalized in stable condition. The NYPD’s hate-crime investigators were involved; the motive had not been established. London’s Metropolitan Police confirmed that a man appeared in court October 21 charged with assaulting three Jewish women on October 19. He was remanded in custody, and police increased local patrols. My assessment: New York and London owe Jews more than extra patrols after an assault. Their leaders, schools and public institutions must neither amplify misinformation nor lend legitimacy to narratives that portray Jews as collectively guilty or deserving of hostility. That means challenging false allegations, correcting them prominently and refusing to excuse intimidation as political activism. A city cannot credibly promise Jewish safety while its institutions give authority to ideas used to demonize Jews. My standard is explicit: Zionism is core to Judaism, and uniquely vilifying it is classic antisemitism. Israel and Zion are embedded in Jewish religion, history and peoplehood. Jewish national self-determination cannot be treated as inherently sinister, or something Jews must renounce to earn acceptance. Condemnations afterward are inadequate if that underlying problem goes unchallenged. 🗳️ Israel’s election security Israeli reporting describes intelligence that Iran or its proxies may seek to influence the election through an attack, while military briefings distinguish that concern from a specific warning of an imminent strike. Separately, the Shin Bet reported removing foreign influence profiles; that does not establish compromised voting systems. My assessment: Security agencies need the resources and freedom to act on credible threats. Public warnings should accurately reflect the intelligence so voters can make decisions without either complacency or manufactured panic. 🔎 What to watch: the next 24–72 hours Iran and the Gulf: Replacement Iranian cargoes, verified export interruptions or significant new sanctions enforcement would show whether economic pressure is tightening or being circumvented. Gaza: Official confirmation of the reported Hamas warning and concrete decisions assigning responsibility for disarmament would clarify both the threat and the response. Lebanon: A Tampa readout specifying inspection access, weapons removal and consequences for violations would reveal whether negotiations are producing enforceable commitments. Jewish safety: Investigative findings in Manhattan and developments in the London prosecution should clarify individual responsibility and whether further protective measures are needed.

The United States has quietly reduced troop levels at bases in Jordan, Qatar and Kuwait, NBC News reports, as Washington protects personnel while weighing military options against Iran. The Wall Street Journal separately reports that some troops have been moved off regional bases and out of harm’s way.

Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 21 that Iran is again trying to develop nuclear weapons. Speaking at an IDF officers’ graduation ceremony, he described toppling Iran’s regime as his directive to the IDF, Mossad and other security agencies.

Israeli forces detained Jewish U.S. congressional candidate Brad Lander and dozens of other volunteers during an olive harvest near Nahalin in the West Bank on October 21. The IDF says the harvest near Beitar Illit lacked required advance coordination and that the landowner was given contacts to arrange another date. Organizers say the volunteers were accompanying Palestinian farmers. Reuters reports that Lander had since been released.

🇮🇱 Inside Israel Intel: The Daily Strategic Brief October 21, 2026 | 9:02 a.m. EDT Iran’s demands, the widening cost of regional insecurity, and Israel’s unfinished security tasks 🧭The strategic picture The central question this morning is whether military and economic pressure is producing durable security gains. Tehran is demanding relief while insisting on retaining its enriched material. Netanyahu has publicly defined success as bringing down Iran’s regime. Washington continues to welcome mediation while insisting Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons. Those positions leave major questions about an acceptable settlement unresolved. Meanwhile, shipping incidents and Britain’s expanded support for Saudi Arabia show how broadly regional insecurity is being felt. America’s diesel shortage adds another consequence: pressure to ease restrictions on Russian fuel. My assessment is that endurance increasingly matters alongside military capability. Israel and its partners need arrangements that prevent enemies from rebuilding, while sustaining the economic and political capacity to enforce them. That connects the Iran negotiations, the dispute over Hezbollah disarmament, and continuing operations against Hamas. Israel is also entering the final week before its election, with soldiers beginning to vote today. 📰What you need to know 🇮🇷1. Iran wants relief first. The unresolved question is what it would surrender afterward. 📌The facts On October 20, Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei told Pakistan’s army chief that Iran would retain all its enriched nuclear material. Iranian leaders also demanded sanctions and blockade relief before renewed negotiations. These are Tehran’s stated conditions, not a verified account of its stockpile’s condition or accessibility. At Tel Hai University that day, Netanyahu called eliminating Iran’s regime Israel’s primary objective and said he had discussed it with President Trump. That establishes Netanyahu’s position, not American endorsement. Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio welcomed mediation by Qatar and Pakistan while reiterating that an agreement must prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The Times of Israel 🔎My assessment Tehran is trying to make economic concessions the entrance fee for negotiations while protecting a central bargaining asset. Granting substantial relief before enforceable nuclear restrictions would reduce American leverage precisely when it is needed most. The allied question is equally important. Preventing a nuclear weapon, dismantling proxies and missile programs, and bringing down a regime require different commitments, resources and definitions of success. Israel needs clarity about what Washington will enforce and what Israel must be prepared to do itself. Continued mediation means a negotiated outcome remains possible. The evidence that would change my assessment is a verifiable change in Iran’s nuclear position, with inspection and enforcement arrangements. Another meeting, by itself, would tell us little. 🚢2. Regional insecurity is imposing military costs and changing America’s economic choices. 📌The facts UK Maritime Trade Operations reported two tanker incidents: one near Iraq’s Al Faw at 2:30 p.m. EDT on October 20, and another near Oman’s Bukha at 9:45 p.m. EDT. A fire on the latter vessel was extinguished; both crews were reported safe. Neither notice identified the attacker, but it is safe to assume Iran is behind both. Britain announced additional Saudi support on October 20, including defensive Typhoon missions. Its expanded refueling assistance also supports Saudi operations against Houthi military targets. Separately, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia signed a defense cooperation accord today covering production, training and research, not mutual defense. These measures operate on different timelines: immediate protection and longer-term capacity. The American connection is concrete. Russia’s deputy prime minister said today that a 40,000-ton diesel cargo would depart for the United States on October 22; departure has not been verified. An October 9 Treasury license authorized specified Russian-diesel transactions through April 7, 2027. The vulnerability predates these latest shipping incidents: September US East Coast distillate inventories were 32 percent below their seasonal five-year average, according to the Energy Information Administration. Reuters 🔎My assessment Disruption creates leverage when governments must absorb higher defense costs and pressure on household and industrial energy supplies. The Russian fuel arrangement exposes a strategic tradeoff. Washington has a legitimate interest in relieving shortages, but reopening commercial opportunities for Moscow can weaken economic pressure on another adversary. Its value should be judged by additional supply actually delivered and inventories restored. Let us also not forget that Iran and Russia are strategic allies and relief for Russia may eventually end up aiding the Iranians as well. 🛡️3. Lebanon and Gaza remain unfinished security problems as Israel begins voting. 📌The facts Israeli, Lebanese and American military representatives began talks in Tampa on October 20. Hezbollah disarmament and Israeli operations remain disputed. That day, the IDF released footage it said showed Hezbollah removing weapons from a site the Lebanese Army had reported addressing. The Lebanese Army offered a specific competing chronology: it said work had stopped under Israeli threats, with the monitoring mechanism informed that weapons remained, and that clearance was completed October 16. It dated the truck-strike footage to July 3. In Gaza, Israel announced today that an October 18 strike killed Hamas operative Musa Hamouda, whom the IDF and Shin Bet linked to an attack that killed four soldiers and to renewed operational activity. 🔎My assessment The Lebanon dispute goes directly to what would make an agreement safe for northern Israel: demonstrable removal of Hezbollah’s military capacity and a mechanism that detects its return. The monitoring records matter. If they substantiate Lebanon’s chronology, the allegation concerning this site needs reassessment. If they establish premature clearance claims, further withdrawal requires stronger safeguards as this would be a return to the historical issues behind UNIFIL lead disarmament. Israel’s security interest is served only by an accurate operational picture. Frankly the same can be said for Lebanon in terms of being freed from Hezbollah. Gaza presents a related challenge. Removing experienced operatives disrupts attacks, but eliminations do not establish that Hamas has lost its ability to recruit, command or rebuild. Those are the measures of lasting progress and have yet to be seen through. ✡️4. Antisemitism policy must recognize the Jewish connection to Israel. 📌The facts An October 20 preview of Sir David Bell’s review of antisemitism in English schools reported 27 recommendations, including encouraging the IHRA definition and improving teaching about contemporary Judaism. The full recommendations and government response could not be verified by this edition’s cutoff, so a definitive assessment remains premature. An American case illustrates the issue. An October 15 complaint against Maryland’s Montgomery County Public Schools, publicized October 19 and followed by a district response October 20, alleges that an Orthodox Jewish student faced threats and exclusion as a “Zionist,” including after announcing plans to study in Israel. The complaint acknowledges protective measures but says they failed to restore full participation. 🔎My assessment My test is explicit: does the policy recognize that Zionism is core to Judaism, and that uniquely vilifying it is classic antisemitism? Israel and Zion are embedded in Jewish religion, history and peoplehood. Zionism expresses Jewish national self-determination. That connection cannot be treated as something Jews must renounce to be accepted in school or public life. Canada’s IHRA handbook provides useful substantive guidance on Jewish identity and discriminatory denial of Jewish self-determination. Training and complaint procedures matter, but their content determines their value. If a school recognizes antisemitism only when it uses familiar Nazi imagery, while overlooking discriminatory exclusion expressed through “Zionist,” it leaves a central vulnerability unaddressed. Bell’s published recommendations should be judged against that standard. 👀What to watch: the next 24–72 hours 🇮🇷Iran: Any concrete change on enriched material, inspections or the sequencing of relief. That would distinguish bargaining movement from repeated positions. This is very unlikely prior to elections. 🇱🇧Lebanon: A Tampa outcome specifying verification, access and consequences for violations. Those details determine whether withdrawals can produce durable security. 🚢Shipping and fuel: Verified additional attacks, changes in vessel movements, and confirmation of the proposed Russian cargo’s departure. Actual flows will test the economic response. 🗳️Israel: Documented threats to polling or changes to election security arrangements. Elevated readiness alone does not establish an imminent attack. ✡️Jewish safety: Bell’s full recommendations and government response, specifically their treatment of Zionism, Jewish identity and discriminatory exclusion. If you appreciate this report, please share and comment. Your engagement makes it possible for me to continue providing this kind of information. Thanks and stay safe!

The IDF says 40 of the 42 Chabad men detained at Ben Gurion Airport on October 20 have agreed to enlist. Thirteen who initially refused subsequently signed commitments, joining 27 who had already agreed. All 40 received suspended sentences. Two others were jailed for prolonged draft evasion. Agreement to enlist does not mean they have begun serving.